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Traditionally, among the various functions assigned to the public sector, it is primarily responsible for 
providing citizens with a set of public services (such as health, education or welfare) and for constructing 
basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, etc.). There are three main economic reasons for these 
public interventions. The first reason is market failure, as the private sector is normally not interested in 
these types of services or projects because it may take too long to recuperate the heavy initial 
investments. Second, these interventions are usually regarded as a public good (see for instance (Arrow, 
1970; Arrow & Lind, 1970)). Third, providing infrastructure to the community generates positive 
economic and political externalities. 
These positive externalities are most often the motivation behind which the project is decided, and not its 
profitability or financial value. These are the benefits of a social order, such as reduced illiteracy, 
improved health conditions in the population or fewer accidents. While all this has an economic value, 
that value may not always be financially expressed and is not always reflected by revenues directly 
associated with the project.  
There is a vast body of economic literature on externalities from public sector intervention and 
investments. The impact of the role of government and public investment in development and economic 
growth (Barro, 1988) or externalities and taxes as a form of financing public expenditure (Mayeres & 
Proost, 1997) have been widely discussed. Regarding economic growth, public investment can have two 
effects: an impact on the GDP, through macroeconomic rates of return and public investment, can induce 
more or less private investment (the crowding in-out effect
1
) (Afonso & st. Aubyn, 2009). This last effect 
causes, on one hand, an increase in public spending that reduces the amount of credit available to the 
private sector (either by taxes or debt); however, on the other hand, by making available relevant 
infrastructures, better conditions are created for private sector operations.  
Infrastructural investments produce positive externalities that affect the society as a whole. This occurs 
when the actions of firms or consumers impose costs or confer benefits on third parties, which the firms 
or the consumers fail to take into account when choosing their actions (Brealey, Cooper, & Habib, 1997). 
Often it is argued that infrastructures lower fixed costs, attracting companies and factors of production 
and thereby increasing production (De Haan, Romp, & Sturm, 2008). This way, infrastructures may have 
a significant impact on private sector productivity. 
Another example is that building a road will reduce the travel time of people and goods while 
simultaneously reducing the accident rate and having a positive impact on the level and quality of life of 
                                                          
1
 This refers to whether public investment is productive and contributes positively to growth, either directly or 
indirectly via private investment decisions. Public investment may induce private investment, directing the attention 
to increases in the productivity of private capital resulting from the accumulation of public capital through public 




people who use that route. On the contrary, this intervention can lead to more traffic, thereby yielding a 
negative externality: more pollution. However, neither outcome has a direct financial impact on the road, 
which can be measured. Public projects should account for not only the financial revenues and costs but 
also the benefits of each project, including externalities and other non-market impacts. 
Additionally the public sector must guarantee universal access to certain types of goods and services, 
such as health and education. Otherwise, burdening citizens directly for these costs would cause the 
exclusion of a portion of the population. The infrastructure also presents the reason that, in the case of a 
high investment, the profitability can only be long-term and, as such, is difficult to implement by the 
private sector. Moreover, investment and provision of these services is crucial to economic development, 
well-being and quality of life, as well as for the correction of inequalities and asymmetries, whether social 
or regional. 
Despite the public sector role, over the last two decades, the private sector has emerged has an actor in 
these fields (particularly in building and operating infrastructures). During the past 20 years, various 
governments (at the central, regional or local level) were replacing part of the traditional public 
investment through the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A recent study by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) indicates that in 2009, there were more than 1,500 in Europe PPPs, with a 
cumulative investment of € 250 billion. PPPs have become increasingly used by governments, with two 
main objectives: address the infrastructure gap or the population’s need for public services (under the 
budgetary constraints) and bring to these projects and services the private sector’s higher level of 
efficiency (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002b, 2005a, 2005b).  
Therefore, we can conclude from the literature and practice that the PPPs’ main objective is to create 
Value for Money (VfM). VfM provides the same quantity and quality of services at a lower overall cost 
(i.e., the whole-life cost required to meet the user´s requirements) (Ball, Heafey & King, 2007). Fitzgerald 
(2004) argues that VfM can be delivered through risk transfer, innovation, greater asset utilisation, and 
integrated whole-life management. Debande (2002) and (Quiggin, 2005) add that the benefits of PPPs 
should compensate for the additional costs of recurring to private sector financing because, traditionally, 
the public sector faces a low cost of debt (the risk free rate). Returning to the externalities of public 
investments, how should these positives (and negatives) be addressed in cases where the investment is 
made under a Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)? It could be argued that if the government is pursuing 
developing the project, then the way the project is developed and financed is neutral in terms of 
externalities. This way, we separate the investment decision from the public decision, even for public 
investments. However, it could also be argued that due to budgetary constraints, if the project were not 
developed under a PPP scheme, it would not be developed; consequently, there is some argument to 
account for the externalities in the PPP value. Externalities of various types (e.g., environmental side-
effects) may require some form of regulation but does not rule out the private supply of the infrastructure 




However, PPPs are often criticised as an ‘off-budget temptation’ for governments (especially when fiscal 
constraints are binding). PPPs can enable governments to make public investments and postpone the 
expenditures without compromising the current budget and debt. For the last several years, there has been 
extensive discussion in the European Union, whether public investment should count for the budget 
deficit threshold established under the Maastricht Treaty.  
Other criticisms on PPPs have been raised: (i) the real levels of enhanced efficiency (Glaister, 1999); (ii) 
the level of accountability of PPPs ( Broadbent, 2003; Froud, 2003; Asenova & Beck, 2010); (iii) the 
efficient government management of the (unavoidable) problem of incomplete contracting (Blanc-
Brude  H. Goldsmith & T. Valila, 2006, 2009); and (iv) the level of VfM generation for the public sector 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002a, 2005b). 
Why study PPPs and Project Finance? Despite the relevance of this topic, there is very little research in 
the economic and finance field. This gap between practitioners and theory must be addressed and means a 
requirement for understanding this phenomenon from a finance perspective: what are PPPs and project 
finance, how they create value for the public and private sectors, and how they are structured and 
financed. 
As for each project, a specific PPP company is created (SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle), which has 
several characteristics relevant for economic and finance studies: it is possible to observe the 
determinants and impacts of decisions in a more transparent and clear way (Esty, 2004). The author states 
that the fact that the project companies are standalone entities allows researchers to more easily observe 
the structure details and the performance outcomes. Additionally, the high leverage, the complexity of the 
operation, the relatively small number of shareholders, the dividend policy of not being allowed to 
reinvest in other businesses, and the debt priority and interest rates differ from Corporate Finance 
principles.  
Therefore, and despite the increased research over the past years, this is still a most unexplored subject. 
We expect research on PPPs to increase substantially over the next years, not only as the projects already 
undergoing tend to mature but also by expansion of the concepts beyond Europe, becoming a worldwide 
phenomenon. 
Why study PPPs using the Portuguese case? Since 1993, Portugal has been using PPPs intensively, 
mainly for highway construction and in the health sector. Portugal has used PPPs to build an extensive 
highway network. This network has increased by 700% between 1990 and 2007, similar to Ireland 
(+900%) and Greece (+500%) (Cruz & Marques, 2011). By 2012, Portugal had constructed 2,700 km of 
highways aiming to reach 4,000 km by 2014. This places Portugal among the countries with the highest 
density of highways in Europe. 
According to the European Investment Bank (EIB), Portugal was responsible for 3% of a total of 1,340 




for approximately 1% of Europe’s GDP, further calculations by (Sarmento & Reis, 2012) show that 
Portugal leads in the use of PPPs across Europe. 
As one of the leading countries using PPPs, the Portuguese experience is impressive, relevant, and an 
interesting study subject. However, there has been little discussion and research, with only a few studies 
published: (De Lemos, 2004; Monteiro, 2005; Sarmento, 2010; Basílio, 2011; Cruz, 2011; Cruz & 
Marques, 2013 a, b and Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). 
Thirty-five PPP projects were launched in four sectors: roads (22), railway (2), health (10) and security 
(1). In total, €20 billion was invested between 1995 and 2014 with the road sector accounting for almost 
94% of this investment and railways and health representing 3% each. The future payments due by the 
state to honour these contracts are estimated to represent an annual effort of a little above 0.5% of GDP 
until 2030, but between 2014 and 2020, these payments will amount to 1% of GDP. Using the 6% legal 
discount rate that is used by the public sector to evaluate projects, the payments for 2014 and beyond have 
a net present value of approximately 12% of the current Portuguese GDP. 
Along with the heavy value burden of PPP contracts for the public sector, one must also consider the 
extremely rapid pace with which these many contracts were set up. This was done without necessarily 
ensuring that the administration was capable of managing them all. The novelty of the experience, added 
to the fact that the governments were not prepared for the level of complexity some of these contracts 
introduced, led to some questionable decisions. Doubts about whether PPPs represent value-for-money 
have emerged for the Portuguese case. There are several reasons why the PPPs were unsuccessful: (i) the 
concentration of PPP projects was very high over a limited time span, and the public sector was not 
prepared and did not have the ability to manage and control the contracts; (ii) the motive to resort to PPPs 
was mainly to avoid budget constraints rather than to use public resources better by taking advantage of 
private sector efficiency; (iii) the risk allocation between the private and public sector was flawed because 
the private sector bore too little risk, and payments from the public to the private sector were considerably 
above the investment cost.  
Despite the enormous effort over the last 20 years to close the infrastructure gap, Portugal still needs to 
continue to invest in certain areas, such as health, water, and sanitation or railways. As tight budgetary 
restrictions will last for at least another decade, governments will continue to use PPPs. In Portuguese-
speaking countries (Brazil, Angola or Mozambique), the Portuguese experience could be an interesting 
example to improve upon (Basílio, 2011). 
Because of the large number of projects, PPP research in Portugal is expected to grow in the future. In 
particular, the abnormal frequency of renegotiations deserves more interest, as does the PPPs’ efficiency 
relative to other forms of public procurement. Especially for the health sector, contract analysis, 
accountability, and risk analysis should be examined in order to generate policy recommendations. An 
international comparison with other countries, particularly those also in a difficult budgetary situation 




The five chapters of this thesis examine several PPP aspects.  
The first chapter (co-authored with Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog) is a literature review on risk allocation, 
valuation and VfM, using some examples from the Portuguese experience. This paper reviews the 
principles and fundaments of risk from either the government or academic perspective. We reach the 
conclusion that although risk allocation is considered a key aspect in VfM, academics are sceptical if the 
PPPs evaluated had created VfM as the governments reached opposite conclusions.  
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog) uses a case-study methodology to review the PPP 
life cycle. We address several issues including the following: from the public sector perspective, how are 
PPPs different from public procurement and privatisation? Additionally, what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs, and how do they interact with one another—with some advantages leading to 
possible disadvantages. From the private sector perspective, we show how PPPs and Project Finance 
differ from the traditional firms and the Corporate Finance principles, in terms of company structure, 
finance, shareholders and dividend policy. Finally, the two case studies also address a crucial issue in 
PPPs: renegotiations. By using these two cases, we introduce the subject of study in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3 (also co-authored with Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog) describes the Portuguese experience in PPP 
renegotiations. Using a data panel of 254 renegotiation events, we are able to determine which sector, 
project, political, legal and economic variables affect the likelihood of renegotiation, the renegotiation 
motive and the duration of each event. There is some evidence of opportunistic bidding leading to more 
renegotiations, as PPPs in the operational stage are also more likely to renegotiate. Moreover, majority 
governments appear to be more prone to renegotiate, although political cycles (defined by the nearby of 
elections) appear to have no effect. A better institutional framework, defined as a low country risk, a 
strong rule of law, and lower corruption, tends to reduce the probability of renegotiations. There is also 
evidence that during periods of higher corruption, more renegotiations occur. 
Chapter 4 (co-authored with Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog and Prof. Dr. Pedro Verga Matos, from 
ISEG/Lisbon) addresses the PPP efficiency by using seven highway projects and the Malmquist index 
efficiency model. Not only is there evidence of poor management due to a lack of competitive pressure, 
but the increased use of outsourcing in these companies has also increased inefficiencies. The 
introduction of tolls and the outburst of the economic crises in Portugal have substantially reduced traffic, 
further contributing to inefficiency. Finally, the local context, such as highways in low-income areas and 
rural regions with a lower traffic density affect PPP highway performance. 
Finally, chapter 5 (co-authored with Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog) addresses the public sector efficiency in 
building infrastructures by public procurement. There is a clear relationship between the public sector 
efficiency in infrastructure projects and PPPs. To achieve VfM, the PPP costs must be below the public 
sector costs. This is determined by using the Public Sector Comparator (PSC). According to (Sarmento, 
2010), the PSC is based on estimates of full costs, revenues and risks, set out in cash flow terms, 




with the discounted value of payments (along with risks and costs retained by the public sector) to the 
private supplier. The public sector comparator is therefore the financial difference between the two 
procurement options for the same project (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). As the public sector tends to be less 
efficient than the private sector, it is necessary to have realistic and reliable values of how inefficient the 
public sector will be, in either construction or operational costs. This chapter addresses the first stage of 
projects (the construction costs). 
We analyse the cost overruns and identify which project, political, legal and economic variables can 
affect the size and the probability of a public project having cost overruns. Using a sample of 243 public 
projects, we found that the average cost deviation amounts to 24%. Large projects, which are often more 
complex, have a longer duration, are subject to higher risk, and have a higher cost deviation and a higher 
probability of cost overruns. Local and regional governments appear to control costs better than the 
central government does. Cost overruns are more likely in election years, as politicians seem eager to 
conclude infrastructural investments, and consequently, they inaugurate a new service to harvest political 
goodwill with the population. Over time, cost deviations are reduced due to other factors, such as more 
experience or increased fiscal constraints. Less corruption reduces not only the level of deviations but 
also the probability of cost overruns. 
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Chapter 1  
Public-Private Partnerships: Risk Allocation and Value for Money 
 
ABSTRACT:  
This paper addresses the allocation and valuation of public-private partnerships (PPPs), by reviewing the 
literature and using the Portuguese case to provide some practical examples. First, the paper discusses why 
governments pursue PPPs and how value for money (VfM) is achieved. Second, the paper reviews the principles 
of risk allocation and valuation from an academic and public sector perspective. Both the private and public 
sector consider risk allocation to be a critical issue with respect to PPPs and VfM generation, although 
governments adopt a less complex approach to risk measurement. This paper analyses papers, case-studies, and 
reports concerning VfM from PPPs and concludes that, from an academic perspective, the majority of PPPs do 
not create VfM (government reports usually reach the opposite conclusion).  
 
KEYWORDS: Public-Private Partnerships; Risk; Risk Allocation; Value for Money 




Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasing in number worldwide and are used to build and 
manage large public infrastructure projects. PPPs enable countries, especially those with significant 
fiscal constraints, to initiate public asset construction while decreasing the fiscal burden during the 
investment phase (although this burden may increase at a later stage). PPPs incorporate private sector 
expertise and superior management to public sector projects with the aim of achieving higher levels of 
efficiency. However, concern exists with respect to the efficient use of public money in PPPs. There is 
debate surrounding the efficiency of PPPs in the realm of public procurement and, specifically, the 
value for money (VfM) effect of PPPs in the public sector. 
VfM is defined in the literature as private sector services provided at a lower cost than the same 
quality and quantity of services provided by the public sector. The lower costs offered by private 
companies are achieved from greater efficiency (at least when compared to public organisations). Prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis, private sector finance costs were higher than the risk-free rate that the 
public sector traditionally applied. PPPs will only create VfM if there is private sector efficiency that 
sufficiently compensates for the price difference between the project´s weighted-average cost of 
capital (WACC) and the risk-free rate (Rf). The efficiency advantage from the private sector affects 




fewer delays, and reduced budget overruns. The efficiency advantage stems from the allocation and 
management of risk. Transferred risk is better managed by the private sector; therefore, costs are lower 
than they would be if managed by a public entity. Hence, the allocation of risk and appropriate risk 
valuation models are critical issues for PPPs. 
This paper will address four questions. (i) How is risk allocated in PPPs? (ii) How is risk valued? (iii) 
Do PPPs create VfM? (iv) Is risk allocation essential to create VfM? With respect to the first question, 
risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage them and to achieve an optimal risk 
allocation. Determining how to achieve an optimal risk allocation is complex to verify; however, only 
an optimal risk allocation reduces costs and effectively manages incentives so that a PPP will generate 
VfM. In relation to the second question concerning risk valuation, our survey shows that studies and 
analyses are recent and limited in number. Although academics (unlike governments) use advanced 
research techniques (mainly value-at-risk (VaR), cash-flow-at-risk (CFaR), and real option analysis), 
research studies are few and limited in scope. Therefore, further analyses are required, and more 
detailed techniques must be considered. Our survey also shows that governments use basic tools to 
value risks. With the exception of South Korea (which uses a Black-Scholes model), most countries 
rely on value sensitivity analysis based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or the equity risk 
premium. Despite frequent use of Monte-Carlo simulations, we believe that a government qualitative 
approach ought to be complemented with more quantitative analyses. The risk assessment from the 
government perspective remains limited and may be a result of inexperience in the public sector, a 
lack of knowledge, or insufficient data.  
We conclude, despite the limited literature, that both academics and practitioners unanimously agree 
that risk is fundamental for VfM; however, their agreement ends here. Most academic studies show 
that PPPs projects do not generate VfM. We demonstrate that academic papers focus on five main 
points of criticism, all of which are related to risk. Contrastingly, the majority of government reports 
conclude that PPPs create VfM, although some of these reports have obvious pitfalls. We provide 
evidence that government reports are biased in favour of PPPs and present possible explanations. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the PPP concepts, VfM, and 
private sector efficiency. Section 3 reviews the academic literature and government guidelines on the 
allocation and valuation of risks. Additionally, this section provides insights on the risk-related 
behaviour of the different PPP parties and how the individual parties manage controversial risk. This 
section addresses the first and second research questions (i.e. how risk is allocated and valuated). 
Section 4 reviews relevant papers, case studies, and government reports concerning VfM and risks and 
addresses the last two research questions: Do PPPs create VfM, and is risk allocation crucial in this 





2. The concept of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
2.1 What are PPPs? 
 
A PPP has been defined as ‘an agreement where the public sector enters into long-term contractual 
agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of public sector 
infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services (using infrastructure 
facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a public sector entity’ (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2002, pg. 248).  
However, there are many definitions of a PPP in the literature.
1
 The ambiguity exists because PPPs are 
a recent phenomenon (the first PPPs appeared in the UK in the early 1990s) and governments 
worldwide have taken different approaches to PPPs. Using the dimensions of control, funding, and 
ownership, Zarco-Jasso (2005) identify eight types of PPPs. PPPs are substantially different from full 
privatisation and, according to Vega (1997), the difference lies in the transfer of risk. In a 
privatisation, all risks are transferred to the private sector, whereas some risk from a PPP is retained by 
the public sector. Moreover, contractual arrangements are the core of PPPs (Demirag & Khadaroo, 
2008) and extend over finite (but long) periods.  
PPPs are mechanisms that blend traditional procurement and full privatisation (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005a). Boardman (2010) notes that PPPs combine government control and ownership with access to 
private sector efficiency and capital. In a PPP, the private sector is responsible for constructing, partial 
financing, asset operations, and the service provision. Despite intensive use, it remains unclear 
whether PPPs lead to more efficient use of public resources; however, the ‘infrastructure gap’ implies 
that the long-term global prospects for PPPs remain strong. Understanding government motivation in 
the use of PPPs and their ability to enhance public sector efficiency is valuable for future PPP success. 
 
2.2 Why do governments use PPPs? 
 
Governments have increasingly employed PPPs in the last few decades to finance and manage 
complex operations. The additional private sector involvement has caused a reduction in public sector 
investment in new and old infrastructure development. Governments expect that private sector 
management enables a better allocation and a more efficient use of public resources. However, despite 
the intensive use of PPPs, their effectiveness is not unequivocal. Debande (2002) states that PPPs use 
private capital to build infrastructure, which may not otherwise be possible without private funds 
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because of significant government budget constraints. Another advantage to PPPs is that public 
authorities can focus on strategic priorities and rely on the private sector to manage operations. This 
provides comparative advantage in terms of efficiency (provided the private sector has incentive). The 
main benefit of PPPs is private sector efficiency (from higher quality management) and a reduction in 
construction and operational cost deviations.  
However, PPPs are often criticised as an ‘off-budget temptation’ for governments (especially when 
fiscal constraints are binding). PPPs can enable governments to make public investments and postpone 
the expenditures without compromising current budget and debt. However, PPPs can dilute political 
control over decision-making in the public sector. Bovaird (2004) argues that PPPs can undermine 
competition. Still, whether that issue is related to the structure of PPPs or the fact that the sectors in 
which PPPs are set up are low-competition is unclear. Other criticisms on PPPs have been raised: (i) 
the real levels of enhanced efficiency (Glaister, 1999); (ii) the level of accountability of PPPs ( 
Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003; Froud, 2003; Asenova & Beck, 2010); (iii) the efficient government 
management of the (unavoidable) problem of incomplete contracting (Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith, & 
Valila, 2006) and, (iv) the level of VfM generation for the public sector (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 
2005b).  
This study addresses concerns with two fundamental questions: (i) Should the PPP be on or off the 
public sector balance sheet? (ii) Do PPPs yield VfM?  
 
2.3 Should the PPP be on or off the public sector balance sheet? 
 
Infrastructure development typically has two stages: construction and operation. The majority of 
infrastructure requires high levels of investments but low levels of annual operating and maintenance 
costs. Using highways in Portugal during the last 15 years, as an example, Sarmento (2010) finds that 
construction costs amounted to between €3,000,000 and €7,000,000 per km, whereas annual operating 
and maintenance costs were approximately €75,000 per km. This shows that the majority of the PPP 
financial outlay occurs in the first four or five years, during the construction stage. Therefore, 
accounting for this phase in the public budget is a key issue. 
In traditional procurement, the investment is a public expenditure because it is recognised at the 
moment of payment, which affects the deficit and the national debt. In contrast, the majority of 
Eurozone countries consider the PPP as an off-balance sheet operation. Investments are considered as 
private because long-term construction and availability, or demand risk, are transferred to the private 
sector. Investments are not considered in the deficit and the debt during the construction years, placing 
the government in a better fiscal position. Future payments from the government to the private sector 
are recognised as expenditures, increasing the deficit in the payment years. This tendency has led 




The temptation to deliver a public service through a PPP is a reflection of budget rather than efficient 
public procurement. The high levels of public expenditure for assets and services indicates that 
governments are concerned with public deficits to a greater extent than VfM. Hence, we conclude that 
governments use PPPs for a single purpose: to place certain public investment outside the public 
accounts. Figure 1 shows the tendency for countries with higher levels of public debt to use PPPs to a 
greater extent. This temptation is facilitated by the accounting mechanism that allows governments to 
build public projects and to simultaneously maintain public expenditure levels, taxes, and deficits by 
postponing PPP costs. However, problems regarding affordability may arise when the postponed 
payments emerge in the subsequent decades, as is the case with Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The Portuguese case is an example of the "off-budget temptation" in PPPs. Portugal has used PPPs 
intensively to build an extensive highway network. This network increased by 700% between 1990 
and 2007, similar to Ireland (+900%) and Greece (+500%) (Cruz & Marques, 2011). According to the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), Portugal was responsible for 3% of a total of 1,340 PPP projects in 
Europe and 7% of a total of €254 billion of investment. As Portugal only accounts for approximately 
1% of Europe’s GDP, further calculations by Sarmento & Reis (2012) show that Portugal leads in the 
use of PPPs across Europe. 
Why did the government choose PPPs to build most of the highway network? The first motive was 
that highways built by PPPs did not have sufficient traffic do be financial viable. Therefore, they could 
be built under public procurement (meaning that the investment would affect the public deficit and 
debt) or by a PPP scheme. By 1995, Portugal was entering the Euro Zone and was facing a public 
deficit of 3% of the GDP by 19992. Therefore, having this high investment in highways counting for 
the deficit would have undermined the fiscal position and could have compromised the purpose of 
entering the single currency. Additionally, the reallocation of EU funds to other fields reduced the 
funds available for the Portuguese road infrastructure. Hence, PPPs emerged mainly because of budget 
constraints, although the public sector was also expecting that the private sector would improve the 
quality and efficiency of the infrastructure. Given the size of the public payments for assets and 
services, several researchers have concluded that PPPs were used mainly to put public investment 
outside the perimeter of the public budgets (Marques & Berg, 2010; Sarmento, 2010; Sarmento & 
Reis, 2012). In 2011, Portugal was forced to ask for financial rescue from the troika (EU, ECB and 
IMF). The memorandum of understanding of the financial rescue packages included several measures 
regarding lowering the PPPs costs. 
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2.4 Are PPPs value for money? 
 
VfM provides the same quantity and quality of services at a lower overall cost (i.e. the whole-life cost 
required to meet the user´s requirements) (Ball, Heafey & King, 2007). Fitzgerald (2004) argues that 
VfM can be delivered through risk transfer, innovation, greater asset utilisation, and integrated whole-
life management. Andersen (2000) mentions risk as only one of the six drivers of VfM; however, this 
paper demonstrates that risk is the most crucial of the six.  
The private sector must be more efficient than the public sector because the public sector’s borrowing 
costs are lower. Since 2007, the sequence of property, bank, and government debt crises has brought 
some concern with respect to this rule for a number of countries. As long as public sector interest rates 
are lower than those of the private sector, PPPs will generate VfM if private sector efficiency is greater 
than the difference in financial costs. After all, if:  
Rf < Rd < Re, then Rf < WACC 
then PPPs can generate VfM if: 
Efficiency gains > (WACC – Rf). 
where Rf, Rd, Re, and WACC stand for the risk-free rate, the cost of debt, the cost of equity, and the 
weighted-average cost of capital, respectively. 
Using the Portuguese experience shows the difference between private and public sector cost of 
capital. In average, PPPs were financed by 70% in debt and 30% in equity. The credit risk was 
considered low (mainly because the government retains the traffic risk), and therefore, the spreads are 
approximately 2% above Euribor. Figure 2 shows the difference in the cost of debt compared with the 
Portuguese risk-free rate. This allows us to conclude that the WACC of the projects is above (but not 
much above) the government borrowing costs. Therefore, this higher financial cost from the private 
sector must be compensated in order to generate VfM. This must derive from the private sector being 
more efficient in the construction, operation and risk management of the infrastructure. 
Considering this fact, (Debande, 2002; Quiggin, 2005) add that the benefits of PPPs should 
compensate for the additional costs of recurring to private sector financing. The private sector has a 
higher discount factor for two reasons. First, the public sector faces lower risk because it does not 
default in the same way as private companies. Second, risks to the public sector are borne by the 
taxpayer. The risk premium is the market evaluation of the risk transfer to the private sector, and the 
higher financial cost forces the private sector to be more efficient.  
The private sector is considered more efficient than the public sector because the former is subject to 
superior incentives towards cost-effective investments, to control operational costs and especially 




issues in private sector performance. Grout (1997) demonstrates that inappropriate risk allocation, in 
conjunction with a lack of competition, innovation, and transparency usually leads to PPP failure. Risk 
transfer improves the cost efficiency of PPPs and renders them more cost efficient than traditional 
procurement. An effective transfer of risk from the public to the private sector can lead to a more 
explicit treatment of risk because it is the acceptance of risk that provides motivation to the private 
sector to price and produce efficiently.  
According to Sarmento (2010), the public sector comparator (PSC) prior to the bid is an effective 
measure for evaluating VfM because it enables the public sector to base decisions on a financial 
evaluation of alternatives. The PSC is the difference between the costs for the public sector of a PPP 
payment and the cost of building the asset or providing it through traditional procurement. The PSC is 
based on full cost, revenue, and risk estimates in cash flow terms, discounted at the public sector rate 
to determine the net present value (NPV), and compared with the discounted value of payments to the 
private supplier (considering the risks and costs retained by the public sector) (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005b). The PSC is, therefore, the cost difference between the two procurement options for the same 
project. The authors argue that the PSC is simpler and easier to compute than any of its alternatives. 
The PSC offers a cost-effective trade-off between a full cost-benefit analysis of all project options 
(conducted in Germany) and the selection of the best private bid (the method used in France). The 
PSC ensures that all options are subject to the same analyses and tests. The PSC should be calculated 
prior to evaluating bids for two reasons. First, the PSC will be evaluated as a ‘pure’ public sector 
option and, second, it enables the public decision maker to understand the VfM elements that the 
private bid should reflect. Therefore, it is important to maintain a current PSC. The PSC becomes a 
negotiating tool for the public sector, enabling it to achieve the best possible deal. 
The PSC should provide the base for costing. It represents a fair estimation of all costs, for the same 
level of volume and quality that the public sector would provide.  
Once the NPVs of both the PSC and the PPP are adjusted to reflect comparable bases, they can then be 
compared. Ceteris paribus (i.e. with respect to quality and risk allocation), VfM is generated when the 
total present value of the cost of private sector supply is less than the NPV of the base cost of the 
service, adjusted for the cost of retained government risk, transferable risk, and competitive neutrality 
effects. 
However, the PSC is liable to potential pitfalls in the forecasting cash flows and choice of an 
appropriate discount rate (Froud, 2003; Jean Shaoul, 2005). Grimsey & Lewis (2005b) add that the 
risk analysis required for the PSC is part of a broader process of risk identification, allocation, and 
management. In many cases, the difference between the PSC and the private sector proposal will be 
relatively narrow and the procurer has to make professional judgments as to the VfM to be derived 




3. PPPs and risk 
 
This section presents an overview of the academic literature and government guidelines concerning 
risk allocation that is central to achieving VfM from PPPs.  
Risk management with respect to PPPs is a potential factor contributing to efficiency (Stephen 
Glaister, Scanlon, & Travers, 2000). It consists of a structured approach to the identification, 
assessment, and control of risks that emerge during the policy, program, or project lifecycle (HM 
Treasury, 2003a). The identification of the source of risk is required to effectively manage risk.
3
 
Additionally, the responsible party for risk at each project stage and the management strategy for 
minimising the potential negative consequences of the risk during the entire project life must be 
determined (McDowall, 2003). Investment projects are vulnerable to behavioural biases: managers are 
concerned with the size of potential losses to a greater extent than the likelihood of a loss occurring 
(Helliar, Lonie, Power, & Sinclair, 2001).  
In this section, we analyse how the three main parties in a PPP (the government, the private 
companies, and banks as lenders) address risk.  
 
3.1 Risk and the PPP actors 
 
The three main parties involved in a PPP are the public sector (the public entity that grants the 
service), a private company, and the private bank sector. Each partner holds a different perspective 
with respect to time, risk, and decision making (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010), especially 
concerning the identification, analysis, quantification, and allocation of risk. The different motives, 
goals, and values of the involved parties require successful cooperation and interaction and a high 
level of trust between the players.  
  
3.1.1 The public sector perspective with respect to risk 
 
There have been several developments in the PPP concept of risk. First, several innovations have been 
introduced in the field of risk identification, allocation, valuation, and management (Shaoul, 2005). 
Second, the public sector has a fixed payment schedule, which reduces financial risk. This fixed 
payment does not guarantee that there will be available resources in the public budget for these costs. 
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However, a fixed payment schedule is an advantage because the guaranteed and stable prices (even if 
higher) cater to public sector risk aversion. Third, the law of large numbers applies to the public sector 
with respect to risk as a probability. This advantage is also at the centre of the public sector´s 
optimism bias, often presented as a criticism. The optimism bias implies that the public sector accepts 
a lower probability of a negative event compared to other sectors. It can also be considered as 
systematic bias by appraisers in the over-estimation of a key project’s parameters. There are several 
reasons for this bias. Optimism is common in the public sector because the sector often suffers from 
poor management and inadequate information. However, the main reason for the bias is that losses are 
borne by the taxpayer, whereas they are borne by the shareholder in the private sector.  
The use of PPPs also entails certain disadvantages (for the public sector). PPPs reduce the public 
sector’s power in addressing changing needs and circumstances (Quiggin, 2005) because there is 
limited opportunity for the renegotiation of contracts (following the principle of pacta sunt servanda). 
Additionally, even in cases where a renegotiation of a contract is possible, the private sector has a 
significant advantage from information asymmetry. Another criticism in literature is the paradox of 
infrastructure investments (Gleason, 1995). The paradox stems from the high risk associated with high 
returns because, as noted by Esty (2004), the sponsor may appear to profit excessively at taxpayer 
expense. Excessive private sector profits can generate an aversion to investment trough PPPs. 
There is a perception that the public sector carries a lower level of risk than the private sector with 
respect to investment and financing choices (Sarmento, 2010). Public sector investments have not, 
historically, distinguished between investment and financing decisions: investments are frequently 
undertaken when credit is cheap and abundant, although the investment decision should consider 
opportunity cost (i.e. whether there is no better alternative use for taxpayer money). Consequently, the 
minimum hurdle rate that the public sector employs is often lower than that of the private sector, a 
situation exacerbated by public sector consideration of variables such as public interest, economic 
externalities, and social assistance in addition to maximum value. Brealey, Cooper, & Habib (1997) 
question whether governments view public sector projects as low risk, or whether governments 
consider that projects are low risk because they are undertaken by the public sector. The authors show 
that the evaluation of the investment should be independent of the financing source. The fact that the 
public sector usually has a lower interest rate should be irrelevant in the evaluation of a project. Too 
often, countries approve projects because there are available resources and not because of their 
economic or social value. Because PPPs have no impact on the public deficit during the investment 
phase, they have become an off-budget temptation. Hence, not separating the investment and financing 
decisions has led to a myopic perspective by the public sector with respect to investment and a 
misjudgement of risk.  
Successful public sector risk management requires a proactive rather than a reactive approach. PPPs 
force the public sector to examine risk in alternative ways than traditional public procurement. Private 




when negotiating with the public sector. The next subsection explains why the private sector is 
efficient in managing risk.  
 
3.1.2 The private sector’s perspective on risk 
 
The private sector has traditionally been better prepared to deal with risk for two reasons: (i) the 
private sector exhibits no optimism bias concerning risk. Such bias would increase bankruptcy risk 
and, (ii) private sector project financing is conducted with substantial experience in risk estimation and 
management. Two private sector players are involved in PPPs: the company (and sponsors) and the 
lender. How they behave towards risk, with each other and the public sector, is analysed in this 
subsection. 
Sponsors of PPPs are investors who are responsible for the project and the equity capital. Because a 
PPP is developed under project finance rules, sponsors only receive the return on their investment in 
the final stage. Project finance has a cascading cash flow, whereas revenue distribution follows a 
specific order: operating and maintenance costs, taxes, debt services, and equity returns. Therefore, 
sponsors assume the highest financial risk and require a higher return on equity than the cost of debt. 
However, if the project defaults, they lose the capital they invested. From the sponsor’s perspective, 
the low level of equity does not imply a higher propensity for risk. 
From a private capital perspective, the high scale of investment, delayed payback period and maturity, 
and the various risks involved can make a project extremely risky. Usually, lenders show greater 
concern for risk than sponsors because PPPs rely on debt to a greater extent than equity. Esty (2004) 
shows that debt on PPPs represents 70 to 90% of the investment, which is three times more than 
traditional corporate financing companies. Because banks assume the majority of the financing, their 
risk aversion increases and they are eager for the project to assume as low a level of risk as possible. 
Banks are involved in the early phases of projects. They gauge projects to ensure acceptable risk levels 
and sufficient project cash flows for the debt service (Asenova & Beck, 2010). Lenders are concerned 
with the level of risk transfer to the PPP and the reallocation of risk to third parties. Lenders would 
prefer that the PPP resemble an ‘empty box’ in terms of risk (Yescombe, 2013) and have become 
reluctant to accept any but the most limited and measurable risk. If a project is low risk, it enables the 
bank to lend greater amounts at a low interest rate. Therefore, the difference between the WACC and 
Rf may not be that high. Consequently, the private sector’s efficiency should be sufficient to overcome 
the difference and generate VfM. Lenders bear the financial and bankruptcy risks and, if project 
revenues fall below estimates (or in the extreme event that the project defaults), lenders are not repaid. 







3.1.3 Summary of risks and PPP parties 
 
The three main parties in PPPs possess different goals: the public sector, the private companies, and 
the lending banks. The public sector is concerned with VfM and efficient public spending, whereas the 
private sector (i.e. the private companies and the lenders) is profit-oriented. Different players with 
different objectives have a different perspective on risk. The public sector has a different approach to 
PPP risk than traditional public procurement. Additionally, the public sector has an ‘optimism bias’, 
making it less efficient in the management of most of risks. PPPs bring innovation in the management 
of risks by separating investment and financing decisions and that public sector only have lower 
interest rates because the taxpayer´s support losses.  
The banks minimise bankruptcy risk and participate in the risk allocation process. Low operational 
risk reduces the financial costs, which increases the potential to create VfM. However, as the 
investment and financial decision, in many cases, is not separate, suitable financial conditions often 
encourage governments to invest in suboptimal projects.  
This follows from the fact that the private sector has higher standards concerning investment 
conditions because the private sector experiences higher default risks and potential losses. Lower 
project risk can be achieved in two ways: either the company transfers the risks to third parties or the 
government guarantees a portion of the risk. Therefore, projects can possess high leverage without 
assuming a high level of risk. 
 
3.2 Risk Allocation 
 
The higher financial costs of the private sector must be compensated for by greater efficiency in 
operations and risk management to obtain sufficiently high VfM. The optimal risk allocation reduces 
the economic cost, provides incentive for sound management, and reduces the need for future 
renegotiation (Asenova & Beck, 2010). A UK survey, (Bing et al., 2005) finds that risk allocation is 
the first priority for the private sector, whereas it is a secondary priority for the public sector following 
the overcoming of budgetary constraints. 
 





The academic literature considers three risk allocation factors: 1) risk classification, 2) the general 
allocation of risk, and 3) the allocation of specific risk.  
Risk can be categorised in several ways: (i) endogenous versus exogenous risk (exogenous risk cannot 
be controlled); (ii)  commercial risk (allocated preferably to the private sector) versus legal and 
political risk (usually allocated to the public sector) (OECD, 2008); (iii) development phase risk 
(planning and construction), the operation and transfer phase risk, and the lifetime phase (political, 
financial, environmental, and force majeure risks) (Jin, 2010) and, (iv) risks at the macro-, meso- and 
micro-level (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005b). Macro-level risks are exogenous and are 
composed of country/industry risk in addition to acts of God. Meso-level risk includes endogenous 
risk but occurs within project system boundaries such as those concerned with construction, demand, 
and technology. Micro-level risks are assumed by stakeholders and are party-related (rather than 
project-related).  
Risk allocation complexity arises because the contractual arrangement is achieved through a 
bargaining process (Medda, 2007). The literature examines whether the risk allocation advantages lead 
to biased conclusions concerning PPP adoption at the expense of traditional procurement. The 
criticism is that PPP efficiency is predominantly a result of the pricing of risk in the PSC and from the 
perceived cost overruns that occur under conventional public investment (Sawyer, 2005). This is 
discussed in the following subsections.  
The majority of PPP risk can be allocated simply: risks can be retained by the public sector, 
transferred to the private company that manages the PPP (which could opt in turn to reallocate risk to 
third parties), or shared between public and private parties.  
Certain risk is always borne by the public sector (e.g. political risk such as unilateral change in 
contracts or changes in sector legislation, regulation related to archaeological finds and fossil 
discoveries, and acts of God). These risks almost always remain with the public sector because they 
cannot be controlled and could lead to project default. If the private sector were to take responsibility 
for such risks, it would expect a high financial premium, which would undermine the VfM concept. 
Other types of risk (related to construction, operations, and maintenance) are always transferred to the 
private company. This transfer has a minimal level of risk because below this level there is little 
incentive for private sector efficiency and, therefore, for VfM generation. The allocation of other types 
of risk such as planning, environmental, demand, and interest rate risk are allocated to other parties 
and are summarised in Table 1.  
Demand risk should be allocated to the private sector for several reasons. Demand risk management 
requires additional effort and efficiency from the private sector (Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010). The 
private sector understands how to attract users and how to calculate demand elasticity. The private 
sector is better equipped to accomplish commercial tasks. However, in most PPP projects, this 




project financially viable. The decision to build the PPP is based not only on demand but also on other 
factors (social, political or environmental, for instance). In the Portuguese experience, we can see how 
the demand risk was allocated to the private or public side by the type of payment mechanism. In the 
road sector, there are some PPPs with payments based on levying tolls whereby the private party bears 
all the traffic risks. However, in all the other road projects, the payments to the private sector are based 
on availability. This means that as long as the infrastructure is available to be used, the company 
receives a fixed rent. Therefore, the demand risk in these cases is completely allocated to the public 
sector.  
Because finance risks are economic risks associated with project finance, some researchers believe 
they should be allocated to the private sector. Interest rate and financial market risk representing 
project finance economic risk should also be allocated to the private sector. PPPs are essentially a 
project finance scheme with non-resource debt. This implies that the banks will lend money based 
solely on the project’s future cash flows. Allocating financial risk to the private sector prompts the 
PPP to pursue sound risk management. Because financing is the greatest cost, the private sector is 
motivated to minimise it. Finally, the private sector is more familiar and experienced with financial 
markets than the public sector (Bing et al., 2005b). However, some authors (e.g. Wang, Tiong, Ting, 
& Ashley (2000 a,b)) consider that traditional public sector borrowing rates are lower than private 
sector borrowing rates and that this risk should be shared by government guaranteed private sector 
financing.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2.2 Risk allocation in governments reports 
 
Governments view PPP risk allocation as critical for VfM. Some public authorities have created PPP 
manuals, and Table 2 summarises their perspectives on risk. These manuals provide guidelines and 
procedures for government departments involved in PPPs and identify the steps necessary to achieve 
VfM. The guidelines intend to ensure that the PPP process is homogeneous across government 
departments to enhance transparency and objectivity in PPP management.  
The government reports presented in Table 2 identify the risks that should be retained by the public 
sector, the risks that should be transferred to the private company, and the risks that are subject to 
negotiation between the private and public sector. The manuals also consider the PSC as a risk 
adjustment cost. The risks are assessed individually, subjected to sensitivity analyses, and aggregated 
in NPV terms. Some manuals also contain risk contingency plans and guidelines in case the public 




Government efforts to address risk allocation are undermined by the off-balance sheet temptation. 
Therefore, many PPPs incorrectly allocate risk because the projects must be incorporated into PPPs to 
avoid fiscal constraints and not because of the process itself. The need to invest through PPPs to avoid 
budget constraints leads to incorrect risk allocation, which undermines VfM.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.2.3 Summary of PPP risk allocation 
 
The PPP literature focuses mainly on the risk allocation process. Accurate insight into the various 
types of risk is central to VfM. The risk allocation process may be misused to exploit PPP advantages 
over traditional procurement. Without accounting for risk transfer, traditional procurement may appear 
cheaper than PPPs. The governments that adopt PPPs have developed guidelines for the retention, 
transfer, and negotiation of risk. Additionally, governments provide risk allocation and valuation 
guidelines. The next subsection addresses the valuation of risk.  
 
3.3 PPP risk valuation models 
 
PPP risk is similar to traditional project risk. The typical project finance evaluation methods are 
employed to value PPPs, although each type of risk should be individually evaluated before 
aggregation with other types of risk. Additionally, each type of risk should undergo a sensitivity 
analysis to determine the robustness of the forecasts and the business plan.  
The combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods (often in combination with a Monte-
Carlo analysis) has been proposed for risk valuation (Tanaka, Ishida, Tsutsumi, & Okamoto, 2005)
4
. 
However, a Monte-Carlo simulation is only appropriate if there is sufficient, quality data, otherwise 
simple probability methods are sufficient (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005b).  
No consensus exists in the literature concerning the optimal discount rate to calculate present value 
(Sarmento, 2010). Two conflicting theories are apparent: (i) public projects bear minimal risk and 
require the risk-free discount rate (or a governmental borrowing rate) and, (ii) public projects require a 
private sector discount rate (Arrow & Lind, 1970; Mehra & Prescott, 1988). Brealey et al. (1997) 
argue that the discount rate for government projects equals the expected return in the capital markets 
for comparable investments, that is, the opportunity cost of capital for the private sector. The discount 
rate can have an overwhelming influence on the NPV. Sarmento (2010) studies seven highway 
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projects and shows that the sum of the NPV of these PPPs drops by more than one billion Euro (from 
eight billion to under seven billion) if the discount rate augments from 4.5% to 6%.  
Academics apply a wide variety of more sophisticated techniques (Table 3) in contrast to the 
governments who usually stick to simple valuation methods such as discounted cash-flows (see Table 
4).  
VaR has gained in popularity as it measures the risk of losses in a specific portfolio of financial assets. 
VaR is defined as the maximum potential loss (given by a certain confidence level, e.g.: 95% or 99%) 
which faced by a portfolio or financial institution within a certain period. For example, a VaR of a 
trading portfolio of 50 million in a specific currency at a 99% confidence level implies that there is 
only one chance in 100, under normal market conditions, that a loss greater than 50 million will occur. 
This number summarises the portfolio’s exposure to market risk, the probability of loss and the level 
of risk in that specific currency. It also provides an aggregated portfolio risk that accounts for 
leverage, correlation, and current position. The method can be broadly applied, from market to other 
types of financial risk (Jorion, 2006). The method is used for risk management, financial control, and 
reporting. 
Some researchers question whether common credit risk evaluation models are suitable for PPPs 
because of specific project finance characteristics (Esty, 2004). Gatti, Rigamonti, Saita, & Senati 
(2007) argue that applying VaR to project finance in the same way as traditional corporate financing is 
not possible. VaR is mainly used for financial portfolios, and PPPs are usually conducted in a non-
financial industry context. An alternative is the Cash-Flow at risk (CFaR) approach that assumes 
uncertain future cash flows and thus a more realistic approach. However, instead of using a single 
NPV, this approach yields a range of expected values. CFaR represents the cash that would be 
received or paid from a portfolio of transactions with a likelihood of certainty within a specific time 
horizon. Earnings-at-risk (EaR) is another approach similar to the CFaR that uses a cash base to 
estimate earnings and expenditures instead of cash flows and adopts an accrual perspective. 
[Insert Table 3 and 4 here] 
Sudong & Tiong (2000) developed a new method called NPV-at-risk, which combines the cost of 
capital, measured by WACC, and dual risk return methods. This method allows the correlation and 
measuring of risk and return. NPV-at-risk represents the minimum expected NPV at a specific 
confidence level (e.g. 95%). It involves the determination of the discount rate and the generation of the 
cumulative distribution of possible NPVs. The authors argue that NPV-at-risk can lead to superior 
decisions concerning the risk evaluation of infrastructure projects. Other authors (Cheah & Jicai, 2006; 
Alonso-Conde, Brown, & Rojo-Suarez, 2007; Takashima, Yagi, & Takamori, 2010) introduced the 





Whereas the proposed valuation methods are presented in the academic research, Table 4 shows the 
valuation methods of governments for PPPs. Governments prefer a qualitative approach based on 
nominal or descriptive scales that describe the likelihood and consequences of specific types of risk. 
Traditionally, the public sector has often used a risk probability assessment (to determine the 
likelihood of a risk occurring) and a risk impact assessment (to determine the potential effect of a risk 
event) in a straightforward way, possibly because of the public sector’s inexperience, lack of 
knowledge, insufficient data, and complexities in defining risk in terms of likelihood and impact. 
Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin (2008), report a recent trend towards more quantitative risk evaluation. 
The Australian government uses the CAPM with a discounted cash flow (DCF). The CAPM is a 
frequently used risk-return model and was independently introduced by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965), and builds on the earlier work of Markowitz concerning the diversification and 
modern portfolio theory further developed by Jensen, Black & Scholes (1972). The CAPM is based on 
restrictive assumptions concerning transaction costs and asymmetric information. Ross (1976)
5
 
suggests a different model, the arbitrage pricing model (APM) that offers no arbitrage opportunity. 
The market risk of any asset is provided by the betas of the factors that affect all investments. The 
Australian government also applies a risk model using Monte-Carlo simulation.  
The UK government sets a risk premium using Monte-Carlo simulation (HM Treasury, 2003a). The 
fact that the UK government uses a more complex analysis is not necessarily a reflection of more 
sophisticated or less controversial risk valuation methods because such methods do not appear to 
capture all of the risk values in the risk transfer.  
The South Korean public sector uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to examine whether the 
returns to private participants are appropriate for the risks that they bear. A project is valued as an 
option and the payoff is a function of the value of an underlying asset. The minimum revenue 
guarantee is interpreted as a private participant put option on the toll revenue, and early termination is 
a put option on the project. This method enables the public sector to examine and valuate the risk for 
all parties involved in the PPP. It allows the estimation of fair returns based on the contractual returns 
of the private participants. The benchmark for the private sector premium is the five-year government 
bond yield. However, this model requires a complex analysis with additional data requirements and 
the South Korean government remains in the early stages of the Black-Scholes method. 
 
4. Empirical analyses of PPPs, VfM, and risk 
 
Although PPPs have increased in recent decades, there are doubts concerning their efficiency. 
Academics and governments have performed studies to examine whether PPPs yield VfM (Hodge & 
Greve, 2009).  
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This section reviews the evaluations of PPP VfM by academics and the public sector (governments 
and audit court reports) over the last 15 years. We address the last two research questions of this 
paper: Do PPPs create VfM, and does risk play a fundamental role in VfM generation? The majority 
of the research that we surveyed concludes that PPPs do not generate sufficient VfM and, therefore, 
questions their efficiency. Contrastingly, governments and audit courts present a positive picture of 
PPP VfM.  
We searched academic journal databases from the year 2000 and gathered book chapters and studies 
that were presented at academic conferences. We retained the papers that performed an evaluation of 
VfM in PPP projects. The research focused on the UK and Australia; therefore, we compare these 
results with the government information and audit court reports from these two countries.  
 
4.1 Academic case studies 
 
Whether risk plays a fundamental role in VfM generation can be briefly addressed. This is because the 
majority of academics (as well as the government and audit court reports) are unanimous that risk is 
the central factor (perhaps the most important factor) in the generation of VfM from PPPs. Whether 
PPPs create value is considered from a negative perspective by the majority of authors (see Table 5). 
[Insert Table 5 and 6 here] 
Academics provide five main explanations for the lack of sufficient VfM generation by PPPs (Table 
6). First, the private sector assumes limited risk and has thus few incentives to pursue superior 
management and efficiency. Second, risk is an ambiguous and complex concept with accompanying 
valuation uncertainty. Third, the methods used to valuate risk are incomplete. Fourth, the PSC favours 
PPPs because of optimism bias or the use of artificially low discount rates. Finally, PPPs often exhibit 
VfM only after risk transfer, which closes the gap between the PSC and PPP. 
Risk transfer is used to render PPPs an advantageous solution. Several authors conclude that without 
accounting for risk transfer, traditional procurement or the PSC is cheaper (Pollock, Shaoul, & 
Vickers, 2002). The efficiency gains from PPPs appear to rely on the pricing of risk transfer or in the 
expected overrun of costs in the public sector (Sawyer, 2005). Hood, Fraser, & McGarvey (2006) also 
state that many critics of PPPs have argued that the government has overemphasised the risk that the 
private sector truly assumes. Ball, Heafey & King (2007) shows that when risk transfers are not 
considered, VfM is negative. To illustrate why negative VfM occurs, we use the following example. 
Suppose a PPP faces the PSC cost in NPV terms. This implies that to generate VfM, a PPP should 
meet the following restriction (in NPV terms): 
PPP payments < (PSC cost of construction + PSC operation and maintenance costs + risk transfer to 




When the risk is transferred to the private sector, the NPV of the PPP payments becomes higher than 
the NPV of the PSC construction plus the operating and maintenance costs. Most academics conclude 
that the PPP is an inferior option in public procurement. 
The debate is expected to continue, at least until the entire life-cycle of sufficient projects has been 
studied in detail (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). Many projects remain in the early stages, and VfM can 
only be properly evaluated over the long term (Nisar, 2007; Weihe, 2008). A greater number of 
detailed academic studies are required to overcome the gap between theoretical knowledge and 
practical experience. Academics do not consider PPPs an effective and efficient alternative to 
traditional procurement, whereas governments reach the opposite conclusion. These varying opinions 
require further analysis. 
  
4.2 Public sector reports 
 
The public sector perspective concerning PPPs is drawn from government reports and reports from the 
Court of Audit or National Audit Offices. Governments are an actively involved party, in contrast to 
academics and audit courts. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from government reports must be 
considered with caution. Audit courts are independent. They scrutinise government action and 
decisions to sanction poor decisions by public managers or to provide recommendations for the 
appropriate use of public resources. We separate the public sector reports in Table 7 into government 
reports (Panel A) and audit court reports (Panel B). We refer to Table 7 as we attempt to address the 
last two research questions: Do PPPs generate VfM? Does risk transfer play a key role in VfM 
generation? 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The majority of government reports conclude that PPPs generate VfM. Although most audit court 
reports reach the same conclusion, they are conservative in concluding that a PPP yields VfM. A 
cross-country report shows that the UK government appears the most enthusiastic concerning PPP 
efficiency.  
UK government studies (Table 7) cover a range of projects and sectors and compare a PPP with 
traditional procurement in terms of performance. All four UK government studies that we surveyed 
concluded that PPPs generate VFM. The conclusion was based on within deadline and budget PPP 
project delivery, unlike traditional procurement. Governments assess a PPP’s efficiency in relation to 
alternatives and do not state whether a PPP leads to a Pareto optimal solution. Two of the UK 
government studies were sector specific (public schools) and focused on the significance of risk in 
generating VfM. Three Australian government studies used the same approach as the UK studies and 




13 audit court reports from the UK and four from Australia. These reports raise concern with respect 
to the efficiency of PPPs. Some PPP projects effectively and efficiently achieve goals, whereas others 
do not. Thus, overall, the courts have a mixed perspective concerning PPP ability to generate VfM. 
The arguments for and against PPPs in public sector reports are listed in Table 8. The main reason for 
support of PPPs is their efficiency compared to traditional procurement. Efficiency is defined as the 
timely and within budget delivery of services. Moreover, PPPs deliver the contracted results (although 
traditional procurement also does so using third-party contractors). The experience curve of the parties 
involved is another factor encouraging PPP support. Two decades since PPP first emerged, the 
processes are more efficient because the public and private sectors have gained experience. Finally, 
PPPs eliminate some risks to public sector. Contrastingly, traditional procurement does not eliminate 
risk but merely transfers the responsibility to taxpayers. The risks may be less visible, but they are still 
present. 
Arguments exist in opposition of PPPs, some originating from the public sector and especially by the 
audit courts. VfM depends almost exclusively on risk transfer, and any conclusion concerning VfM is 
subjective. Some argue that the private sector bears limited risk, whereas the public sector bears more 
risk than it should. A final argument by the audit courts is that PPP evaluation is not entirely 
independent, especially when conducted by governments.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The public sector has two arguments in support of PPPs. First, because the public sector is less 
efficient, building an asset or providing a service using public administration resources is expensive. 
Second, PPPs reduce uncertainty for public managers because the cost and output are known ex-ante 
(although this argument may be undermined by potential frequent renegotiations and financial 
rescues). The main criticism is that PPPs only generate VfM following risk transfer. The VfM, in the 
calculation of the PSC as opposed to the PPP payments, is the value of the risk transfer that balances 
the PSC cost in favour of the PPP. Relying on risk transfer to assure VfM is controversial. Andersen 
(2000) and the UK National Audit Office (2003) state that PPPs, after risk transfer, have exhibited 
VfM although their conclusions may be biased.
6
  
Academics conclude that PPPs do not generate VfM, as shown in 25 out of the 40 papers that we 
analysed. The remainder is unsure whether PPPs can generate VfM (eleven papers) or are certain that 
PPPs do yield VfM (four papers). Government researchers, however, mostly conclude that PPPs 
generate VfM, as shown in six of the seven studies we reviewed (one study was inconclusive). Audit 
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 However, Andersen (2000) study, which is frequently cited in defence of PPPs, has pitfalls. First, Andersen 
only analyses 7% of the total number of projects (28 out of 400). Second, risk accounts for 60% of total savings. 
Third, 80% of the savings account for a single project that was run by a company with close ties to Andersen at 
the time. Therefore, this study should not be relied upon. According to Shaoul (2009), studies by the global 
consulting firms Price Waterhouse Coopers and KPMG may also be biased towards PPPs because the firms have 




court researchers are divided; 7 of 17 studies show that PPPs generate VFM, seven do not, and three 
were inconclusive. 
We find that academics and governments agree that risk transfer is central to achieving VfM with 
respect to PPPs; however, they disagree whether PPPs generate VfM. We discuss the biases from the 
public and private sector perspectives in the following subsection.  





4.3 Study limitations 
 
Academics, governments, and audit courts agree on the critical role of risk in VfM generation; 
however, their diverging opinions concerning PPP ability to generate VfM are surprising. The 
divergence is caused by several factors. First, PPP evaluation is complex because evaluations are time 
specific and, to date, no PPP project has completed the operational phase. Even the oldest PPPs 
(initiated in the early 1990s) have not yet completed their life-cycle, and most projects have not yet 
reached maturity. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate an entire PPP process. Second, government 
studies are based on a single PPP or country, whereas academic studies involve the study of a larger 
number of PPPs. Third, the level of experience with PPPs differs according to country: the UK has 
initiated more than 100 PPPs and Portugal, Spain, and South Korea have initiated more than 40 PPPs 
each (Araújo & Sutherland, 2010). Other countries are just beginning to use PPPs. Fourth, benchmark 
studies on traditional public procurement are required to evaluate PPPs, but limited research exists on 
this topic (with the exception of Fouracre, Allport, & Thompson (1990); Pickrell (1990); Flyvbjerg, 
Holm & Buhl (2002)). This gap in the literature adds complexity to the measuring of public sector 
inefficiency and its comparison with the real cost of PPPs. Fifth, academic studies suffer from limited 
data, whereas government agencies have access to richer data (Hodge & Greve, 2009). Sixth, some 
studies mix the investment decision with the finance decision. There are cases where governments 
identify assets to be built using limited economic or social rationality. Seventh, academic evaluations 
may be more objective with an independent viewpoint (known as the arm´s length principle for PPPs 
(Boardman & Vining, 2010) compared to governments and even audit courts (that tend to focus on 
legal issues rather than performance). Additionally, academics use superior valuation methods than the 
public sector. Eighth, government analysis and risk management may be subject to optimism bias that 
can cause the public sector to be vulnerable to risk.  
 




The majority of PPP studies originate from the UK or Australia. Although these studies address 
different project types (e.g. schools, prisons, health care institutions), some are comparable in terms of 
scope (Panel A, Table 10). These studies differ in terms of methodology (Panel B of Table 10). 
Government studies compare traditional procurement costs with those of PPPs, or the real and 
estimated PPP costs of the base case, whereas academic researchers base their findings on case-studies 
and surveys. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
The UK studies by Macdonald (2002) and the National Audit Office (2003) that compare the PSC (or 
the real cost to the public sector) to PPP cost, conclude that VfM has been generated. Studies for 
Australia by Group (2007) and Forum (2008) find similar results. A UK study on PPPs for schools that 
was based on surveys of the project stakeholders also shows VfM.  
These government findings may be biased because they reflect individual perceptions, which may 
focus on quality and availability and not on costs and risk transfer. These studies compare the present 
solution (PPPs) with that of the past (public procurement), but do not compare PPPs with the most 
efficient theory, model, or existing solution. 
Shaoul (2005) presents a VfM methodology for the UK health sector that determines the risk transfer 
and compares the cost of the PSC with PPPs. The study concludes that PPPs are more costly than the 
PSC before risk transfer. The author shows that VfM was based solely on risk transfer (a vague and 
subjective basis). The National Audit Office (2010b) compares the real costs with the estimated, 
original contract costs for the health sector, but this analysis does not study VfM, unless the original 
contracts themselves have shown VfM. 
Group (2007) and Forum (2008) conducted comprehensive studies in Australia on PPP projects by 
comparing the costs between PPPs and public procurement. The assessment on PPP VfM is positive, 
and the studies show that public investment is more costly with time and budget overruns. 
Contrastingly, English (2003) reviews performance audits in Australia and finds that PPPs do not 
generate VfM. The different methods used in these studies make the results difficult to compare. Only 
a few audit reports used in English (2003; 2007) work are available and are based on the pre-
contracting stage. The reports focus on the performance of the contract benchmark with best practices. 
The audits do not compare the alternative public sector ‘state of the art’. It should be noted that the 
conclusions of these government reports and English (2003) is not totally contradictory: The studies 
concludes that PPPs do not perform well, but (Forum, 2008; Group, 2007) conclude that they perform 
better than traditional procurement. PPPs can underperform and still be a better solution than 
traditional procurement. However, we cannot draw a definite conclusion for the Australian case based 




We find diverging distinctions among the conclusions in the 64 studies reviewed. Overall, academics 
are sceptical concerning PPP ability to generate VfM, whereas governments and audit courts are more 




Governments use PPPs for two purposes: to remove public investments from the balance-sheet and to 
generate VfM. A PPP creates VfM when it provides the same level of service quality and quantity at a 
lower overall cost than traditional public sector procurement. Because private sector financial costs are 
traditionally higher than those of the public sector, PPPs face a financial disadvantage. Therefore, 
VfM from PPPs must originate from greater efficiency provided by the private sector, an efficiency 
that must compensate for the sector´s higher financial costs. The private sector is more efficient 
because there are built-in, performance-oriented incentives and economies of scale. PPP efficiency is a 
result of investment and operational cost and superior risk management.  
This study addressed four research questions: (i) How should risk be allocated in PPPs? (ii) How 
should risk be valued? (iii) Do PPPs create VfM? (iv) Is risk essential for value creation? 
With respect to the first question, we find that risk is crucial for VfM. Although the three main parties 
in a PPP (the government, the company, and the bank as lender) possess their own objectives, the three 
parties must be aligned concerning the allocation of risk. Academic researchers express concern for 
risk allocation, and some consider that VfM is used to make PPPs appear more advantageous. 
However, governments focus on providing guidelines to public departments concerning risk 
allocation. 
With respect to the second question, we document that the public sector usually adopts simple 
valuation tools that are often based on a qualitative approach. Contrastingly, academics usually 
employ methodologies such as VaR, NPV-at-risk, CFaR, and real options. NPV-at-risk and CFaR are 
appropriate to apply in a PPP context. However, the academic literature on this issue is limited only in 
terms of quantity and because existing studies use only one technique or consider a single project.  
To answer the third and fourth questions, we examined PPP evaluation by academics, governments, 
and audit courts. We examined the paper, government report, and audit report conclusions in terms of 
VfM generation and risk management. All parties provide a positive answer to the fourth question; 
however, they report diverging conclusions for the third. Academics are sceptical concerning PPP 
ability for VfM generation, whereas governments are not. Academic scepticism (related to risk 
transfer) is based on the following. First, the PSC favours PPPs because PPPs only generate VfM 




concept. The public sector claims that PPPs create VfM because they are more efficient than the 
alternative public procurement and because PPPs reduce uncertainty. 
All the studies we reviewed, however, have several limitations. First, PPPs are a convoluted system 
involving different parts and specific technicalities. Additionally, PPPs worldwide are either 
incomplete or have not yet reached maturity. Second, studies are based on a single PPP or country. 
This is an important issue because the PPP experience differs substantially according to country. 
Finally, studies lack objectivity and data. 
Are the results we found contradictory? Somehow yes, but limitations, different methodologies, and a 
lack of meta-analysis causes conclusions that are vague and imprecise. Therefore, additional country 
studies with complete methodologies, risk evaluation tools, a greater number of projects, richer data, 
and longer study periods are required. Further research can clarify PPP ability to generate VfM and 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of Portuguese sovereign bonds 10 years and PPP cost of debt 
This graph shows the evolution of the risk free rate in Portugal (measured by the yield to maturity in the secondary market of the 10 years Portuguese government bonds) versus 








































Table 1 – Allocation of different types of risk 
This table summarises the literature on how risks are allocated. Planning risks: risks related with the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the project; Environmental risks: risks related to environmental 
regulations and approvals; Demand risks: risks related with insufficient demand, which is necessary to 
profitability; Finance risks: risks related with the financing of the CAPEX and which mainly changes with 
the interest rate. Source: own table. 
Type of Risks 
Literature  favouring risk 
allocation to the  
Public Sector 
Literature  favouring shared 
risk allocation 
Literature favouring risk 
allocation to the Private 
Sector 
Planning 
Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, 
& Hardcastle (2005a)  
 
Ng & Loosemore (2007)  
 





Bing et al. (2005a)  
Ng & Loosemore (2007)  
Lam et al. (2007) 
Demand -------------------- 
Arndt (1999)  
 
Wang, Tiong, Ting, 
Ashley (2000,a,b) 
Lewis (2001) 
Bing et al. (2005a) 
Grimsey & Lewis (2005b) 
Ng & Loosemore (2007) 
Chung et al. (2010)  
Finance ----------------------- 
Wang, Tiong, Ting & 
Ashley (2000, a,bc)  
Lewis (2001) 
Ng & Loosemore (2007)  
Bing et al. (2005a)  
Chung et al. (2010) 






Table 2 – Risk allocation in governmental reports 
This table presents the main guidelines that governments (of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) use to allocate risks in PPP. 
PSC and VfM stand for public sector comparator and Value for Money, respectively. Source: own table. 
Report Country Year Main guidelines 
(Scotia, 1997) Transferring Risks 
in PPP 
Canada 1997 
 Risk is divided in four categories: Ownership; Operational; Financial and “Acts of God” 
 Guidelines about strategies to allocate risks (must be objective and clearly evaluated)  
(NAO) - Examining the value for 
money of deals under the Private 
Finance Initiative 
UK 2000 
  Description of several risk categories and to whom they should be allocated  
  Each project has its own specification 
(Treasury) The Government´s 
Approach  
UK 2000 
 Clear differentiation between private sector responsibilities and remaining public sector accountability  
 Contractor is only exposed to financial penalties for his own performance 
(Victoria) Partnerships Victoria: 
Guidance material Overview 
Australia 2001 
 Private party should bear risks related to designing, building, and operating the infrastructure, including the 
risk of obsolescence and/or residual value  
 VfM: government should retain the risks which they can manage efficiently  
 Specific government-preferred approaches for each type of risk (10 major categories) 
 How to price risks 
(Canada) Public-Private 
Partnerships: A Canadian Guide 
Canada 2001 
 Potential risks associated with PPPs  
 Governments can reduce or eliminate these risks through negotiations and contractual arrangements  
 The costs that these risks represent must be factored into the PSC model  
 It is important to consider the financial strength of the parties to whom risks are allocated  
(Victoria) Partnerships Victoria: 
PSC Supplementary Technical 
Note 
Australia 2003 
 Risk allocation guide  
 PSC includes a valuation of transferable and retained risks  
(Canada) The Public Sector 
Comparator: A Canadian Best 
Practices Guide  
Canada 2003 
 PSC is a risk-adjusted costing 
  Each type of risk should be aggregated to determine the NPV of the transferable risk component of the PSC  
 Each type of risk should be included as a separate cash flow item, for a detailed analysis and their sensitivity  
(Canada)  P3 Public Sector 
Readiness Assessment Guide 
Canada 2003 
 Public sector must develop a contingency plans for mitigating risk  
 All risks should be identified in an appropriate matrix  
 Optimum allocation should be identified 
(Treasury) PFI – Meeting the 
Investment Challenge 
UK 2003 
 Transfer only those risks which the private sector can more effectively and efficiently manage 
 
(Treasury) The Orange Book UK 2004 
 Aims at an optimum response to risk  
 Prioritizes risks based on an evaluation  







Country Year Main guidelines 
(Treasury) and (Treasury) 






 Standard mandatory spread sheet for the VfM assessment, with a proposed testable risk management approach 
 Identifies all relevant risks, irrespective of which party has responsibility for managing the risk  
 Identifies which party is best placed to manage each risk 
(Treasury) PFI: strengthening 
long-term partnerships 
UK 2006 
 Setting out further improvements to PPP to support their ongoing important role in delivering better public 
services 
 Defines risks to be transferred to private and to be retained by public sector 
(Treasury)  VfM Assessment 
Guide 
UK 2006 
 Optimum allocation of risks is one of the main key drivers for VfM 
 The transfer or risks goal is to incentive private sector efficiency and VfM 
(Treasury) How to manage the 




2007  Contingent plans for the public sector in case of reassuming risks previously allocated to the private sector 
(Treasury) Standardization of 
PFI Contracts Version 4 
UK 2007  Promotes a common understanding of the main risks encountered in a standard PPP project 
 (4P`s, 2007) A  guide to contract 
management for PFI and PPP 
projects 
UK 2007 
 Risks and levels of deductions must be clearly understood by all parties  
 Systems and methodologies should be in place to mitigate operational risks  
 Risks should be reviewed at all stages of the process  
(Treasury) Guidance for Public 





 Government has to evaluate benefits, risks, and costs of the preferred option against other options  
 PSC includes an estimation for any additional costs and for risks that would be transferred to the private sector 
partner under a PPP 
 Risk allocation matrix must be developed, all risks should be considered, and no unintended effects should 
arise 
(4P´s, 2009) 
4P´s: developing public private 
partnerships in housing 





Table 3 - Risk models valuation  
This table presents the risk valuation models used in PPP in the literature. DEA: Data envelopment analysis; DCF: Discounted cash-flows; WACC: Weighted average cost of 
capital.Source: own table. 
MODEL AUTHORS CHARACTHERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Value at Risk 
Gatti et al. (2007)  
Li, (2008) 
Hanli, ChaoQun, 
Bo, & Tao (2009) 
Specific VaR (with Monte-
Carlo simulation) for project 
finance specifications 
 Calculates the default risk 
of a PPP project 
 Recognises different levels 
of complexity of project 
 More precise in risk-
adjusted pricing 
 Quantity and quality data 
required 
 Need to checking the 
model structure and the key 
indicators 
 Difficult to precisely 
estimate the distribution of 
parameters in the model 
precisely 
 Suited for estimating project 
risks for sponsors and lenders 
 Method that simplify PPP 
complexity 
NPV at Risk 
Sudong & Tiong, 
(2000)  
Combines WACC with dual 
risk methods 
 Leads to a better decision 
in risk valuation than 
traditional methods like CAPM 
 
 Complex 
 Quantity and quality data 
required  
 NPV at risk represents a more 





Tennican, Usher, & 
Youngen  (2000) 
Simulates cash-flow risk by 
Monte-Carlo simulation 
 More appropriate for 
projects than VaR 
 Requires calculating a 
probability distribution for 
future cash-flows 
 Quantifies differences in the 




Cheng, Chiang, & 
Tang (2007)  
Calculate the credit scoring 
model of a PPP by DEA 
 DEA is more objective 
 Used in several types of 
financial loans, not just PPP 
 Only applies to credit 
scoring. 
 Valid only for financial 
risk 
 Appropriate because PPP relies 
strongly on debt financed by banks 
Real Options 
Cheah & Jicai, 
(2006) 
Alonso-Conde et al. 
(2007) 
Takashima et al., 
(2010) 
Subsidies and guarantees 
represent a form of options and 
all options have value 
Real options provide a 
framework for valuating these 
guarantees  
 
 Flexibility of this approach 
 More accurate valuation of 
guarantees and risks in a PPP 
 Use of DCF with a single 
risk-adjusted discount rate is 
problematic 
 No multiple PPP cases in a 
single study 
 Complexity of the analysis.  
 Options can be evaluated with a 
















CHARACTHERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
CAPM using  
DCF analysis 
Australia Victoria (2003b) 
Risk is considered in the 
discount rate 
Simple risk valuation 
Discount rate must be 
calculated for each 
project 
Depends on the accuracy of forecast 








Adds a risk premium to 
provide the value of base case, 
in order to adjust for the 
“optimist bias”.  
More complex and 
detailed analysis than 
other governments 
guidelines 
Requires more data and 
more specialized staff  
Add a risk premium to provide the 
full expected value of the base case 




Australia Victoria (2003a) 
Uses probability distribution of 
input variables 
Risk allocation guide. 
Only possible if 
sufficient data are 
available 
Technique depends on significance 








Examines the level of returns 
to private parties in 
comparison with the risks that 
they bear 
 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
is a private sector put option on 
toll revenue, and early 




right is a call option on toll 
revenue and early termination 
is a call option on the project 
Valuate risks for all 
PPP participants  
 
More complex and 







Estimation of appropriate return 
has steps:  
(i) estimation 
of base case fair return and  
(ii) adjustment for option values 
such as minimum revenue 






Table 5 - Academic studies on Value for Money and Risk in PPPs 
This table summarizes the academic findings regarding VfM and Risk in PPP projects. Column “VfM” indicates whether the PPP yields VfM: Y indicates that 
VfM is positive; N indicates that VfM is negative; N/D indicates that it could not be determined whether VfM is positive. The column ’Risk crucial to VfM?’” 
shows whether risk as an indispensable issue for ensuring VfM in PPPs (Y=yes, N=no). CSF = Critical success factors; PSC= Public sector comparator; VfM= 
Value for Money. Source: own table. 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 




 VfM remains uncertain 
 Risk valuation has uncertainties, making risk transfer unreliable 
 Risk transfer may not be as significant as the public sector claims 
Froud & Shaoul 2001 UK NHS Hospitals N Y 
 Risk transfer is main justification for PPP and is central to VfM 
 Interest rate paid by private sector suggests that banks consider PPPs low risk 
 Limited evidence on risk transfer 
McCabe 2001 UK Schools N Y 
 Concerns about quantification of risk transfer and cost calculation, which questions 
validation of PSC and VfM 
 Doubts over selectivity in transferred risks, methods used to calculate risk-related costs, 
and the fact that the public sector assumes all demand risks 
 Confirms questions raised by previous studies over robustness and subjective nature of 
evidence used to substantiate VfM in PPPs 
Pollock 2002 UK 6 Hospitals N Y 
 VfM assessment is skewed in favour of private sector 
 VfM is only shown after risk transfer 
 NPV of PSC is lower than PPP before risk transfer 
 No method for valuating risks 
Pollitt 2002 UK 10 PPP projects Y Y 
 PPP is successful in the UK, compared with traditional procurement 
 PPPs save time and money, promote innovation and efficiently allocate risks 




 Project was not affordable, since private sector does not assume risks, relying on public 
guarantees 
English 2003 Australia Overall projects N Y 
 Evidence that governments are not as successful as private-sector in identifying and shifting 
risk and, therefore, at achieving VfM 
Edwards 2004 UK 
8 Roads and 13 
hospitals 
N/D Y 
 Allocation of risk among partners may be unclear and therefore so is its transfer Additional 





AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
Fitzgerald 2004 Australia 8 projects N/D Y 
 Risk evaluation process needs to be improved 
 Need more evidence of frequency and a large sample of risks events 
 Public sector should use a discount rate that does not incorporate a premium risk 




 Investigates risk transfer 
 Outlines empirical experience on transfer of risks 




 Examines, through a questionnaire, the importance of 18 CSFs for PPP 
 Finds risk allocation and sharing are relevant CSFs 
Hodge 
 
2005 Australia Overall projects N/D Y 
 Few available assessments suggest varied performance 
 No rigorous and transparent evaluations of all Australian PPPs 
Pollitt 2005 UK Overall projects Y Y  Positive overall assessment 
Shaoul 2005 UK Health sector N Y 
 Risk transfer is an ambiguous concept 
 Uses ex-ante risk transfer to close gap between public and private options, to ensure 
preference is given to PPP 
 Instead of demonstrating risk transfer, business case simply asserts what they intended to 
prove 





 Up to 24% of PPPs have ‘optimism bias’ in risk adjustment 
 Studies fail to present sound data-based proof for addressing time and costs overruns 
Dixon 2005 UK Case-studies N/D Y 
 VfM and risk transfer are key to success 
 High procurement and transaction costs, and large-scale nature of PPPs are barriers to 
entry 
Boardman 2005 USA 
Private toll road 
case 
N Y  PPPs incur significant losses, even after refinancing and tax benefits 
Shaoul, Stafford, 
& Stapleton 
2006 UK 8 Highway projects N Y 
 Risk transfer is critical to PPP VfM 
 Most risk transfers are related to construction risks. But after construction phase, it is not 
clear what other risks, beside operational ones, the private sector accounts for 
 Risk transfer is very expensive 
Blanc-Brude 2006 Europe 




 Ex-ante construction costs of PPPs are 24% higher than traditional procurement 




AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
Darvish 2006 Australia 
2 PPP: Tunnel and 
Airport 
N Y 
 VfM and private sector profits in PPPs are only viable through optimal risk allocation and 
balance of interests between public and private sectors 
English 2007 Australia Overall projects N Y 
 Australia’s audit offices largely fail to independently scrutinise PPP 
 High premium in transferring risks to private sector 
Pollock, Price, & 
Player 
2007 UK 11 PPP projects N Y 
 No evidence of improved efficiency in PPP 
 The Treasury “Green book” is biased towards PPPs 
Ng & Loosemore 2007 Australia Railway project N Y 
 Government assumes most of the risks. 
 Provides useful recommendations for better risk management 
 Shows complexity and obscurity of risks in PPPs and difficulties in distributing such risks 
appropriately 
Chung 2007 Australia Hospital project N Y 
 Government fails to ensure that financing is channelled through appropriate risk sharing 
arrangements. It fails to make private sector accountable for required level of quality 
Ball 2007 UK School projects N Y 
 Suggests a significant problem with VfM in PPP projects 
 VfM and economic viability of projects depend entirely on transfer of risk in 9 of 11 projects 
 Highlights problems with risk transfer 
 2/3 of risk transfer regards construction and quality. Inaccurate risk transfer lead to 
different results in VfM 
 Without risk transfer, 5 projects would have had a lower VfM by more than 10% 
Nisar 2007 UK 
5 cases: Prison, 
hospital, bridge and 
military 
N Y 
 Evidence is balanced on PPP effectiveness 
 More emphasis needs to be placed on strategies for transfer of risk for successful 
conclusion of PPP contracts 
Chan 2008 Australia Bridge project N Y 
 Improper allocation of risks could affect success of PPP 




2008 UK 6 hospitals N Y 
 PPPs increase complexity between project delivery and hospital operational functions 
 Inefficient allocation of risks hinders innovation 





AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
Broadbent et al. 2008 UK 17 Health PPPs N Y 
 Risk estimation is central in decision making 
 Dominance in “accounting logic” 
 Quantitative analysis and recognising uncertainty are important 
Andrew 2009 Australia Prisons N Y  Cost data are not an adequate basis for policy decisions 
Tallman 2010 Canada Overall projects N Y 
 In over half of the cases, risks are identified through formal mechanisms, but few quantify 
risks 
 Less than half of the cases show VfM generation. Half of the cases do not evaluate VfM. 
Cuthbert & 
Cuthbert 
2010 UK Health project N Y 
 NPV of PSC is inflated because of misallocation ascribing of risks and costs. 
 Decision was biased in PPP favour 
Demirag & 
Khadaroo 
2010 UK School projects Y Y 
 Evaluates VfM Ex-post and impact of project size in VfM 









with 6 case-studies 
N/D Y 
 Risks transferred from public sector are dispersed amongst multiple entities. This 
dispersion of risks adds cost, raising questions about VfM 
Sarmento 2010 Portugal PPP roads N Y 
 PSC considerably below PPP payments 




Overall projects ND Y 
 In the UK there are doubts about the validity of the VfM analysis, even the NAO ones. 
 In Australia some analysis conclude that some projects did not show VfM 




2012 Australia Overall projects Y Y  PPPs show VfM especially in large and complex projects, due to risk transfer 
Haughton & 
Mcmanus 
2012 Australia Tunnel project N Y  This project failed to deliver most of its objectives. 
Barlow, Roehrich, 
& Wright 
2013 Europe Health N/D Y 
 Results are mixed: older PPPs did not show effectiveness, as new models show better 






Table 6 - Main criticism on VfM in PPP 
This table summarizes the main criticisms in the literature regarding VfM in PPPs.  
PSC: Public sector comparator; VfM: Value for Money.  
Source: own table. 
Main Points Main ideas Authors 
Private sector 
risks 
 Private sector assumes few risks and therefore has 
little incentive to perform better and be more efficient 
Ball (2000); Froud & Shaoul (2001); 
Shaoul (2002); Shaoul et al. (2006); Ng 
& Loosemore (2007). 
Risk concepts 
 Risk is an ambiguous concept 
 Risk is complex 
 Risk valuation is uncertain 
Ball (2000); Shaoul (2005); Ng & 
Loosemore (2007); Broadbent et al. 
(2008) 
Risk valuation  No methods or simple methods used  
McCabe (2001); Pollock (2002); 
Fitzgerald (2004); Tallman (2010) 
PSC  
 PSC is biased in favour of PPP  
 Optimist bias 
 Discount rate used in PSC favours PPPs 
 Pollock (2002); Pollock (2005); Pollock 
et al. (2007); Shaoul (2005); Sarmento 
(2010)  
Risks and VfM 
 Risk transfer is used to close the gap between PSC 
and PPP  
 PPP only show VfM after risk transfer 
Froud & Shaoul (2001); Pollock (2002); 







Table 7 - Public sector reports on Value of Money and Risk in PPPs  
Panel A summarizes government reports on PPP whereas Panel B shows Courts of Audit reports. Both panels evaluate PPPs’ VfM and the role of risk in achieving VfM. Column VfM 
indicates whether Value for Money is obtained (Y=yes; N= No; N/D=unable to determine VfM. Column “Risk crucial to VfM?” shows if the study considers risk as an indispensable 
issue for ensuring VfM in PPPs. CSF= Critical success factors; PSC= Public sector comparator; VfM= Value for Money. Source: own table.   
PANEL A – GOVERNMENT REPORTS 




RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
Andersen 2000 UK 29 projects Y Y 
 Risk is the main driver (out of 6) of VfM 
 Cost savings amount to  17% relative to traditional procurement, but most of 
these savings are explained by 2 very successful PPPs 
MacDonald 2002 UK 
11 PPP vs 39 
public projects 
Y Y 
 PPPs deliver late in 24% of cases and overestimated cost in 22% 
 Public projects deliver late in 70% of cases and overestimated cost in 73% 
Commission 2003 UK Schools Y Y  Economic viability and VfM in all PPP schools depend on risk transfer 
VPAEC 2006 Australia Overall projects N/D Y 
  Limited independent external scrutiny of PPP to date 
  Inadequate independent oversight (in quality and quantity); Inconclusive on 
PPPs ability to transfer risk, achieve VfM and savings, and other program 
objectives 
Group 2007 Australia 
21 PPP projects vs 
33 public 
Y Y 
  PPPs clearly demonstrate greater cost efficiency than traditional 
procurement 
  Traditional procurement does not eliminate risks, only transfers them to 
taxpayers 
Forum 2008 Australia 




  In 35% of the cases, PPPs perform better than traditional procurement 
  PPPs have average cost escalation of 4.3%, compared to 18% for traditional 
projects 
  During construction, average delay for PPPs is 2.6%, and for traditional 
procurement 25.9% 






PANEL B – COURTs OF AUDIT REPORTS 
 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY PPP ANALYZED VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
NAO 2003 UK 
38 PPPs vs 37 
public projects  
Y Y 
 PPP deliver on time in 76% of cases and within budget in 78%  









  Inconclusive on performance assessment against contractual benchmarks 








  Limited assurance that risk valuation is credible 
  High rate of return for the risks assumed 




 Large number and scale of risks is one of three main reasons for project’s 
failure 
 Significant risks, due to complexity and timescale (that lead to specific 
additional project and political risks) 
Auditor-
General 
2006a Australia Schools Y Y 
 VfM is achieved with risk transfer 








2 major PPP 
projects 
Y Y 
  Risk allocation is reasonable 








 Effective risk allocation and management is particularly important to 
delivering VfM in PPP contracts 
 Most risks are well managed 
 In nine out of ten examined risk categories, there was either low or moderate 
risk in private sector 





AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY PPP ANALYZED VfM 






UK Overall PPP Y Y 
 PPPs usually deliver what was contracted. They also successfully transfer risks 
 Risk transfer depends on contracts 








 PPPs were delivered on time and within budget in two thirds of the time 
 Public projects were delivered on time in two thirds of the cases and within 




UK Schools N/D Y 
  Inconclusive regarding VfM  









Overall PPP: 162 
projects 
N Y 
 No clear data to conclude whether PPPs have led to demonstrably better or 
worse VfM than other forms of procurement 
 Insufficient data on returns to equity investors for the risks they  bear 





UK Housing sector N/D Y 
 Housing is one of the more complex PPP sectors due to the specific risks 
(construction and tenants) 




UK Hospital Y Y 
 Most contracts perform satisfactorily or better than expected 
 Inconclusive about whether PPPs generate VfM better by including hotel 
services in contracts 
Auditor-
General 
2010 Australia Prisons N Y 
 Appropriate management of the allocated risks is necessary to avoid 
deterioration in the VfM 
NAO 2012 UK 
Equity capital in 
PPP 
N/D Y 
 Private investors bear some but very limited risks. 
 Public sector has relied on competition to seek efficient contract pricing, 
without information about the PSC cost 






Table 8 –PPPs in government’s reports 
This table summarizes the main arguments for and against PPPs, according to the government and courts of 
audit reports included in Table 5 and 7. 
VfM: Value for Money 
Source: own table. 
Arguments in favour Arguments against 
PPPs reduce cost  and time deviations  
VfM depends entirely on risk transfer 
Yet, risk transfer is subjective and difficult to 
measure 
PPPs deliver what was contracted Low/inadequate risk transfer 
Few PPPs fail and most perform well 
Public sector could be paying more than it 
should 
With time and experience, PPPs become more 
efficient, and private sector returns decrease (in 
early PPPs, the private sector gained excessive 
returns)  
Not all projects should be conducted as a PPP 
Traditional procurement does not eliminate 
risks, but only transfer them to taxpayers 
Evaluations are not independent enough 
 
More and better studies and evaluations are 
required 





Table 9 - Value for Money in PPPs 
This table presents the results on VfM from academic studies, government reports and Courts of Audit reports. 
Information is presented by the number of studies/reports by evaluation outcome (Y – show VfM; N – Not show 
VfM, N/D- VfM not determined). Source: own table. 
 
Academic Studies 
Country Nº Studies 
VfM? 






















































Country Nº Studies 
VfM? 





















Courts of Audit reports 
Country Nº Studies 
VfM? 































Table 10 –The UK and Australian PPP experience 
This table shows an overview of PPP studies by country and type of projects and highlights the studies which demonstrate that VfM was generated and those which cannot.  The table limits to 
studies to those on the UK and Australia. BC: Business Case; NAO: National Audit Office (UK); PSC: Public Sector Comparator. Source: own table. 
Panel A: Comparable studies on VfM by country and type of project 






 English (2003) 
English (2007) 
Prisons Auditor-General (2010) Andrew (2009) 
Railway -------------- Ng & Loosemore (2007) 
Schools AUDIT (2006b) ------------------ 


























Health NAO (2010b) 
Froud & Shaoul (2001) 
Pollock (2002) 
NAO (2006) 
Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser (2008) 
Cuthbert & Cuthbert (2010) 
Roads -------------- Shaoul et al. (2006) 





Pollock et al. (2005) 






Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B : Comparable studies on VfM by country and type of methodology 
COUNTRY PPP PROJECT 
STUDY SHOW VfM STUDY NOT SHOW VfM 
AUTHOR METHODOLOGY AUTHOR METHODOLOGY 
AUSTRALIA Overall projects 
Group (2007) 
 Compares costs and times between 
traditional procurement and PPPs 
English (2003) 
 Based on PPPs’ performance audits 
Forum (2008) 
 Compares capital costs between 





 Calculates the cost of the PSC (with 
risk adjustment) and compares it with 
the PPP cost 
NAO (2010a) 
 Compares the conclusions of five 
previous NAO reports 
MacDonald (2002) 
 Compares real costs and time execution 
with the base case 
Pollitt (2002) 
 Case-studies and overall NAO 
assessment 
NAO (2003) 
 Compares the PPPs cost with traditional 
procurement cost 
 Assumes the latter to have a certain 
price, be completed on time, and have 
the same quality output 
Pollitt (2005)  Case studies 
NAO (2009e) 
 Based on conclusions of previous 
reports of NAO 
NAO (2009d) 
 Survey: Do PPPs achieve contracted 
price, time, and quality? 
Schools 
Commission (2003)  Compares PSC with PPPs Ball (2000)  Survey on risk impact 
CCPPP (2010) 
 A survey on opinion of several 
stakeholders 
McCabe (2001)  Case-study 
Demirag et al. (2010)  Survey  Ball (2007)  Analysis of VfM without risk transfer  
Health NAO (2010b) 
 Compares real costs /specifications with 
contract; 





Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser (2008) 
 Compare PSC with PPPs 
 
 Interviews and case studies 








Chapter 2  
Anatomy of Public–Private Partnerships: Their creation, financing and renegotiations 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted as well as the 
possible disadvantages for the public and private sectors. By means of two case studies on bridge 
construction and railway infrastructure (Fertagus and Lusoponte), we elucidate how a PPP is structured 
and financed. Furthermore, the two case studies illustrate how the renegotiation processes are 
conducted when the public-private contracts have to be altered and what determines (un)successful 
renegotiations.   
 
KEYWORDS: Public–Private Partnerships; Concessions; Renegotiations; Case studies; Transports  





In public-private partnerships (PPPs), the private sector plays a role in developing and 
maintaining public infrastructure and services, which is usually a public sector responsibility. 
PPPs are a recent phenomenon and were first experimented with approximately 20 years ago. 
As the design, construction, operation, financing, ownership and risk transfer of PPPs are 
country-specific, it is difficult to establish a clear definition of PPPs (Duffield, 2010)
1
. In 
some European countries, such as the UK, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland 
(EIB, 2009)), but also in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, private 
sector participation in infrastructure and public services through the use of PPPs has become 
increasingly popular (Hodge & Greve, 2009).  
This paper offers a systematic and integrated approach to the main concepts, definitions, 
models, characteristics, structure and financing of PPPs. We analyse why basic infrastructure 
and public services must be guaranteed by governments and how the private sector has been 
instrumental in establishing such infrastructure and services. Furthermore, we also concentrate 
on how PPP renegotiations are conducted. To detail typical PPP structures and financing 
                                                          
1
 For various definitions, see, e.g., (Bovaird, 2004; CCPPP, 2001; Corner, 2006; Hardcastle  C., & 
Boothroyd K., 2003; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Kirk & Wall, 2001; Klijn & Teisman, 2000; Linder, 1999; 




models, we use two case studies on completely different projects: Fertagus and Lusoponte. 
We answer the following questions: (1) How are PPPs established? (2) How does the private 
sector structure and finance a PPP relative to a private set-up following a traditional 
procurement? (3) Why and how are PPPs renegotiated? 
This paper contributes to the literature by addressing both the advantages and disadvantages of 
PPPs. For example, the main advantage of a PPP—the fact that PPPs are ‘off-balance sheet’—
comes with several disadvantages: the budget ‘temptation’ and future liabilities. We show that 
the structure, financing, and life cycle of a PPP are significantly different from those of a 
traditional, privately owned project. For example, there are differences in portfolio 
management, asset ownership, project duration, amount of debt and risk, dividend policy, and 
shareholder structure. Although most renegotiation studies focus on the determinants that lead, 
in macro terms, to successful renegotiations, there is a lack of research on the negotiation 
process, which can be induced by financial distress, increased bankruptcy risks, and a 
changing political agenda.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the fundamental concepts of PPP. 
Section 3 lays out the structure and financing of PPPs. Section 4 reviews renegotiation theory. 
Section 5 presents the two case studies and the data used, and Section 6 discusses the 
renegotiation dynamics of Lusoponte and Fertagus. Conclusions are provided in Section 7. 
 
2. Main concepts of PPPs  
 
Traditionally, the public sector is responsible for providing specific services such as defence, 
security, justice, education, health, and culture, and for building basic infrastructure such as 
roads or prisons (Savas, 2000). The reasons why these types of services or infrastructure are 
not provided by the private sector are described in economic literature as ‘market failures’ ( 
Stiglitz, 1989; Chong, Huet, Saussier, & Steiner, 2006b). The private sector is not eager to 
deliver these types of goods and services because they are not profitable. However, for social 
or political reasons, they must be made available to society. Therefore, it becomes the public 
sector’s responsibility to ensure universal access to these goods and services. Another reason 
for the public sector’s provision of the above-mentioned services and infrastructure is that 
they may be ‘natural’ monopolies, requiring some source of public intervention (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2002b). In additional, some of these services or types of infrastructure generate 
positive externalities (the classic example is the construction of a new road that reduces travel 
time and accidents). Another example is the provision of health services that will lead to a 




productivity and economic growth (Sachs, & Tiong, 2005). Infrastructure comprises various 
types of fixed investments that are characterised by a long duration in construction and 
operation, as well as indivisibility, capital intensity, and a complex valuation process 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002a). This type of infrastructure usually requires a high initial 
investment, and it is only financially viable over the long run, which may extend beyond the 
scope of the private sector (Delmon, 2009). Although the public sector is responsible for 
guaranteeing specific services and infrastructure, its role has changed in recent decades; the 
public sector remains the guarantor but is in some cases no longer the provider. In fact, the 
private sector plays an increasingly important role in providing in some countries’ services 
and infrastructure that have traditionally been the public sector’s responsibility (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2004). 
 
2.1. PPP definitions and different models 
 
To mark the boundaries of a PPP’s role and scope, let us first discuss the various stages of the 
project: (1) conception, (2) design, (3) construction, (4) financing, (5) operations and 
maintenance (O&M), and (6) residual value or transfer of the infrastructure from the private 
sector to government at the end of the contract. In traditional procurement, the government is 
responsible for all of these stages. When construction is contracted to a private firm, the final 
responsibility lies with the public sector, which stands in contrast to privatizations where the 
asset or service is completely transferred to the private partner along with all risks and rewards 
(Savas, 2000; Demirag & Khadaroo, 2008).  
The difference between PPPs and traditional procurement or privatisation is that the 
responsibilities over the several stages of a PPP project are divided between the public and 
private sectors. De facto, in a PPP, the public sector purchases a service under specific terms 
and conditions (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002b). 
Figure 1 shows the different government procurement models. In traditional procurement, the 
government is responsible for all stages of the process, i.e., for project, risk, costs, budget 
treatment, financing, contract and ownership, whereas in a privatisation, the private sector 
takes on all of these responsibilities. In PPPs, some stages of the project are public 
responsibilities, whereas others are private. Consequently, risks are allocated between public 
and private sectors. For example, construction, financing and O&M usually falls under the 
private sector, whereas political risks, administrative licenses and other risks, e.g., unilateral 
changes, remain with the public sector. Table 1 summarises the public and private 




[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here] 
 
2.2. Aspects of PPP contracts falling under the responsibility of the public sector 
 
The specific issues faced by PPP regarding the public sector are summarised in Table 2, and 
the rest of this section provides a close look at some of these issues.  
In PPPs, the private sector assumes all costs during the investment stage, enabling the 
government to avoid the investment’s impacts on the budget and national debt. Only future 
payments will affect public expenditures. In contrast, capital and operational expenditures are 
public expenses in traditional procurement, which may create a direct budget deficit and 
immediately pile up more public debt. Figure 2 describes the financial outflows for the 
government under these two scenarios.  
When building infrastructure by means of traditional procurement, there is a high level of cash 
outflow during the investment stage and usually low levels of O&M. However, major repairs 
could occasionally be necessary, leading to an increase in operating costs. In PPPs, there are 
no cash outflows during the investment stage, and payments are made to the private 
consortium during the operational stage only. Those payments cover the investment, O&M, 
debt service, and corporate taxes and provide shareholders a return. The shapes that these 
payments can take are shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here] 
The public budget finances traditional procurement, i.e., by taxes and debt, whereas in a PPP, 
investment is made by means of equity and debt as financing is commonly a private sector 
responsibility. The main differences between project financing and traditional corporate 
financing are discussed below (in section 3.3).  
In traditional procurement, the government and the construction firm set up a construction 
contract for building an infrastructure. In a privatisation, a selling contract is negotiated from 
the public to private sector. However, in PPPs, a concession contract is agreed upon between 
the public and private sector. This contractual framework combines construction, financing, 
and operation (Hart, 2003) and is limited in time (usually long term—30 or more years). 
Although the contract does not cover or predict all conditions or future events, the concession 
contract is complex and covers a wide range of issues such as conditions of the design, 
construction, financing, O&M, public and users’ payments, and the residual value or the final 
transfer of the asset to the public sector. In addition, the PPP comprises a series of detailed 




contract with syndicated banks, outsourcing contracts for O&M, insurance contracts to cover 
risks and a shareholder’s agreement that defines the long-term relations with the PPP owners. 
Although the public sector is not formally present in these contracts, it is critical to the PPPs’ 
success, and governments should therefore still carefully monitor.  
The ownership of the asset also differs among procurement, privatisation, and PPP. As a 
privatisation is de facto a selling contract, the ownership of the asset is completely transferred 
to the private sector. In traditional procurement, in contrast, the assets remain in the hands of 
the public sector. In PPPs, the physical asset also remains public, even over the duration of the 
concession contract, and the PPP private company usually recognises the concession contract 
in the balance sheet as an intangible asset during the concession period. Afterwards, the assets 
revert to the public sector, usually with a residual value of zero. 
 
2.3. PPP advantages and disadvantages 
 
What advantages does the government see in PPPs relative to traditional procurement? Why 
are academic studies sceptical about PPPs as an alternative use of public funds? The 
advantage ascribed to PPPs that is most frequently advanced is the ‘off-balance sheet’ 
accounting of this transaction (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). PPPs have no impact on public 
expenditure and therefore no impact on the public debt during the investment stage; only the 
future payments from government to the PPP will be accounted for in the public budget. This 
advantage embeds a potential danger, namely the temptation to avoid budget constraints, 
which may lead to a debt overhang. We use this term to refer to the condition of an 
organisation (either government or a company) under which the debt level is so high that the 
organisation is no longer able to attract more debt, even if the debt conditions are favourable 
to new investments (Cordella, Ruiz-Arranz, & Ricci, 2005). Some countries have established 
many projects over a short period of time, raising concerns about their affordability ( Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2002a ; Froud, 2003). Future payments can threaten the sustainability of public 
finances in some cases, as liabilities may only arise when payments are due (Maskin & Tirole, 
2008). As such, the impact of PPPs on governments’ future budgets is also an issue of concern 
(Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2007b). 
The second advantage of PPPs is the possibility of building an infrastructure that otherwise 
would not be built because of budget restrictions (Debande, 2002; Grout, 2005). In several 
countries, PPPs have been instrumental in reducing infrastructure gaps. However, as budget 
constraints are less binding, concerns about rational decision making have emerged. The PPP 




Georgiou, 2011) show that in some cases, assets are chosen with little (or even no) economic 
or social rationality, which is attributed to the fact that governments tend to not separate the 
investment decision from the financial decision.  
Third, PPPs aim at generating Value for Money (VfM), the idea being that the same quantity 
and quality of services can be provided at a lower overall cost. The goal of PPPs is to achieve 
microeconomic efficiency of public money in terms of a better use of those resources because 
of better management (OECD, 2008). However, VfM is complex to measure and has led to an 
intensive debate on whether PPPs really do generate VfM (Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin, 
2008). A pitfall in VfM valuation is that the concept is mainly based on risk transfer (Ball, 
Heafey, & King, 2007). Academics provide the following reasons for why PPPs do not deliver 
sufficient VfM: (i) the private sector assumes few risks and thus has few incentives to pursue 
better management and efficiency; (ii) risk is an ambiguous and complex concept, leading to 
valuation uncertainty; (iii) the methods used to valuate risks are considered incomplete, as the 
public sector usually adopts simple valuation tools, often based on a qualitative approach; (iv) 
the public sector comparator favours PPPs because of an ‘optimism bias’ or the use of 
excessively low discount rates; and (v) PPPs often only show VfM after a risk transfer. 
Fourth, the private sector assumes some of the risks of a PPP project, which is considered yet 
another advantage compared to traditional procurement. Nevertheless, Ng & Loosemore 
(2007), and Broadbent et al. (2008), note that the valuation of risk transfers is not 
straightforward and hinges on some subjectivity (Shaoul, 2005; Ball, Heafey, & King, 2007). 
Pollitt (2002), and Klijn & Teisman (2003), argue that this situation is aggravated by the 
public sector’s lack of experience.  
Fifth, the public sector can focus more on strategy and less on operational tasks when it 
initiates a PPP (Bovaird, 2004). Still, PPP contracts are long-term (usually more than 20 
years), and government policies are not necessarily consistent over time following changes in 
government, making strategic planning even more difficult and unpredictable (Heald, 2003).  
Sixth, a PPP represents simplicity as it leads to just one contract between the public and one 
private company, whereas traditional procurement brings about a multitude of contracts. 
Nevertheless, despite the PPP contract’s complexity, it is unavoidably still incomplete (Blanc-
Brude, Goldsmith, & Valila, 2006), which can and frequently does lead to future 
renegotiations (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2003). Furthermore, a single contract also induces 
asymmetric information because it allows the private sector to have more information than the 
public sector; in addition, there is no competitive environment once the contract is signed. 
This situation could lead to ‘opportunistic behaviour’ on the part of the private sector  (Parker 




contracting party strategically uses the contract’s imperfections to obtain a higher proportion 
of the value generated by the contract at the expense of its contracting partner (Chong, Huet, 
& Saussier, 2006). For instance, Ho & Liu (2004) claim that in cases in which the private 
sector can easily obtain a renegotiation, the private sector would be able to opportunistically 
behave with respect to contract obligations. These conditions may result in the public sector 
choosing an inferior option (adverse selection) or moral hazard from the private sector (accept 
a lower price at the bidding stage, with the goal to later, without competition, renegotiate, 
leading to extra costs to users and/or taxpayers). The advantages and disadvantages are 
summarised in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3. PPP structure and finance 
 
3.1. The procurement process leading towards a PPP 
 
The Portuguese case provides us an example of this procurement process.  
Before making a decision to develop a public investment through traditional procurement or 
PPP, the Portuguese government is obliged to create a task force to study and analyse the 
project. The task-force report is a necessary starting point for launching a PPP because it 
comprises the main characteristics of the technical, legal and financial issues for each project. 
The procurement process for PPPs in Portugal follows several stages. The first step is for the 
sectorial minister who is planning the project to notify the Ministry of Finance. This 
notification set up a committee responsible for preparing a preliminary evaluation of the 
project and the decision to use a PPP instead of public procurement. This also includes a 
feasibility study, a strategic plan and the legal instruments to perform the procedure prior to 
the bidding. It is also expected that this committee will evaluate the initial studies that support 
the project.  
After the decision to use a PPP, the process begins with the opening of a tender procedure that 
contains the following information and conditions: PPP contracting procedures and 
specifications, analysis of the options that determine the configuration of the project, project 
descriptions and financing, demonstration of the public interest to justify the choice of using a 




statement (Verhoest et al., 2013). Given that the PPP involves vast amounts of investment, it 
is mandatory to make an international announcement and publish the tender in the Official 
Journal of the European Community. The government, after receiving the bidders’ proposals, 
makes a first evaluation. The evaluation criteria are of a technical and financial nature. In most 
of the projects, the criteria are as follows: (i) minimising the public financial input 
(approximately 30% of the final award classification), (ii) the technical quality of the proposal 
(in terms of the conception, project, construction and exploration, worth approximately 50% 
of the classification) and (iii) the service quality and security. 
The best-qualified bidders are shortlisted, and a round of negotiations starts. At the end of the 
negotiation process, two bidders are allowed to present their best and final offer. After a final 
evaluation of these proposals, the Finance Minister and the Sector Minister make a joint 
decision on the winning proposal. The ultimate stage is the signing of the PPP contract 
between the government and the private party. As there is no contract template, each PPP 
agreement is a tailor-made contract based on the tender specifications. However, some 
elements are mandatory, such as the programme´s contracting procedure, the project analysis, 
the project description, risk allocation, budgetary costs and financing and the environmental 
impact. 
Ultimately, several entities are involved in the PPP process, with different roles and 
responsibilities: the sectorial minister is responsible for the project initiation, invitation to the 
bidding and budget allocation for the future payments. The Ministry of Finance is responsible 
for the project approval, negotiation, bid approval and contract monitoring and management. 
The first committee has a role in assessing the feasibility and Value for Money. The second 
committee is responsible for the bidding process. 
We have found a variety of payment mechanisms in the 35 Portuguese PPPs. In the road 
sector, there are some PPPs with payments based on levying tolls whereby the private party 
bears all the traffic risks. By contrast, in all the other road projects, the payments to the private 
sector are based on availability, and the toll revenue goes to the public sector. The revenues of 
the two railway PPPs depend on the tolls. As for the health sector, as we have seen, for each 
hospital there are two PPPs: one responsible for building and maintain the infrastructure, 
being paid by availability. The other PPP is responsible for the medical services. In this 
second PPP, payments are made according to the clinical production, but with an annual cap 
on public payments. Prices for each clinical service or action are based on a price system 






3.2. PPP structure 
 
For each PPP project, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is created. The SPV represents a legal 
individual company that, however, only operates and owns one specific project/concession 
during the contract period. It is this company that will sign the PPP contract with the 
government. This company will be responsible for all stages of the project when they fall 
under the private sector (for instance, this comprises the phases of the design, construction, 
financing, operation, and maintenance). The reason why an SPV is created is that a project 
finance scheme is used (see the next subsection) (Yescombe, 2013). Thus, several relevant 
issues are addressed: (i) the lenders can evaluate the (fluctuations of the) cash flows that 
cannot be diverted to other businesses. This evaluation increases the lenders’ confidence that 
the project will be able to repay debts. (ii) There is no recourse to the shareholders, protecting 
them with limited liability and non-resource (sometimes limited) financing. (iii) The project 
will not be affected by problems caused by other business operations, which could occur if an 
existing company were used to develop the project rather than an SPV.  
SPV funding is derived from shareholders, banks, and bond markets. Financial advisers, 
lawyers and other types of consultants are involved in the SPV, especially in the planning 
stage and at the public bidding (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 2000). During the construction stage, the 
construction sub-contractors are responsible for building the infrastructure. In this manner, the 
SPV passes the construction risks on to third parties. At the operational stage, important 
relationships with outsourcing and insurance companies are established. Again, the SPV’s 
goal is to pass the operational and maintenance risks to third parties.  
Using Lusoponte as an example, we present a typical SPV structure (Figure 3). Lusoponte’s 
SPV has attracted debt from banks and equity from sponsors. The construction of the new 
bridge was contracted to another company, Novaponte, which is owned by the same 
shareholders of Lusoponte. Operating and maintenance (O&M) was also contracted to another 
company, Gestiponte, owned by the same shareholders. Thus, construction and O&M risks 
were transferred to third parties. These risks will no longer affect Lusoponte’s future cash 
flows, reducing the lenders’ uncertainty about the SPV’s ability to repay the debt.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The PPP framework is described in Figure 4. Although the public sector is often described as 
a single entity, there are in fact several independent parties, such as the government that issues 
the contract, the national audit office (NAO) that controls the use of public money, and a PPP-




The public stakeholder is the government that signs the concession contract with the private 
sector. As PPPs are usually created in regulated and low-competition markets (such as 
transport, health or education), the regulatory agencies of that specific sector usually play an 
important role, which is especially true during the operational stage, when the task of the 
public sector is to monitor the private sector. This monitoring requirement does not only arise 
from the contract, as regulated markets necessitate supervision, regardless of the contractual 
responsibilities of the public and private sectors.  
Because PPPs involve public money, other important entities in the public sector will be 
involved at a later stage, including organisations such as the NAO
2
, or as it is called in some 
countries, the Court of Audits. An NAO is an independent body that scrutinises government 
actions and decisions. Although it is part of the public sector, the NAO is independent of the 
executive power. They also tend to sanction poor decisions or at least provide 
recommendations for the better use of public money. 
Another important public entity present in most countries is a PPP-dedicated unit. This unit is 
defined as ‘any organisation set up with full or partial aid of the government to ensure that the 
necessary capacity to create, support, and evaluate multiple PPP agreements exists’ (OECD, 
2010, pg.11). Therefore, a PPP unit is a government department that oversees the complete 
life cycle of the PPP (Farrugia, 2008). Both of these studies emphasise the importance of PPP-
dedicated units for the ultimate success of PPPs.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
3.3. PPP finance 
 
PPPs are financed by the private sector using a scheme called project finance. This refers to ‘a 
non-resource or limited resource financing structure in which debt, equity, and credit are 
enhanced for the construction and operation of a particular facility in a capital-intensive 
industry’ (Fight, 2005). Typically, PPPs (especially with respect to infrastructures such as 
highways) require high capital investment and low O&M costs. Revenues mainly serve to 
cover depreciation and debt service and, to a lesser degree, to yield shareholder return. The 
high capital investment phase (during the construction phase, normally the first 4–5 years of 
the contract) is mainly financed through debt. (Esty, 2004) reports project finance to have debt 
levels of 70%–90%, with equity covering the remaining part. For the United Kingdom, the 
debt levels amount to 80%–90% (Spackman, 2002), whereas for the Portuguese highway 
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sector, the reported debt amounts to a similar percentage of investment (Sarmento, 2010). 
Debt is often called ‘non-resource debt’, which indicates that lenders rely solely on future cash 
flows for debt service (repayment of principal plus interest). 
PPP debt consists of senior and mezzanine (also called junior or subordinated) debt. During a 
construction stage of 4 or 5 years, milestone payments are to be made to the construction 
company (Yescombe, 2013), indicating that the same level of financing is not necessary at any 
moment in time; project finance follows a drawdown in financing (Figure 5). The SPV first 
uses the mezzanine debt as a resource, followed by equity, and finally senior debt. In the 
operational stage, the reimbursement of debt and equity follows a different path (Figure 6). 
The SPV first pays back the senior debt (which has a priority right on the cash flows), then 
mezzanine debt and only subsequently the shareholders’ equity. Usually, the debt maturity is 
shorter than the project duration (Gatti, 2012).  
[Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 here] 
In Table 4, we compare project finance to the typical financing of corporations (corporate 
finance). The main difference lies in the nature of the company. In project finance, the 
company is an SPV, which means that the company only operates one particular project such 
that one could state that the company is in fact the project.  
In project finance, debt represents at least 70% of the investment, often more. This figure is 
three times greater than in traditional corporate finance (Esty, 2004). In a company, the 
shareholders ultimately own the assets, and debt is usually guaranteed by those assets, or at 
least in part. In project finance, debt is only guaranteed by the future project’s cash, and the 
SPV does not own the asset, but only a concession contract for a long but limited period. 
Business risk and, consequently, interest and discount rates can significantly vary across 
firms. Nevertheless, before the recent financial crises, this variation was very low in project 
finance as the interest rates used for discounting were not significantly above the risk-free 
rate, which reflected the low level of project risk. 
A disadvantage of project finance is that transaction costs are higher than those in traditional 
corporate financing because the concession contracts are complex and incomplete. However, 
the long-term high level of investment in project finance enables more efficient financing. By 
transferring risks to other parties (who can manage them better), project finance promotes 
more efficient and transparent risk sharing and risk management. Ultimately, high leverage 
with a low risk premium allows for a reduced weighted average cost of capital.  





4. Renegotiations  
 
Many PPP contracts are renegotiated at one point in time. Renegotiations (also known as 
financial rebalancing or financial rescue agreements (FRAs)) are usually triggered by a 
specific event and affect the financial conditions of the concession (Yescombe, 2011). 
Renegotiations usually result from unpredicted or uncontrolled events, although some 
conditions triggering renegotiation are listed in the contract. It should be noted that adjusting 
tariffs for inflation is not considered a renegotiation. Only when substantial departures from 
the original contract occur and the contract is amended shall we label such a change as a 
renegotiation. 
There are several reasons why renegotiations frequently occur in PPPs; the long-term and 
complex nature of such contracts and the political context make it impossible to foresee all 
future states of the world (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009). There are three main events 
that trigger renegotiations: (i) bankruptcy of the SPV, obliging the public sector to rescue the 
project; (ii) failure due to incorrect contractual assumptions that affect the private partner’s 
profitability; or (iii) a unilateral change by government that results in changes that affect the 
concession. Usually, a tariff increase or financial compensation from the government to 
restore the profitability of the PPP is the outcome of the renegotiations. 
Renegotiations initiated by governments are usually related to political decisions that affect 
the concession contract or the financial conditions. These political decisions can affect several 
stages of the concession. At the design and build phase, governments can make changes in the 
project (reducing or increasing investments and additional works), change environmental 
requirements or create new administrative delays. Other changes can occur at the operational 
stage, such as specific legal changes or contract changes, regarding issues such as tariffs, 
service requirements, or payments.   
Most PPP renegotiation studies relate to the South American transport, water, and sanitation 
sectors.
3
 These studies document that the existence of a regulator, better quality of the 
institutional framework, GDP growth, and a low level of corruption reduce the probability of a 
renegotiation. In contrast, price caps on tariffs, a need for follow-up investments and new 
elections increase the odds that the concession contract will be altered.
4
  
In sum, PPP renegotiations can be an opportunity to adjust and address new conditions and 
terms of a project and thus increase the projects value, on either the public or the private side.  
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To illustrate how renegotiations work in practice, we will analyse two case studies, but we 
turn first to the methodology employed. Given that academic finance research on PPPs is still 
in its early days, the two case studies will demonstrate the specific characteristics and 
idiosyncrasies of PPPs in relation to the complex process of contract renegotiation. 
In the next subsection, we will answer the following questions: Why and how did Fertagus 
and Lusoponte renegotiate, and what were the negotiations’ outcomes? 
 
4.1 Two PPPs: Fertagus and Lusoponte 
 
Let us commence by introducing the two firms.  
 
Fertagus 
In 1997, the government decided to open a railway concession for the bridge named ‘Ponte 25 
de Abril’ (the 25
th
 of April Bridge) to improve the connection between the northern and 
southern parts of Lisbon. The concession contract with the private sector included investment 
in the transport material (rolling stock) and the railway service (operations and maintenance). 
The railway infrastructure was already available (when the bridge was built in the 1960s, it 
was prepared to have trains in the lower deck). The decision was to leave the infrastructure a 
public sector responsibility and allocate only the operations to a private company. In 1999, a 
contract was signed with Fertagus (one of the three bidders), a company owned by the 
Barraqueiro group, a private sector transport group already operating in the Lisbon 
metropolitan area but mainly in bus services.  
The contract conditions stipulated an investment of €114 M, which was to be made only with 
private sector funding through a bank loan of €89 M and equity of €25 M (or 22% of the total 
investment). The concession had a 30-year duration, with the financial viability dependent on 
revenues from traffic (i.e., tolls). The contract included the traffic conditions (density) under 
which the private sector was allowed to renegotiate. 
 
Lusoponte 
In the early 1990s, the Lisbon urban area, south of the Tagus, was served by a single bridge
5
 
to reach the city. This situation presented a major constraint on traffic, not only in the city but 
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also between the northern and southern parts of the country. In 1992, the government decided 
to open a bidding process for a second bridge. This new bridge, called ‘Vasco da Gama’,
6
 
connected the eastern part of Lisbon to the southern rim in Alcochete. Two consortiums 
participated in the bidding, and the ‘Lusoponte’ consortium won. A design, build, finance, 
operate, and transfer model was set up in 1993 to build the new bridge (to open in 1998). 
There was a condition that the O&M of the older bridge (the ‘Ponte 25 de Abril’) would 
become the responsibility of Lusoponte starting on 1 January 1996. Lusoponte set up a typical 
PPP structure with a consortium of eight shareholders (which during the concession period 
was to be reduced to five
7
). 
The initial concession was financed by private and European Union funds, along with the 
revenues from the Ponte 25 de Abril, but without public funds. The total investment, €987 M, 
consisted of construction costs (€645 M) and other costs, including maintenance costs, 
payments to expropriate land and environmental costs. A significant amount of private debt 
was derived from the European Investment Bank (EIB). In 1993, before the introduction of 
the euro, Portugal was only able to borrow for the medium term (usually for only 3 to 5 
years). A 20-year loan was only possible by borrowing from the EIB. Hence, most of the debt 
was derived from EIB and not from commercial banks. Ultimately, funding came from EU 
funds (€319 M - 32%); ‘25 Abril’ revenues (€50 M - 5%); EIB loans (€299 M - 30%); bank 
loans (€120 M - 12%) and equity (€199 M - 20%), a total investment of €987 M. 
The concession period was to end as soon as 2.25 billion vehicles had crossed both sides of 
the river (which was expected to occur between 2019 and 2022) or on March of 2028, 
whichever came first. To allow the project to be financially sustainable without public direct 
investment, three conditions were agreed upon at the time of contract: 1) The toll prices on the 
existing bridge (‘25 de Abril’) would increase at the beginning of 1994 to reach the ‘Vasco da 
Gama bridge’ toll prices by 1998; 2) After 1994, the existing exemption on toll payments 
during August for the ‘25 de Abril’ bridge should end; 3) Until the end of the contract, if the 
government should decide to construct new bridges on the river, concession would have to be 
granted to Lusoponte. Thus, the absence of future competition was an important incentive to 
attract private funds for this project. 
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 Initial shareholder structure: Kvaerner Group (24.8%); Campenon Bernanrd SGE (22.0%); Bento 
Pedroso Construções (14.8%); Mota e Companhia (13.8%); Somague (13.8%); Teixeira Duarte 
(7.5%); H. Hagen (2.8%); Edifer (0.4%).  
Actual structure: Macquarie Infrastructure (UK) Limited (31%); Vinci Construction Grands Projects 
(31%); Mota/Engil, S.A. (14%); Somague Itinere - Concessões de Infraestruturas, S.A. (17%); 




The fact that the first two assumptions were determined to be unrealistic at a later stage 
triggered renegotiations. 
For each of the above mentioned PPPs, an SPV was created with long concession periods (20 
years for Fertagus and 30 years for Lusoponte). Fertagus had a high level of leverage (78%), 
whereas Lusoponte did not (42%, which is unusually low in project finance). The reason for 
the low debt level is that European Union grants (subsidies) represented 32% of the 
investment. The debts in both companies were ‘non-resource’ and included both senior and 
mezzanine debt.  
 
4.2 The process dynamics of the Fertagus and Lusoponte renegotiations  
 
 Fertagus  
 
The Fertagus contract comprised a band traffic system with three bands (an upper, a reference, 
and a lower band) to share traffic risk between the government and the private company. The 
concession contract defined conditions in terms of the real traffic that was expected to use the 
railway during the operation period (see Table 5). If traffic estimations were understated and 
real traffic exceeded the upper band, Fertagus would face a reduction in tariffs and would be 
responsible for improving service. If traffic projections were too optimistic, with real traffic 
falling below the lower band, Fertagus could demand a financial rescue. The following was 
the government’s guarantee to the private sector: the ability to address the possibility of 
overoptimistic government traffic projections, which would trigger a renegotiation. Fertagus 
could then ask for an increase in the concession period, tariffs and/or financial compensation. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 7 here] 
Over the period 1999–2003, the actual traffic was substantially below the lower band by 40%–
60% in every year (Figure 7). This allowed Fertagus to ask for a renegotiation that resulted in 
several changes to the concession, leading to a better and more balanced agreement between 
the parties. These conditions and changes were as follows: the financial compensation paid by 
the government to Fertagus was €24 M in 2004, €21 M in 2005, plus a total of €65 M split 
over the period 2005 to 2010)
8
. The net payment for this period was approximately € 80 M. 
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Although the private sector received a financial compensation, the concession period was 
reduced to 10 years (but the possibility of a 9-year extension was created). This extension 
would only apply if the concession became financially viable without public support, which 
indeed occurred in 2010. Fertagus is currently operating without any public financial support 
(until 2019 when the concession ends). The reasons for reducing the concession period were 
primarily to limit the private sector’s gains but also to ensure, if the SPV were to incur further 
losses, that the public sector would recover the project sooner, not having to face a new 
renegotiation process. A second change to Fertagus’ contract was that the traffic risk, which 
was originally shared, became Fertagus sole responsibility. Third, the financial conditions 
were also altered: despite the higher project risk (due to the assumption of traffic risk), the 
profitability was decreased (the internal rate of return [IRR] dropped from 10.9% to 7.8%). 
Fertagus passed on the senior debt to the public sector, along with ownership of the assets, but 
remained responsible for the debt service. Fourth, a claw-back mechanism was introduced, 
regulating the sharing of unexpected revenues between the government and the private sector. 
Fifth, the service conditions were also revised; users had to pay a higher tariff for services, 
and the number of trains was reduced. 
In the end, the public sector spent almost €80 M (in current 2014 prices) between 2004 and 
2010, but the concession could remain open and is now financially independent from public 
money. After 2010, as foreseen in the 2004 renegotiation, the concession period was extended 
to 2019, with no further public compensation. In fact, from 2010 onwards, the public sector 
continues to receive the revenues above the case-base forecast. Moreover, from 2017-2019, 






Initially, the Lusoponte concession was completely financed by the private sector, EU funds, 
and the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge revenues. This financial scheme depended on the three 
conditions previously mentioned. The contract established that if any of these three conditions 
was not met, Lusoponte could demand a renegotiation of the contract and financial 
compensation from the government. Additional clauses that could trigger renegotiations 
included ‘exceptional events’ in the currency market (unfavourable movement of the 
Escudo/Deutsche Mark exchange rate—prior to the introduction of the euro) and specific 
legislative changes with a direct impact on the concession. Risks to the public sector 
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representing possible financial compensation to the PPP were limited to unilateral changes to 
contract, force majeure, specific legal changes, and delays in EU grant payments or delays in 
land expropriations. The compensation could be made by using each of the following three 
mechanisms (or a combination thereof): (1) increase in the concession period, (2) increasing 
tolls or (3) direct financial compensation. If any of these events were to occur, the project 
could be renegotiated. Public financial compensation would have to assure minimum project 
financial stability. In the contract, financially stability was determined by a ‘ratio of debt 
coverage’
10
 of 1.13 in 1998, 1.19 in 1999, and 1.25 beyond. In addition, the project minimum 
IRR (pre-tax) was established to be 11.43%. 
In 1994, the government increased the Ponte 25 de Abril tolls, which led to a major political 
crisis involving street riots and a bridge blockade. To avoid future conflicts, the government 
decided not to increase the toll, maintain the August exemption, and start a discount policy for 
frequent users. These changes were valid for one year and had to be renewed each year (over 
the period 1995–2000). As previously mentioned, the private sector investment was initially to 
be paid by tolls from both bridges. The fact that the ‘25 de abril’ bridge toll prices did not 
increase reduced the expected revenues, unbalancing the financial base case. This loss of 
revenue led the company to request a renegotiation, which led to the first of five financial 
rebalance agreements (FRAs) (see Table 6).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In 2001, a global agreement (referred to as FRA 6) was reached to end the succession of 
FRAs. The agreement had three main objectives: (i) create a price policy that differentiates the 
toll prices on both bridges by keeping the price on the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge lower than 
that on the Vasco da Gama bridge, (ii) adapt the initial financial model to the new toll 
conditions, and (iii) end all of the remaining renegotiation requests and conflicts and adapt the 
concession to the new financial conditions of the Eurozone. These new conditions allowed for 
a refinancing of the concession and substantially lowered the cost of debt. Portugal´s entrance 
to the Eurozone, along with the borrowing conditions in the financial markets during that 
period, significantly reduced the country’s interest rate, making credit abundant and cheap. 
The private sector fully benefited from these new financial conditions of Lusoponte. 
The global agreement compensated the private partner in different ways: there was (i) a direct 
financial compensation (a total of €306 M, divided between 2001 to 2019); (ii) an increase in 
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the concession period, until 2030. Considering that in the initial contract the concession period 
was determined to last until 2.25 billion vehicles had crossed both sides of the river (which 
was expected to occur between 2019 and 2022), the concession period has increased 7 to 11 
years beyond the initial projections. (iii) A change in the risk allocation matrix (reducing the 
risk to the private partner). (iv) The end of Lusoponte’s responsibility for the Ponte 25 de 
Abril bridge’s O&M (reducing the overall cost to the private sector). (v) The continuation of 
the concession at an 11.43% IRR pre-tax. (vi) If the corporate tax rate were to increase by 
more than 1 p.p., the government would have to compensate the company (see Table 7). In 
spite of these benefits given to Lusoponte, there was no claw-back clause that would allow the 
public sector to share future additional (unexpected) benefits. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The global agreement (FRA 6) has led to changes in the original risk allocation matrix. Three 
types of risks have changed: (i) Generic legislative changes (e.g., an increase in the tax rate 
would not affect this company, as the government would provide financial compensation for 
an additional tax burden). (ii) The operational risk of the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge, which was 
originally the private sector’s responsibility, became a public responsibility, as the operational 
costs were paid by the Ministry of Transport. (iii) The financing and demand risks, which 
were allocated to the private sector in the original contract, are now shared between the two 
parties. Overall, the private sector risk level was decreased, but despite the reduction in the 
risk level of the project, there was no reduction in the PPP profitability (which is very 
different from that in the Fertagus case). In fact, now with less risk, Lusoponte has continued 
to have the same pre-tax IRR as in the initial agreement. 
In 2007, Lusoponte asked for an FRA 7, following changes in corporate tax rates, a 
reclassification of vehicles in terms of toll payments, the introduction of tolls in the month of 
August and additional maintenance work necessary on the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge. As a 
consequence, the government directly paid Lusoponte €22 million.  
These series of renegotiations over the past 15 years have significantly altered the concession 
characteristics. As we have described, there were changes in the risk allocation matrix, 
reducing the project risk. In addition, the debt conditions have improved, lowering the cost of 
debt to Lusoponte. However, the main change is that the project no longer solely relies on 
private funds. The several renegotiations resulted in a variety of types of public funding: direct 
financial compensation, an increase in the concession period and a reduction in the concession 
maintenance costs. How did this public funding change the overall funding of this investment? 
At the end of these renegotiations, the funding of the project had changed substantially. From 




financed through public resources. Focusing on the initial funding (the €987 M of investment 
mentioned previously), we learn that the public sector financial support resulting from the 
renegotiations amount to half of this value.  
 
 
 4.3 Main findings from the case studies 
 
Up to this point, we have discussed how Fertagus and Lusoponte renegotiate. However, what 
can we learn from these two cases? Table 8 summarises the main findings. 
First, the events that led to renegotiations were substantially different in each case: In 
Fertagus, it was the fact that demand was below the case-base estimation. In Lusoponte, it was 
a political decision to change the contract conditions, regarding toll prices. This led to a 
fundamental difference: In Fertagus, renegotiation was initiated by the private company that 
was facing imminent bankruptcy, giving stronger bargaining power to government. In 
Lusoponte, renegotiations resulted from the government’s decision not to increase tariffs. This 
unilateral change in the contract gave the private company a strong asymmetric position in the 
negotiations. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
This difference was aggravated by three other factors: (i) the fact that Fertagus belongs to a 
group whose sole business is to operate several public transportation firms in the Lisbon 
region may have an impact on the private-side negotiation position. There may have been a 
reputational cost to the private group in the collapse of the project or in the PPP being 
perceived by public opinion as inefficient and a waste of public money. (ii) In Lusoponte, 
changes in the public administration structure concerning the monitoring and evaluation of 
this project took place. At the beginning of the contract, Lusoponte was supervised by a 
specific government department (GATTEL). With the extinction of this department, the PPP 
competences regarding the project were divided between the Ministries of Finance and 
Transport. According to several Court of Audit reports, and as emphasised in (De Lemos, 
2004), this division has created coordination problems, which have been aggravated by 
changes in government and policy. (iii) Another reason why Lusoponte did so well in the 
renegotiations was caused by the fact that the initial contract did not account for social and 
political risks. The two bridges have different users. Those who use the ‘25 de Abril’ bridge 
do not frequently use the ‘Vasco da Gama’ bridge. Therefore, the former see the increase in 




did not provide a preview of the necessary mechanisms to allow the public sector to validate 
the company´s financial demands.  
Thus, although both projects had public financial support, their renegotiations outcomes were 
substantially different: Fertagus’s renegotiation resulted in a more sustainable and robust 
concession that became financially independent as it relied only on commercial revenues 
(after 2010). This renegotiation resulted from two main changes in the concession: First, 
deleveraging of the Fertagus balance sheet led to better financial conditions. Second, the 
change in the demand risk made it possible for Fertagus to be more flexible in commercial 
issues (especially those related to traffic, such as prices, discount policies, and timetables) and 
focus more on operations. The public sector also benefited from the renegotiation: 
mechanisms for sharing upper-side revenue enabled the government to reimburse part of the 
public financial effort because demand has been above the new projections for traffic. In 
addition, the reduction in the project risk was followed by a reduction in company 
profitability. This renegotiation forged a new equilibrium between the private sector’s profit 
and the public sector’s interests.  
In contrast, the Lusoponte renegotiation process was quite the opposite that of Fertagus. 
Several issues significantly changed because of the chain of renegotiations. In the initial 
concession, tolls were supposed to have the same price in both bridges. Between 1995 and 
2000, toll prices for the ‘25 de Abril’ bridge were frozen; after the global agreement, it was 
decided that a different price system for each bridge would be maintained. After the first 
renegotiation, a discount policy was introduced. In the global agreement, Lusoponte was 
granted a tax benefit to compensate for the increase in the corporate tax rate. Moreover, 
although the project risk was reduced, the concession profitability did not decrease. The 
government also increased direct compensation, extended the concession period, and reduced 
maintenance costs. In this renegotiation, the public sector gave in to anything requested by 
Lusoponte (see Table 6). This situation raises some doubts about whether the public sector 
was able to correctly assess the consequences of the demands from the private sector. These 
concerns were also expressed by the Portuguese Court of Audits. Furthermore, while real 
traffic during these years was above the traffic projections in the base case, whose benefits 
were entirely captured by the private parties, without being accounted for in the 
renegotiations. As a result, a substantial part of the investment (which was expected to be 
financed exclusively trough private funds and EU subsidies) was financed through public 
resources.  
Ultimately, the Fertagus renegotiation shows that when both parties are committed to sustain 
current and future relationships, they are prone to negotiate a better agreement, ensuring long-




accounted for an accumulated loss of €32 M (a deviation of –600%) relative to the initial base 
case. From 2005 until 2010, the company had a total profit after taxes of €56 M (an increase 
of 42% compared to the renegotiated base case). Improved concession conditions, better 
management, and higher demand were the main causes of this turnaround.  
In contrast, in Lusoponte, these renegotiations ended up requiring substantial public sector 
financial effort, which led to significant opposition to this project and contributed to a 
generally negative view of PPPs in Portugal. As indicated by (de Lemos, Eaton, Betts, & de 
Almeida, 2004), a complete risk management analysis requires an assessment based not only 




We sought the answers to three research questions: (i) What are the main characteristics of 
PPPs? (ii) How does the private sector structure and finance PPPs? (iii) Why and how are PPP 
contracts renegotiated?  
This paper advocates an integrated approach to PPPs, both from the perspective of the public 
and the private sector. Concerning the first question, the main reason why PPPs stand between 
traditional procurement and privatisation is the different role that the private sector plays in 
each stage of a project. However, PPPs also differ in terms of contract, ownership, risk, 
financing, costs, and public budget treatment. Regarding this last issue, by using a PPP, there 
are no costs to the public sector during the investment stage, but annual payments to the 
private company arise over the contract period. PPPs thus avoid budget constraints during the 
construction of infrastructure. Governments should carefully weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs.  
Regarding the second question, we document that PPPs are very different from traditional 
firms in terms of asset ownership, project duration, amount of debt and risk and shareholder 
structures. The financial engineering of PPPs (based on attracting high levels of debt solely 
based on the project cash flows) generates opportunities for more efficient use of capital.   
The two case studies reflect, in response to the third research question, why and how both 
PPPs renegotiate. PPPs have specific characteristics, such as the incomplete nature of the 
contracts that make them prone to renegotiate. However, renegotiations are regarded as a 
pitfall in PPPs. In fact, the likely outcome of most renegotiations is an increase in the costs to 
users and/or taxpayers. Moreover, in many cases, there is a reduction in the quality of service, 




contribute to a generalised negative perception of PPPs and private sector involvement in 
public services. This view reduces the scope of the private sector to improve and reform the 
public sector, along with the private sector’s ability to provide an alternative to public budget 
restrictions.  
PPP projects must be designed to address the issues that can lead to renegotiations and to 
facilitate them in a balanced manner. In many cases, renegotiations are not used to improve 
the conditions of a project. However, renegotiations will be used to that end only if both 
parties are committed to creating a sustainable solution.  
We observed all of these factors in both case studies. The Fertagus renegotiation was a 
success, allowing for a financially viable concession because both parties were committed to 
achieving a more robust concession. This success can be attributed to two reasons: the fact 
that Fertagus belonged to a group already operating in transport in the Lisbon area and the fact 
that renegotiation was requested by the private sector, facing eminent bankruptcy. By contrast, 
the Lusoponte renegotiation was a failure in which public funds were used due to political 
decisions instead of being used to improve public services. Regarding renegotiations, we can 
learn from these two case studies that governments should be extremely careful when 
designing a concession and a corresponding contract. Governments must anticipate on the 
possibility of renegotiation events. In addition, control and regulation of the contract during 
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Figure 1- Different government procurement models 
 
































Figure 2- Public procurement vs. PPP financial outflows in highway construction 
 















Figure 3– Lusoponte’s PPP structure 
 





































Figure 4– A typical PPP structure 
 











































Figure 5– PPP finance during the construction stage 
  
 
Source: own exhibit 
 
Figure 6– PPP finance during the operational stage 
 
Source: own exhibit 
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Figure 7– Lower band traffic and real traffic in Fertagus from 1999 to 2003 


































Table 1 – Different PPP models 
This table presents the most common PPP models with the division of the responsibilities over the 
public/private sectors by project stage. Source: own table. 
Model Design Build Finance Ownership Operate Transfer 
 






























































































responsible for all 
stages of the 
project. 
Government is responsible 
for planning the output and 
outcomes of the project and 
usually also for payments. 
The other issues are the 
private sector´s 
responsibilities. 
Private sector is 
responsible for 
all stages of the 
project. 
Risk 
Risk is entirely 
(or almost 
entirely) assumed 
by public sector. 
Risk is shared between 
public and private sector. 
Private sector assumes 
several risks, (usually: 
design, construction, 
financing, operations and, in 






Private sector is 
only responsible 
for construction 
costs of the asset. 
Private sector is responsible 
for the ‘whole life costing’ 
(capex and opex) of the 
project. 
Private sector is 
responsible for 














No impact on budget during 
the investment stage (PPPs 
are off-balance sheet). Only 
payments, during 
operational stage, are public 
expenditures. 
No public funds. 
Private sector 






the public budget 
(i.e., taxes or 
public debt). 
Investment is financed by 
private sector, equity and 






There is only a 
construction 
contract between 
government and a 
private firm. 
There is a concession 
contract, for a number of 
years (usually 30 y or more), 
specifying the conditions of 
design, construction, 
financing, operation, 
payments and residual 
value/transfer. 
There is a selling 
contract of the 
asset/service to 




Asset is owned by 
public sector. 
Asset is public or 











Table 3 –PPPs advantages and disadvantages from a government perspective 
This table discusses the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs from a public sector perspective.  







































Impact on GDP 
and on unit costs 
Temptation to 
build assets with 
no economic or 
social rationality 
Public funds 







Better use of 
public resources 
VfM is complex 
and difficult to 
measure; 
VfM is based 
mainly on risk 
transfer 
It is not clearly 








Risks allocated to 




Risk is complex 
process;  












managers to address 
key issues and not 
disperse with non-
significant problems 
Lack of clear 
public policies and 
objectives; 
PPP planning is 
complex  


























Table 4 – Corporate finance versus project finance 
This table presents the main differences between corporate and project finance. Source: own table. 
Issue Corporate Finance Project Finance 
Company 
portfolio 
Usually a large portfolio of 
business units and, in some cases, 
in several countries. 
The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
only owns and operates the project. 
Asset 
ownership 
Shareholder ultimately owns the 
assets. 
Usually assets belong to 
governments (especially in PPPs); 
the SPV owns a concession contract. 
Duration No limit in time. 
The concession contract period is 
often long but limited (20-30 years).  
Debt 
guarantees 
Debt is guaranteed by the assets. 
‘Non-resource debt’. The only 
guarantee is the future cash-flows of 
the project. 
Debt priority 
 Bank debt is usually secured. If 
not, there is no debt bank 
prioritisation. 
There is Senior and Junior debt. 
Cash-Flows first repay Senior, later 
Junior and finally equity return.   
Debt balance 
sheet 
Debt appears in company’s 
balance sheet. 
Debt is on the SPV balance sheet.  
 
Leverage 
Medium level (30%-40%) (Esty, 
2004). 
High level: 
(70%-90%), (Esty, 2004); (Blanc-
Brude & Strange, 2007)  
(80%-90%), (Spackman, 2002);  
(80%-98%), (Sarmento, 2010) 




Debt level is related to total assets 
and equity. 
Adjust debt to the project cash-




Level of interest rates is firm-
specific.  
Interest rates are usually low 
(spreads from 1%-2%), a little above 
the free-risk rate. 
Business risk Significant variation, firm-specific  
Low level of risk for sponsors and 
lenders 
Dividend policy Decided by board of directors. 
Dividend policy is fixed. Dividends 
are almost 100% of net income. No 
reinvestment outside the project is 
allowed by the SPV. 
Transaction 
costs 
Low, due to strong competition. 









Table 5 - The traffic bands in the Fertagus concession 
This table shows the predicted traffic bands in Fertagus’s initial contract and the conditions of the private 
company for each traffic scenario. Source: Fertagus 
Annual traffic Conditions to Fertagus 
Above the upper band Improvement in the service and a review of tariffs. 
Upper band Increasing costs to Fertagus 
Reference band According to the concession conditions 
Lower band Reducing costs to Fertagus 




Table 6 – Synthesis of the first five Lusoponte Financial Rebalance Agreements 
This table summarises the outcome of the first five renegotiations (1995 - 2000). Source: own table, based 
on Court of Audits information. 
Request 
fundamentals 
Value of the 
demand by 
Lusoponte 




FRA 1 – 24/03/1995 




 Increase in the 
project risk due to 
protests 
€ 90.4 M € 90.4 M Direct compensation 
FRA 2 – 23/09/1996 
 No increase in 
tools 
€ 4.9 M € 4.9 M€ Direct compensation 
FRA 3 – 17/02/1997 
 Exemption in 
August of 1996 and 
1997 
€ 4.9 M € 4.9 M Direct compensation 
FRA 4 – 22/02/1999 
 No increase in 
tools 
 Exemption in 
August of 1998 
€ 63.2 M €4 .9 M Direct compensation 
FRA 5 – 03/03/2000 
 No increase in 
tools 
 Exemption in 
August of 1999 










Table 7 – Dynamics of negotiation towards the global agreement 
This table presents the initial agreement’s conditions that were changed in the 2001 global agreement. 
Source: own table, based on Court of Audits information. 
Conditions Initial agreement 2001 Global agreement 
Tools 
Two bridges with the 
same tool price 
Pricing difference between the 
two bridges 
Commercial policy Non-existent Frequent user discount 
Tax benefits Non-existent 
Changes in the recognition of 
revenues, reduction in 
corporate income tax 
Concession period 
Up to 2.25 million 
vehicles 
2030 
Claw-back Non-existent Non-existent 
 
Table 8 – Renegotiations 
This table presents the main features in both renegotiation case studies. Source: own table 
Characteristics Fertagus Lusoponte 
Event (s) that lead to 
renegotiation 
 Demand below initial forecast 
 Government decisions to not 
increase tolls price or end 
august exemption in ‘25 
Abril’ bridge 
Renegotiation request by  Private  Public 
Nº renegotiations  1  7 




Changes in contract 
 Deleverage of Fertagus 
balance-sheet 
 Change in demand risk 
 Claw-back mechanism 
 From 1995 to 2000, public 
financial compensations 
 In 2001 (global agreement):  
 Change in toll prices 
 Increase in concession 
period 
 Financial compensation 
 No claw-back 
Did project risk change, and 
how? 
 Yes, reduce  Yes, reduce 
Did project profitability change, 
and how? 
 Yes, reduce  No 
Public sector financial support  € 80 M  € 500 M 
Renegotiation outcome 
 Concession remain open 
 Good performance and 
service quality 
 After 2010, concession 
became financial viable 
 Public sector has shared the 
gains above the base case, 
after renegotiation 
 Public funds support most of 
the investment 
 Additional benefits were 
totally captured by private 
sector 









Renegotiating Public-Private Partnerships 
 
ABSTRACT 
The renegotiations of public–private partnership (PPP) contracts are commonly considered to be one of 
the pitfalls of PPPs, as they tend to undermine their (ex ante) efficiency. A renegotiation occurs when 
specific events change the conditions of a concession, frequently leading to a financial claim from the 
private sector on the public sector. This paper examines the Portuguese experience with PPP 
renegotiations by means of a unique panel data of 254 renegotiation events from 1995 to 2012. We find 
evidence of opportunistic bidding for PPP contracts, which is ex post – after the contract is won and the 
competition eliminated - leading to renegotiations to increase revenues. Renegotiations last on average 
1.8 years. Majority governments are more prone to renegotiate and have more political clout to limit the 
renegotiation duration. There is no evidence of more renegotiations in election years or when there is a 
change in government. A better institutional framework, defined as a low country risk, a strong rule of 
law, and lower corruption, tends to reduce the probability of renegotiations. There is also evidence that at 
times of higher corruption, more renegotiations occur. The project’s leverage decreases the renegotiation 
duration. Strong initial bidder competition for a PPP contract leads to long subsequent renegotiations 
between the winning private party and the government.  
 
KEYWORDS: Public–Private Partnerships; Concessions; Renegotiations 





Over the last few decades, PPPs have been increasingly used by governments around the world 
to finance and manage complex (infrastructural) operations. In this sense, PPPs can be described 
as “…an agreement between the government and one or more private partners (which may 
include the operators and the financiers) according to which the private partners deliver the 
service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with 
the profit objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment 
depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners” (OECD, 2008, pg.17). In this 
way, PPPs are long-term contracts (typically 30–40 years) whereby the private sector assures 




contracts have frequently been subject to renegotiations. Renegotiations occur when specific 
events – often referred to ‘compensation events’ - change the financial conditions of the 
concession. This is mainly the case when the public authority has to compensate the project 
company for a loss of revenue or unanticipated additional costs. A change in compensation 
usually occurs in three situations when a renegotiation is initiated by the government: (i) the 
public sector requires a change in the contract (unilaterally), (ii) the public sector’s actions 
create a liability to the project company, and (iii) a change in a law occurs which affects the 
profitability of the project (Yescombe, 2011). Alternatively, renegotiations can be initiated by 
the private sector and this is mainly the case when the concession’s financial conditions 
deteriorate in such a way that the private company may slip towards bankruptcy. The solution is 
then some additional financial compensation or a revision of the concession terms (e.g. 
increasing prices, reducing investments or lowering operational costs by reducing service 
requirements).     
Given a high degree of uncertainty in these long-term PPP contracts, provisions are included 
regarding the possibility of future renegotiations in case specific events would arise. One of 
criticisms on PPPs is that the high rate of renegotiations undermines the credibility of the initial 
bids by the private sector for PPP projects as the bidding parties may expect renegotiations (that 
tilt in their favour) which affect the bidding competition and the efficiency of PPPs. 
Furthermore, renegotiations impose an additional burden on the public budget. PPPs also have 
particular characteristics that make them more prone to renegotiations, as they are long-term, 
complex, and incomplete contracts. In addition, they occur in heavily regulated sectors that are 
sensitive to political and circumstantial changes. These factors combined with the high levels of 
investment result in larger uncertainty. Therefore, the understanding of the renegotiation process 
is a key aspect of the ex-ante PPP contracting. Only few (geographically disperse) studies have 
touched on this subject, which calls for more research. 
PPP renegotiations on South-American PPPs were examined by Guasch, Laffont, & Straub 
(2003) who identify the renegotiation determinants. The find that a stronger institutional, 
political, and legal environment providing contractual security, reduces the probability of future 
renegotiations, whereas an increase in the level of corruption, elections (bringing different 
political parties to power), or higher required follow-up investments tend to increase the 
probability of renegotiations. 
Since 1993, Portugal has been a leader in the use of PPPs (as a percentage of GDP) with 35 
PPPs to date.  According to Sarmento (2010), the main incentive for the government to adopt 
this intensive use of PPPs was the “off-balance sheet advantage”. By using PPPs rather than 
traditional procurement, the Portuguese governments were able to build a large infrastructure 






 The majority of PPPs in Portugal involved the road sector, accounting for 22 
projects and 80% of total PPP investment, while PPPs were also used in the railway sector, 
health care, and security.  
Despite their prevalence, there has been little discussion or investigation into PPPs in Portugal. 
Only two studies based on a sample of 87 companies focus on the Portuguese experience with 
renegotiations: one at the state central level (Cruz & Marques, 2013b) and the other at the local 
government level (municipalities) (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). They conclude that the concession 
duration, the investment, and the existence of a regulator are correlated with the probability of 
renegotiations.  
The intensive use of PPPs over the last two decades makes the Portuguese experience an 
interesting study object. This entails that we have a sufficient number of observations (in 
contrast to earlier more descriptive research) to quantify the renegotiation probability and 
motives (by means of probit, multinomial logit, and duration models).  
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of PPP renegotiations and aim to answer three 
questions: (i) How does the PPPs renegotiation process work? (ii) What determines the 
probability of PPP renegotiation? and (iii) What is the average duration of a renegotiation event 
and its determinants? 
In relation to the first question, we have collected data on 254 renegotiations events between 
1995 and 2012, the vast majority of which is in the road sector. About 75% of the all the PPPs 
were renegotiated at least once. On average, the first negotiation occurs 3.5 years after the 
concession was awarded. Renegotiations generally occur for several reasons, particularly for 
“specific legal changes” (i.e., a government changes legislation or the regulatory framework 
affecting only the specific sector of the PPP and not general legislation affecting the 
concession), the costs of archaeological findings (construction delays, changed building plans), 
and additional (contractually unforeseen) work requiring more investments. The abnormally 
high frequency of renegotiations raises the question as to whether renegotiations should be 
regarded as natural and typical aspect of the PPP or they induce a substantial disadvantage of 
the PPP procedure relative to procurement as they drive up the costs for the government. 
To answer the second question, we find that some concession variables have an impact on the 
probability of renegotiation. According to our results, PPPs not yet renegotiated are more likely 
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 The EU rules for PPP accounting (in national accounts), is that PPP investments will not count for the 
deficit and debt, as long as the private sector holds the construction risk and one of two risks: availability 
risk or the demand risk. Availability risk means that the private company will be paid as long it provides 
the availability of the asset or service, independently of the volume of utilization. Therefore, during the 
construction stage, there is no impact on the public finances. Later, at the operational stage, the public 





to be renegotiated than previously renegotiated PPPs undergoing further renegotiations. PPPs in 
the operational stage are more likely to renegotiate. Renegotiations occur more frequently when 
the number of initial competitors was higher, which may reflect more aggressive bidding. It 
could be that the winning company has made too low a bid or underestimated the costs, possibly 
anticipating a renegotiation at a later stage when the competition would have been eliminated. 
Election years (and their lags and leads) and a change in government appear to have no impact 
on renegotiations. Conversely, majority governments tend to enter renegotiate more often, as 
they have more power and face less scrutiny than governments which only have minority 
support in Parliament. We also report that a better economic and legal framework also reduces 
the odds of renegotiation. A larger degree of economic corruption is correlated to more frequent 
renegotiations, as governments will be more prone to satisfy private demands. 
Regarding the third question, we find that a renegotiation event has an average duration of 1.8 
years. Concession age, contract duration, and leverage all reduce the duration of each 
renegotiation event, whereas the number of initial bidders, the size of the capital expenditure, 
and PPPs in the operational stage increase the renegotiation duration. Renegotiations in the year 
after elections reduces the duration which is also the case when a right wing government 
renegotiates. Majority governments make quicker decisions. Finally, there is some evidence that 
an improvement in the economic and legal environment (such as a lower country risk or lower 
corruption) tends to make renegotiation last longer. This finding could be explained by the fact 
that a better prepared public sector may be more likely to defend the public interest, extending 
the renegotiations for that purpose. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on renegotiation. 
Section 3 presents the methodology and data. The Portuguese PPP renegotiations are discussed 
in section 4, and the econometric results are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents the 
conclusions.   
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Public–Private Partnerships 
 
Many PPP agreements occur in regulated markets that are politically sensitive. PPPs require that 
project risks are shared between the public and private sectors. During the contract period, the 
government or the users or both will pay for the asset or service. The payments from the 




observe, possible renegotiations can create uncertainty regarding future payments and 
government liabilities. 
The use of PPPs has generated much criticism, some related to disappointing efficiency, 
(Glaister, 1999; Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2006), constraints in competition (Bovaird, 
2004), or lack of accountability ( Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003; Froud, 2003; Asenova & Beck, 
2010). However, the two main points of criticism relate to the fact that PPPs tend not to yield 
value for money (VfM) and that PPPs are initiated by “off-budget temptations” (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). In many cases, PPPs do indeed not yield VfM, meaning they do not provide the 
required quantity and quality of services at a lower overall cost (i.e., the whole-of-life cost to 
meet the user requirements) (Ball, Heafey & King, 2007). The temptation to deliver a public 
service through a PPP relates more to budget limitations than to efficient public procurement, 
especially when fiscal constraints are binding. PPPs postpone the required public investment, 
and as such do not affect a government’s current deficit and debt, and avoid budget restraints.  
A further criticism relates to the fact that PPPs tend to be frequently renegotiated. In fact, a long 
concession period, risk sharing, political change, and the sensitivity of regulated markets all 
substantially increase uncertainty to all stakeholders (Chan, Levitt & Garvin, 2010). 
Renegotiations have become a major issue in PPPs, but the literature on this topic is scarce.  
 
2.2   PPP renegotiations 
 
Renegotiations can be defined as a revision of the concession contract, affecting and altering the 
financial balance of the project firm (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2007). However, changes that 
are anticipated in the contract, such as tariff adjustments for inflation, are not considered 
renegotiations. Only when substantial departures from the original contract occur and the 
contract is then amended, can it be said that a renegotiation has occurred. However, 
renegotiations may also stem from opportunistic behaviour from one of the parties, as bidders 
for a PPP contract who assume that renegotiations may occur, may bid more aggressively 
(Williamson, 1989). Subsequently, when the concession has been awarded, renegotiations can 
occur without further competition from the other bidders. In this way, an opportunistic bidder 
could seek renegotiation to compensate for his initial under-bidding (Guasch, 2004). An 
opportunistic bidder may be in a strong position because in most cases, the interruption of the 
public service is unacceptable because of the social or the political costs, leading to a 
compromised negotiation position for the government. The opposite could also occur when 
governments try to interfere with contract clauses, such as in the Lusoponte case-study where 




contract (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014b). In some renegotiations, the public sector could hold 
a lot of bargaining power, mainly when the private company is in a difficult financial condition 
and bankruptcy would have a significant impact on the shareholders (either financially or in 
terms of reputation). 
Renegotiations are considered to be one of the pitfalls of PPPs for two reasons: the abnormal 
frequency of renegotiations (especially shortly after they have been awarded) (Schwartz, 
Corbacho & Funke, 2008) and the fact that they are viewed as a source of distress in the 
efficiency of PPPs (Guasch & Straub, 2006). Therefore, in the beginning of the partnership, the 
public sector must take into account the possibility of renegotiation over the lifetime of the 
concession and should clearly state in the concession contract what conditions and events can 
initiate a renegotiation. Whereas some authors consider a renegotiation event as a PPP failure 
(Froud & Shaoul, 2001; Jamali, 2004), others consider it a natural and typical process in PPPs 
(Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009). PPPs have several characteristics that make them more 
prone to renegotiations: they are long-term, complex, and incomplete contracts occurring in 
heavily regulated sectors that are sensitive to political and circumstantial changes, require a high 
level of investment, and have a high level of uncertainty. Estache, Guasch, & Trujillo (2003) 
identified several reasons for renegotiation: optimistic base-case scenarios, debt finance 
difficulties or high levels of leverage, interest rate changes, currency risk, and incorrect risk 
allocation. 
The issue of incomplete contracts is unavoidable as no contract can include every possible 
contingency. Furthermore, some events have such a low probability of occurrence that the cost 
of trying to exhaustively include all such events in a contract is prohibitively expensive. 
Moreover, a more complex contract would reduce the transparency in the use of public money.  
An additional important determinant is the country’s legal and political environment. The 
quality of regulation and regulatory bodies, along with the legislative and the rule of law, 
constrain the probability and scope of renegotiations. The pressure of forthcoming elections 
could also affect renegotiations. 
 
2.3 The main PPP renegotiation studies 
 
Unlike contract renegotiation theory (e.g., Grossman (1986); Williamson (1989); Tirole (1999); 
Hart (1990); Hart (2003)), the literature on PPPs (and particularly on renegotiations) is not 
abundant because private firms rarely share information on their agreements and are even more 
unlikely to share information about their renegotiation decisions and outcomes. For this reason, 




2010; De Brux, Beuve, & Saussier, 2011). The main study on (South-American) PPP 
renegotiations is by Guasch et al. (2003) which they subsequently expanded into several 
papers.
2
 These studies incorporate variables that capture both the contract clauses and the 
characteristics of the economic and institutional environments. In the 2003 study, 1,000 South-
American concessions were analysed over a period of nearly 20 years. Approximately 75% of 
the PPPs in transportation were renegotiated as were 90% of the water and sanitation PPPs. 
Guasch et al. (2003) reports that the existence of a regulator and better institutional quality 
reduce the probability of renegotiation, but GDP growth, additional investments, upcoming 
elections, and a reduction in the corruption level increase it. A regulatory body reduces the 
effect of contract incompleteness by leaving less room for mistakes and uncertainties. These 
results are confirmed for French PPPs by De Brux et al. (2011). 
Guasch & Straub (2006) and Guasch, Laffont, & Straub (2007) differentiate the probability of 
firm-led and government-led renegotiations, confirm the importance of the above variables. 
They also show that additional investment requirements and corruption positively affect the 
probability of public sector renegotiating (with a negative impact on the private sector) and that 
exclusive private financing has a positive impact on the probability of the private sector 
renegotiating (and a negative impact on the public one).   
Engel, Fischer & Galetovic (2009) study PPPs in Chile and find evidence that in a competitive 
market, firms lowball their offers, expecting to break even through renegotiation, while 
governments use renegotiation to increase spending and shift the burden of payments to future 
administrations. Reside Jr, & Mendoza Jr (2010), analyse PPP renegotiations in Asia and report 
that approximately 70% of PPPs are renegotiated because of currency risk, as the investments 
are paid in a different currency than the one for revenues and expenditures. While in the Latin-
American experience, the outcome of renegotiations was generally a tariff increase, the 
outcomes in Asia usually consisted of increased subsidies and financial compensation. Menezes 
& Ryan (2013), show that the winning firm (with the lowest bid) are more likely to require a 
subsequent government bail-out and more able to extract additional transfers from the 
government.  
The key issue is how to design better concession contracts, inducing both parties to comply with 
the agreed initial conditions. That way, the probability of renegotiation will be reduced, along 
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2.4 Endogeneity of PPP contracts in renegotiations 
 
The potential endogeneity of PPP contract design and subsequent renegotiations is a critical 
issue. Guasch et al. (2003) and Guasch & Straub (2006), state that contract endogeneity in PPPs 
comprises two problems: an ex-ante self-selection problem and an ex-post moral hazard one. 
The former arises because each party tends to choose specific contract clauses that are 
advantages to them given their own characteristics. For instance, a self-selection effect could 
make more efficient firms prefer price caps, which is more risky but also more profitable. The 
latter problem emerges when both parties act strategically according to the structure of the 
contract. For instance, shorter contracts may provide an incentive to firms to be more efficient 
as they seek to renew the concession. For longer contracts, a minimum income guarantee could 
induce firms to be more indolent in their efforts to be more efficient.  
Guasch et al. (2003) use as endogenous variables several contract conditions, such as the use of 
price caps, projects exclusively financed by the private sector, the existence of an arbitration 
process and a bidding procurement process, the existence of a minimum income guarantee 
(reducing private sector risk on revenues), and the duration of contracts. The instrumented 
variables were the sector, corruption, bureaucracy quality, rule of law, and the existence of a 
regulatory body. All endogenous variables increase the occurrence of renegotiations, with the 
exception of the bidding procurement process (which reduces the occurrence of renegotiations) 
and the arbitration process (which has no significant impact on the occurrence of 
renegotiations). This study was complemented by Guasch et al. (2007); Guasch, Laffont, & 
Straub (2008), and Guasch & Straub (2006, 2009), who focused on the determinants of 
government-led renegotiations and found largely similar results (but corruption was shown to 
have an impact on increasing renegotiations).  
De Brux et al. (2011) analyses the impact of renegotiations in the renewal of PPP contracts in 
the French parking sector. They use contract experience (a proxy for public sector experience in 
contractual agreements, less prone to renegotiations), political colour, and the change of the 
mayor as instruments for the average number of renegotiations. The authors conclude that only 












The renegotiations examined in this paper occurred over the period 1995 to 2012. Of a total of 
35 PPPs, 26 were renegotiated at least once and the total number of renegotiation events 
amounts to 254. The data were hand-collected from 35 reports (one for each PPP) from 
“Direcção Geral do Tesouro e Finanças” (DGTF), the ministry of finance department 
responsible for managing and monitoring PPPs in Portugal. 
We gathered from each report data on each PPP project’s renegotiation events, the year of the 
renegotiation request, the request’s motive, and the time of renegotiation completion (with as 
final date the end of 2012). Details given in Section 4. 
To examine the main determinants that affect the probability of a renegotiation we apply the 
following estimation methods: 
Probit (and logit) models on panel data whereby each year (our dependent variable) is labelled 
as either a renegotiation or no-renegotiation year. Specifically, we assume that the model takes 
the form: Pr  (𝑌 = 1 | 𝑋) =  𝜙 ( 𝑋´ 𝛽)   (1), where Pr denotes the probability, and Φ is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The parameters β can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood. It is possible to motivate the probit model as a latent variable 
model. Suppose there exists an auxiliary random variable: 𝑌 ∗ = 𝑋´ 𝛽 +  𝜀  (2) where ε ~ N(0, 
1). Thus, Y can be viewed as an indicator for whether this latent variable is positive: 
𝑌 =  
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌 ∗ > 0 𝑖. 𝑒 −  𝜀 < 𝑋 ´ 𝛽
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (3) 
In this model, the 254 renegotiation events take the value of 1. Non-renegotiation years take the 
value 0 and are the years in which the 26 PPPs were not renegotiated as well as all the 
concession years of the 9 PPPs that were never renegotiated. We have 175 non-renegotiation 
years and hence a total of 428 observations. We used a random-effects and population-averaged 
probit model, allowing us to cluster of standard errors at the PPP (project) level.  
We also estimate a multinomial logit model, with the motives for the renegotiation as dependent 
variables. Motive 1 captures the public sector reasons, i.e.: specific legal changes, corporate tax 
increases, administrative delays, contract changes, and changes in environmental requirements; 
Motive 2 represents construction motives i.e.: archaeological findings, additional 




the operational and major cause motives (low demand, major cause events, also called “Acts of 
God”, global agreement, additional financial compensation, and other events).  
Finally, we also apply a duration model (Cox Proportional-Hazards semi-parametric model) 
with as dependent variable the length of time of each renegotiation. In this model, Yi denotes 
the observed time (either the censored time or the event time) for renegotiation i, and let Ci be 
the indicator that the time corresponds to an event (i.e., if Ci = 1, the renegotiation occurred, and 
if Ci = 0, the time is a censored time). The hazard function has the form: 𝜆 (𝑡|𝑋) =
 𝜆𝑜(𝑡) exp  (𝛽1𝑋1 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑝) =  𝜆𝑜(𝑡) exp (β´X)  (4).  
The hazard function consists of two parts in multiplicative form: the baseline hazard, which is a 
function of the duration time, and a part that is a function of the explanatory variables and the 
associated parameters (Gujarati, 2011).  
 
3.2 Description of the data 
 
The probability of a renegotiation can be affected by characteristics of the project and the PPP 
contract, the country’s political environment and constraints, and the country’s economic and 
legal environment. We partition our variables into these five groups (and define them below):  
 
(1) Sector (roads, railways, health care, and security);  
(2) Concession characteristics: if the concession has never been renegotiated before (if this 
event is the first renegotiation), the concession age at the moment of each renegotiation event, 
the PPP stage (construction or operational stage) at the time of renegotiation, the availability 
payment, the main shareholders (foreign or domestic investors), the Ascendi Group (the most 
relevant actor in the PPP market with strong political ties), the contract duration, the 
investment, the number of bidders, the size of the loans from the EIB, and the debt in the PPP 
firm as a percentage of capex; 
(3) Political variables: the electoral years (indicator variables) and their lags and leads; the 
dominating political party in government (right or left wing); a year with a change in 
government; and whether the government has a parliamentary majority;  
(4) Legal variables: the composite risk rating, the contract’s viability, the legislative strength, 
the political risk rating, the corruption index, and the time period before and after the 2006 




(5) Macroeconomic variables: GDP growth, the size of the national deficit and public debt as 
a percentage of GDP. 
 
First renegotiation is 1 if the renegotiation event is the first PPP renegotiation and 0 if it is a 
subsequent renegotiation. PPPs never renegotiated should be more prone to renegotiation during 
the life-time of the concession.  
Concession age represents a PPP’s total number of years, beginning with the contract day and 
ending with the renegotiation request. During the life-cycle of a PPP, the probability of 
renegotiation may increase for two reasons: with the passing of time, PPPs are more prone to 
renegotiation because the initial forecast tends to be less accurate in the long term and the 
projects are more subject to instability. Therefore, we expect concession age to be positively 
related to the probability of renegotiation. 
Operational stage equals 0 when the renegotiation occurs during the construction stage, and 1 
during the operational stage. A renegotiation is expected to occur more frequently during the 
operational stage for two reasons: this stage is the longest part of the concession period and 
embeds most uncertainty.  
Availability payment equals 0 if a payment to the PPP is based on service (demand) and 1 if the 
payment is based on availability.  A PPP availability payment consists of a fixed annual rent, as 
long as the asset is in condition to be used according to the contractual requirements. This type 
of payment is expected to decrease the probability of renegotiation because the demand risk has 
been allocated to the public sector. Therefore, there is a lower uncertainty regarding the long-
term projections on revenues for the private party, which reduces its cost of capital.   
The Foreign shareholders variable is 0 if the majority of the equity capital is owned by 
domestic companies and 1 if the majority is owned by foreign companies. A foreign share stake 
majority may decrease the probability to renegotiate.  
Ascendi captures whether the PPP belongs to the Ascendi Group (equal to 1) or not (equal to 0). 
Ascendi is the largest group actively involved in Portuguese PPPs and has strong political ties, 
which strengthens its negotiations power.
3
  
Contract duration is the length of each PPP contract. Longer concessions are likely to be 
renegotiated more frequently due to the imprecision of long-run forecasting.  
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The Ascendi Group plays an important role in the road sector and belongs to two of the largest economic 
groups in Portugal: Mota-Engil, a large construction company, and BES, one of Portugal’s leading banks. 
Therefore, the importance of Ascendi and its political relationships makes it a relevant variable to study in 
renegotiations. Of the 35 PPPs, Ascendi accounts for 6 (all in the road sector). Of the 254 renegotiations 




Investment stands for the total investment required for each PPP. The higher it is, the higher is 
the risk for the owners of and lenders to PPPs. Large infrastructural projects are subject to more 
uncertainty regarding possible overruns in costs, especially during the construction period 
(Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, & Rothengatter, 2002; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). In this regard, 
the level of investments also increases the probability of renegotiations.  
Number of bidders stands for the number of companies that take part in the bidding for the 
project. Strong competition at the bidding phase could lead to underbidding which increases the 
probability of renegotiations. This may be due to the winner´s curse in that renegotiations can 
be viewed as the consequence of aggressive bids, with opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
some bidders who believe they will be able to renegotiate later so as to compensate their initial 
losses (Hong & Shum, 2002).   
Debt/Capex is the percentage of the investment financed by debt (the project’s leverage) and 
EIB is a dummy variable indicating whether the EIB has financed part of that debt. A high debt 
percentage represents the risk for the banking sector, which could increase the probability of 
renegotiations. Additionally, a high level of debt, despite being common in project finance can 
expose the project to shocks and crises in the financial markets, with consequences for the cost 
of debt and the financial sustainability of the project (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014a). The 
presence of the EIB is expected to improve the project’s financial conditions, borrowing rate, 
and sustainability, and thus reduce the probability of renegotiation. The EIB has played a very 
important role in PPP finance in Europe, particularly in Portugal. The bank not only offered 
loans at a lower interest rate than the market but also lends at longer maturities. As the EIB also 
provides expertise and renders international credibility to the PPP program and is thus an 
important factor encouraging international banks to participate in PPPs. Thus, we expect the 
presence of EIB loans to reduce the probability of a renegotiation. 
Election year (at t, t-1, and t+1). In an election year (or the year before), the number of 
renegotiations may increase as private parties may then find a more indulgent government.  
A right wing government may be more prone to renegotiate, as they may have better ties with 
private sector than a socialist government.  
Change in government is an indicator variable equal to 0 if after an election the government did 
not change (the governing political party remains in office) and 1 if there was a change in 
government.
4
 A new government can reconsider previous government’s decisions, either due to 
new priorities or political motives, and thus commence renegotiations of PPPs.  
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Majority Government equals 1 if the government at the time of renegotiation has a 
parliamentary majority (and equals 0 if not).
5
 A majority government has more clout when 
conducting negotiations and could possibly negotiate with a lower degree of transparency (Cruz 
& Marques, 2013b). Hence, this variable is expected to be positively correlated with the 
probability of renegotiation.  
Risk rating, contract viability, political risk, and rule of law proxy for the quality of contract 
(enforcement). These variables are dynamic, with the values ranging from 0 to 10, or 0 to 100. 
An increase in the score signifies an improvement in the country’s situation. Risk rating is a 
composite of political, financial, and economic risk, measuring the relative position of a country 
in these areas. Contract viability represents the risk of unilateral contract modification or 
cancellation and, at worst, outright expropriation of private owned assets. Political risk captures 
a country’ political stability. A more stable political situation is expected to reduce the 
probability of renegotiations, as there is less room for opportunistic behaviour from either the 
public or the private parties. Rule of law represents the quality and strength of the legal system: 
it shows the judicial limits of government to realize its policy program through the legislative 
arm of government. Better enforcement is expected to dissuade or reject inappropriate claims 
for renegotiations.    
Corruption is a dynamic variable ranging from 0 to 10 (with 10 being the lowest corruption).
6
 If 
operators believe that the governmental decision making is subject to influence, the odds for 
renegotiations as a way to capture additional rents may increase (Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999). 
2006 PPP law is 0 if the renegotiation has occurred before the approval of the 2006 PPP law 
and 1 subsequently. The first PPP law in Portugal was created in 2002, and established the 
general regime regarding the concept, preparation, bid, adjudication and monitoring of PPPs. 
However, there was an absence of regulatory and sector framework regarding renegotiations 
until this law was amended in 2006. This was done with the objective of increasing cooperation 
among public sector entities and improve the mechanism of controlling PPPs. Additionally, 
several dispositions regarding the renegotiation process were changed, particularly the 
negotiation procedures and mechanisms to share the benefits between public and private sector. 
This way, the law is expected to strength the legal ground for PPPs and hence to weaken the 
probability of renegotiations for both parties.  
                                                          
5
 The years with majority governments are 2002 through 2009. 
6
 The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived 
to be. A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 
to 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that it is perceived as 




GDP growth can influence infrastructural investments as macroeconomic shocks could increase 
the likelihood of the renegotiation of contracts. 
Deficit and public debt are given as a percentage of GDP. High deficit and debt could increase 
renegotiations for two reasons: First, renegotiations can enable governments to circumvent 
budgetary rules by postponing expenditures. Second, there is a binding budget constraint in 
Portugal due (in part) to the intensive use of PPPs (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014a). 
Furthermore, governments may focus on fiscal objectives rather than efficiency.  
Table 1 summarises the independent variables in this study, and indicates their expected signs. 
Table 2 exhibits their descriptive statistics. The Breusch–Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
rejects the null hypothesis. The Jarque-Bera test on variables’ normality is statistically 
significant, meaning that we can safely consider that the data have a normal distribution.  
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptives of PPP Renegotiations 
 
We answer the first research question: How does the PPP renegotiation process work? 
Portugal´s first PPP concerned the construction of the “Vasco da Gama” bridge (1999-2002 and 
2008-2010), which was followed by another 34 PPPs. The majority of these projects have been 
in the road sector (22 projects), with others in the health (10), railway (2), and security
7
 (1) 
sectors. A total of €20 billion was invested by the private sector over the past two decades. The 
large number of projects and investments implies a large amount payments to the private sector 
over the coming decades. Between 2014 and 2020, annual payments represent 1% of GDP; 
from 2020 to 2035, annual payments are expected to decline to a still sizeable 0.5% of GDP. 
Using the discount rate used by the public sector (6%), the annual payments for the next 30 
years represent a net present value which approximately amounts to 10% of the current GDP 
(2014). The high concentration of PPPs signifies that Portugal is a world leader in PPPs 
according to Sarmento & Reis (2012), which is confirmed when comparing the data on the 
amount invested in PPPs up to 2011 from the EIB with the GDP figures from 1995 to 2011 for 
each European country. We observe from Figure 1 that Portugal is by far the leading country in 
terms of PPP. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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For the road sector PPPs, a high degree of scepticism regarding their VfM has arisen. The 
profitability of the concessions, the conditions of renegotiation and financial rescues, and the 
high level of public payments have laid the basis for such doubts.  
Along with the burden that the PPP contracts place on the public sector, one also needs to 
consider the rapid pace at which these contracts were created. They were often established 
without ensuring that the public administration would be capable of managing them. The 
novelty of the PPP model added to the fact that the Portuguese government was not prepared for 
the level of complexity of these contracts, and has led to a number of questionable decisions. In 
addition, until 2003, there was no proper legal framework for PPPs and, until 2006, there was 
no legal PPP renegotiation framework. All this made the Ministry of Finance behave passively 
in terms of PPP follow-up. Given that Portugal was financially rescued by “the Troika” (the EU, 
ECB, and the IMF) in 2008, the adjustment program has included specific measures regulating 
PPPs (Sarmento & Reis, 2012). The renegotiation rate surged since the financial crises and the 
economic recession started in 2008 (Figure 2). From the 254 renegotiation events, the road 
sector accounted for 233, the railway sector for 17, the security sector for 3, and the health 
sector for 1 (Table 3,Panel A). A significant number of renegotiations took place during the 
operational stage (171 events, 155 of which were in roads). A large number of renegotiations 
were requested in a government election year (117 events, of which 112 were from roads). At 
the end of our sample period (end of 2012), 82 of the 254 renegotiation events were accepted, 5 
were rejected, and 167 are still under negotiation. As most renegotiations end with a financial 
compensation to the private company, the future liabilities for the Portuguese government have 
surged. Forty-three per cent of PPPs were renegotiated in the first 3 years (15 concessions out of 
a total of 35), and 57% in the first 4 years. A first renegotiation in a PPP takes place on average 
after 3.5 years since the signing of the PPP contract (see Table 3, Panel B). 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 here] 
Table 4 (panel A) categorizes the renegotiations by motive and sector. We observe that a 
substantial part of the renegotiations are initiated by the public sector, and follow legal changes, 
increases in taxes, or administrative issues. Unforeseen events, such as archaeological findings 
and major cause events are also an important source of renegotiations. The 14 renegotiation 
triggered by low demand in the railway sector result mainly from the MST project (the South 
Lisbon light railway) and Fertagus (the rail project on the Lisbon bridge) (Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2014b). The average time between the PPP contract and the first renegotiation 
event is 7 years. When we only consider the 155 renegotiation events that occurred during the 
operational stage, the average time for renegotiation is 6 years with a standard deviation of 3.3 




[Insert Table 4 here] 
Relative to the Latin-American PPPs (Guasch, 2004), Portugal has a disproportionally high 
percentage of renegotiations (253 renegotiation events for 35 Portuguese PPPs versus 162 
events for 307 Latin-American PPPs).   
 
4.2 Determinants of PPP renegotiations 
 
To answer our second research question regarding the determinants of renegotiations, we run a 
probit model with and without year effects (Table 5). This model was run using just the road 
sector, with similar results. Renegotiations most frequently occur in the road sector, relative to 
the other sectors. 
Out of the concession variables, the First renegotiation, Operational stage, Number of bidders 
and Debt/Capex have a statistically significant impact on the probability of renegotiations. The 
operational stage comprises the larger part of the concession period and embeds the most 
uncertainty. As expected, the significance of the Number of Bidders suggests that strong initial 
bidding competition increases the likelihood of underbidding, such that the resulting losses are 
expected to be recuperated in subsequent renegotiations. High project leverage is expected to 
make the project’s financial stability weaker such that renegotiations are more likely. However, 
project leverage has a negative sign.  The above results from model 1-7 of Table 5 are 
confirmed by model 8 which includes year-fixed effects.  
While the election years (and their leads and lags) and change in governments do not influence 
the renegotiation likelihood, other aspects of the political environment do. For instance, right-
wing governments are more prone to renegotiate, what confirms our predictions. A government 
with a parliamentary majority has more political clout to renegotiate than a government facing 
strong opposition (a minority government only survives at the discretion of the opposition). 
We then turn to the quality of contract enforcement, proxied by the following yearly indices 
Risk rating, Contract viability, Rule of law, and the Corruption index. Better enforcement 
should dissuade or reject inappropriate claims for renegotiations. An increase in these variables 
represents an improvement in the Portuguese legal and economic environment. Thus, we expect 
all of these four variables to be negatively correlated to the occurrence of renegotiations. We 
find that this is indeed the case for Contract viability, Risk rating, and the Corruption index: 
lower contract viability and more corruption augments the likelihood of PPP renegotiations. The 
fact is that the corruption index in Portugal has reduce, meaning an increase in the corruption 




results opposite to our expectations. The 2006 PPP renegotiations law, appears to be inefficient 
in terms of reducing renegotiations. Finally, we note that a worsening macroeconomic situation 
(as captured by the level of public debt and GDP growth) can also induce more renegotiations. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.3 Renegotiation motives 
 
As we have observed in Table 4 (panel A), several possible motives, partitioned into public 
motives, construction reasons, and operational and major cause events are laying at the basis of 
the renegotiation process. We estimate the determinants of the relative importance of these 
motives by means of a multinomial logit model and show the results in Table 6
8
.  
The motives for renegotiating are not sector dependent. The concession age variable in 
specification (a) indicates that public sector motives (including specific legal changes, corporate 
tax increase, administrative delays, contract changes, and environmental requirements changes) 
are at stake in renegotiations of relatively young PPPs. Likewise, renegotiations occur more 
frequently for reasons of construction (archaeological findings, additional work, delays in 
expropriations, and construction overruns) for older concessions (specification (c)).  
When testing public sector versus construction motives (specification (a)), we find that PPPs 
with demand payment are more likely to face renegotiations induced by the public sector 
(relative to negotiations for reasons of construction issues). This tendency is explained by the 
fact that a substantial number of renegotiations are started by a government decision to change 
tariffs (only affecting PPP with demand payments). The model also shows that when Ascendi is 
the private party in the PPP, public motives are negatively correlated with renegotiations 
(specification (b)). As Ascendi belongs to a major construction group, it uses the groups’ 
knowledge and expertise to seek additional rents through efficiently managing operations. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Ascendi’s political connections (reflected in the fact that several former 
members of government serve on its board) negatively affect the possibility of renegotiation due 
to political decisions (specification (b)). 
When foreign shareholders have a majority of the equity in the PPP company, the main 
renegotiation motives are limited to operational and major causes (specification (c)). PPPs with 
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We have performed several alternative tests: we have introduced the variables Contract viability, 
Political risk, Risk rating, GDP growth, Deficit, and Public debt, introducing one by one although the 
correlations between these variables are below .5. Given the high correlation between Contract viability 




EIB finance face increased odds for renegotiation due to public sector motives (relative to 
construction and other motives, specifications (a) and (b)). 
In addition, renegotiations occurring in the year prior to elections are much more likely to 
emerge as a result of construction motives (relative to public motives; specification (b)), of and 
operational motives (relative to construction motives; specification (c)). This may be because, 
with approaching elections, governments may be more willing to enter negotiations with the 
private partner, accepting their demands (for specific construction terms). Right wing 
governments are more prone to renegotiate for public sector motives: they more frequently 
initiate changes to PPP project possibly due to better contacts with the private sector. In 
addition, a majority government tends to favour renegotiations for operational motives but not 
for motives which are typical for the public sector or for construction reasons.  
When corruption is high (note that the index is then low) and the rule of law is weak, fewer 
renegotiations are started for public reasons. It may be that, in times with high corruption, 
governments are more prone to renegotiate for motives that they not entirely control, as it is the 
case of construction and operational motives (where the private sector has more information and 
superior knowledge), providing this way additional rents to private sector. The above 
conclusions are upheld when we control for a set of legal variables such as the introduction of 
the PPP law in 2006, a contract viability index and a political risk index. The 2006 PPP law, 
which provides a framework for PPP contracting and monitoring, has induces more frequent 
renegotiations for public sector motives or for reasons related to the construction phase, rather 
than for reasons reflecting operational issues. An improvement in the legal environment such as 
better contract viability or lower political risk seem to encourage the government to renegotiate 
by invoking public sector motives and be more resistant to opening renegotiations for problems 
with construction or operations which usually provide additional rents to the private sector. 
 
4.4 Renegotiation duration 
 
The average duration of a renegotiation is 655 days (approximately 1.8 years). For the 74 
completed renegotiations, the average duration amounted to 464 days. A histogram of the 
duration of the renegotiations process (including the non-completed ones) is displayed in Figure 
3. To assess what determines the renegotiation duration period, we estimate a semi-parametric 
duration model (Cox-hazard model) and show the results in Table 7. Just as in table 5, we have 
also run this model using just the road sector sample, with similar results.  




The duration of renegotiation is negatively correlated with the age of PPP (Concession age) 
which reflects that for older PPPs the renegotiations are often finalized and that no new 
renegotiations start. Renegotiations are shorter in the construction phase of the PPP. 
Governments may hurry as they want to inaugurate the infrastructure and collect the political 
dividends. Negotiations are also longer when higher investments are required (capex), and are 
shorter when the contract duration is longer. Contract duration reduces the renegotiation 
because on short contracts a termination incentive exists for government to enter into new 
contracts without ongoing conflicts or future liabilities. When the number of bidders was high 
(which may have led to underbidding), more may be at stake in the subsequent renegotiations, 
which then last longer. A high debt burden generates sufficient pressure not to let renegotiations 
linger, while the fact that the operational stage has started, the investment level, and the number 
of bidders have the opposite effect. High project leverage is related to more condensed 
renegotiations because, as high leverage stands for higher bank risk, banks can exert more 
pressure to assure a fast resolution to the conflict, particularly if the resolution can affect the 
PPP financial sustainability, and consequently, the debt service. When we focus on the road 
sector (Panel B of Table 7), we note that for this sector negotiation last longer in case Ascendi is 
the private party of the PPP. 
In the year after an election, renegotiations take less time (Panel A of Table 7). This contradicts 
our assumption that after election, the probability of renegotiation would increase, because 
newly elected officials may be more willing to negotiate. Right wing parties in government 
decrease the time of renegotiations. Given that they renegotiate more frequently and mainly for 
public sector motives, the short duration of renegotiations may reflect that right-wing 
governments have better ties with private firms or are more sensitive to their concerns. We have 
reported above that majority governments renegotiate more and we find in Table 7 that their 
renegotiations take less time. This results from the fact that they are more powerful than 
minority governments as they do not have to negotiate with the parliamentary opposition.  
There is some evidence that an improvement in the economic and legal environment tends to 
make renegotiations last longer (Contract viability, Rule of law, and Corruption). This increase 
in the renegotiation duration may be explained by a better prepared public sector being more 
likely to defend the public interest and extend renegotiations for that purpose.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
A survival duration (Kaplan-Meyer) analysis examines the isolated impact of specific variables. 
We observe that renegotiations in the road sector tend to last longer than in other sectors. 
Furthermore, we observe that PPPs in the operational stage have shorter renegotiations than 




renegotiations. Domestic shareholders and the Ascendi Group also have an advantage in terms 
of renegotiation periods. There is also some evidence that left wing governments renegotiate 
faster and that the 2006 PPP law did not reduce the duration of renegotiations. 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines why so many PPPs are renegotiated. The rich Portuguese experience with 
PPPs and renegotiations enables us to answer three research questions: (i) How does the PPP 
renegotiation process work? (ii) What determines the probability of PPP renegotiation? (iii) 
What is the average duration of a renegotiation event and its determinants? 
Of the 35 Portuguese PPPs, 26 were renegotiated with a total of 254 renegotiation events. Most 
of these events occurred during the operational stage, in election years, and mainly in the early 
years of the concession. This high incidence of renegotiations – even shortly after contract were 
signed - has a negative impact on both the PPP’s performance and efficiency and could 
undermine the credibility PPP projects. Although changing circumstances could inevitably lead 
to renegotiating PPP contracts, the high incidence of renegotiations may be beyond permissible 
bounds. That there are still many renegotiations during the construction stage is surprising 
because this phase quickly follows the awarding of the contract (typically 3 to 5 years), and is 
less risky given that the costs are predictable. We distinguished between several renegotiation 
motives, including those primarily regarding the public sector (specific legal changes, corporate 
tax, administrative and environmental changes, and delays) and the construction stage 
(archaeological findings, additional works, and delays in expropriations). 
During the construction phase, PPPs are frequently renegotiated, which can be explained by 
pressure from governments seeking to collect political benefits by opening the infrastructure or 
service. We also found evidence that aggressive bidding for PPP contract between several 
competitors occurs, which increases the likelihood of subsequent renegotiations. Some private 
companies may bid merely to win the concession at the detriment of future profitability, which 
they try to remediate in later years through renegotiations. However, after a first renegotiation, 
the occurrence of other renegotiations is less likely.    
There was no conclusive evidence that the political variables, such as election years or a change 
in government, have any impact on renegotiations. Still governments with a parliamentary 
majority seem more prone to renegotiate PPPs, as they are in a more powerful position than 
minority governments. A right-wing government is more likely to enter renegotiations. Higher 
institutional quality (better contracts, rule of law, and less risk) tends to reduce the probability of 
renegotiations. The level of corruption (which fluctuates over the years) is a strong determinant 




prone to satisfy private demands. The high incidence of renegotiations gives some evidence that 
there might be certain flaws in the contract design combined with the inadequate regulatory and 
weak economic and legal environment.    
We show that PPPs with users’ payment are more frequently renegotiated for political reasons, 
which is especially the case in the year prior to elections. Both findings can be related to the 
government’s tendency to change the tariffs agreed to in the contract to obtain political gains. 
PPPs belonging to the Ascendi group are more likely to renegotiate as a result of construction 
rather than political motives. The reason is that as Ascendi belongs to a large construction group 
(which can use it knowledge to seek additional rents) and has strong political ties to use in that 
strategy.   
A renegotiation process lasts on average for 1.8 years. Concession age, contract duration, and 
the project’s debt ratio tend to decrease the duration of the renegotiation, projects in the 
operational stage, with higher capital expenditures, and a higher number of initial bidders have 
longer renegotiation durations. Furthermore, majority government are able to go for short 
renegotiations.  In contrast, the duration is longer when there is an improvement in the 
economic and legal environment (e.g., improvements in contract viability, rule of law, 
corruption and GDP growth). The latter effects may be explained by the fact that a better 
prepared public sector may be more prone to defend the public interest and hence extending the 
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Table 1. Explanatory variables 
This table lists the independent variables used in our models with their expected sign and the theoretical justification. Source: own variables and data. 
 





roads and security, 
health 
Dummy 
0 – No 
1 - Yes 
DGTF 2012 
PPP report 
+ Omitted category in models: health sector 
Concession variables 
First renegotiation Dummy 
0 – No 




Higher probability of renegotiation in PPPs never renegotiated 
before 
Concession age Discrete 
Age of concession (in 





The probability of renegotiation should increase with the time of 
the concession 
Operational stage Dummy 
0 – Construction stage; 




Higher probability of renegotiations in operational stage, due to 
more uncertainty 
Availability  payment Dummy 
0 – No 




PPPs with availability payment have low risk and uncertainty (they 
do not assume demand risk), which reduces probability of 
renegotiations 
Foreign shareholders Dummy 
0- National 




Foreign shareholders renegotiate less than national shareholders, as 
the latter have more political influence 
Ascendi group Dummy 
0 – No 




Ascendi group renegotiates more because of Mota-Engil’s and 
BES’ (the shareholders of Ascendi) political influence 




The length of contracts increases uncertainty, which augments the 
probability of renegotiation 




Higher investment increases private sector risk and thus also the 
probability of renegotiation 




A higher number of bidders increases possibility of opportunistic 








EIB loans Dummy 0 – No 1 – Yes 
DGTF 2012 
PPP report 
- EIB presence improves project sustainability 




Higher debt, means higher bank risk, increases the probability of 
renegotiation 
Political Variables 




Electoral years increase probability of renegotiation because of 
opportunistic behaviour by governing parties 




The year before an election increases probability of renegotiation 
because of opportunistic behaviour by governing parties 




After election, the probability of renegotiation may increase, 
because newly elected officials may be more willing to negotiate 
Right wing 
government 




Liberal (right wing) governments tend to renegotiate more with the 
private sector 




A change in government may lead to opportunistic behaviour by 
private sector, leading to renegotiations 




A majority in government could lead to renegotiations as majority 
government is more powerful in decision making 
Legal variables 
Risk rating Discrete Index (1-10, 10=best) PRS Group - 
This index aggregates political, financial and economic risk. Better 
legal and regulatory environment reduces probability of 
renegotiation 
Contract viability Discrete Index (1-10, 10=best) PRS Group - 
This index provides the risk of unilateral contract modification or 
cancellation and, at worst, outright expropriation of foreign owned 
assets. A lower risk should reduce the probability of renegotiations 
Rule of law Discrete Index (1-100, 100=best) PRS Group - 
This index indicates the quality and strength of the legal system. A 
better legal system should reduce litigation. However, it is also 
possible that a better legal environment would give the private 
sector more confidence to demand compensation and pursue 




Variable Type Definition Source  Reasons 
Political risk rating Discrete Index (1-100, 100=best) PRS Group - 
This index assesses the political stability of the country. A more 
stable political situation should reduce the probability of 
renegotiations 
Corruption index Discrete 




- Low corruption reduces probability of renegotiation 
2006 PPP law   Dummy 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
 - 
This law is expected to provide a better PPP framework and 
regulatory environment, reducing the probability of renegotiation 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
     




- Economic growth decreases probability of renegotiation 





Higher deficits lead to more renegotiations, in order to postpone 
public expenditures 





Higher public debt leads to more renegotiations, in order to 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. Source: own data and calculations. 
Source: own table. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Road 428 0.80 0.40 0 1
Railway 428 0.08 0.28 0 1
Security 428 0.02 0.13 0 1
First renegotiation 428 0.06 0.24 0 1
Concession age 428 6.15 3.94 1 18
Operational stage 428 0.69 0.46 0 1
Availability  payment 428 0.39 0.49 0 1
Foreign shareholders 428 0.23 0.42 0 1
Ascendi 428 0.30 0.46 0 1
Contract duration 428 28.41 6.21 4 36
Investment 428 6.06 1.35 1.10 7.93
Number of bidders  428 4.40 1.86 1 8
EIB 428 0.68 0.47 0 1
Debt/Capex 428 68.94 21.19 14 97
Election year 428 0.42 0.49 0 1
Election year t-1 428 0.32 0.47 0 1
Election year t+1 428 0.35 0.48 0 1
Right wing government  428 0.47 0.50 0 1
Change in government 428 0.33 0.47 0 1
Majority Government 428 0.77 0.42 0 1
Risk rating 428 72.92 3.99 68.50 85.50
Contract viability 428 3.07 0.95 2 4
Rule of law 428 2.31 0.27 1.50 2.50
Political risk 428 79.16 5.62 71 91
Corruption 428 6.17 0.23 5.56 6.97
2006 PPP law  428 0.77 0.42 0 1
Deficit 428 -6.01 2.51 -9.80 -2.69













Table 3. PPP renegotiations 
Panel A shows the main data collected on renegotiations events. Panel B exhibits the percentage of PPP that 
renegotiate under a range of specific conditions. Source: own table, based on data collect. 
 
Roads Railway Health Security
Number of PPP companies 22 2 10 1 35
Capex (M€) 18,801 502 650 126 20,079
Renegotiations events 233 17 1 3 254
Number of companies renegotiated 22 1 1 1 25
Renegotiations asked during construction stage 78 3 0 2 83
Renegotiations asked operation stage 155 14 1 1 171
Renegotiations with traffic/demand payment 103 17 1 0 121
Renegotiations with availability payment 130 0 0 3 133
Renegotiation asked in electoral years 112 4 1 0 117
Renegotiations accepted 70 12 0 0 82
Renegotiations rejected 5 0 0 0 5
Renegotiations undergoing 158 5 1 3 167
Roads Railway Health Security
Average years between contract and the first renegotiation 3.4 7.0 4.0 2.0 3.5
% PPP renegotiated 100% 50% 10% 100% 71%
% PPP renegotiated in the first 3 years 64% 0% 0% 100% 43%
% PPP renegotiated in the first 4 years 82% 0% 10% 100% 57%
% PPP renegotiated in the construction period 82% 50% 0% 100% 57%
% PPP renegotiated in the operation period 77% 50% 10% 100% 57%
% PPP renegotiations in electoral year 44% 2% 0% 0% 46%
% PPP renegotiations by left government 42% 4% 0% 1% 47%














Table 4. Renegotiation motives and timing 
Panel A presents the main motives mentioned for each renegotiation event. Panel B gives the average time 
between the award of the concession and the first renegotiation event, and the time between the beginning of the 
operations and the first renegotiation event.  
We classified these renegotiations motives in three different categories: public sector motives, construction 
motives and operational and force majeure motives. The reason for this division is the following: the objective 
was to analyse when renegotiations were started by a government decision and when they were started by a 
private sector motive. However, data collected was not entirely satisfactory for that purpose. The first 
classification, public sector motives, grants us motives that could only have been started by the government, and 
never by the private sector. However, the motives not included in this first classification were still dubious 
regarding their responsibility. Therefore, we decided to group them according to the PPP stage in which they 
occurred: construction stage or operational stage (including in this last one the force majeure motives, due to the 
difficulty in classification and the few number of observations). 
Source: own table, based on data collect.  
PPP events Roads Railways Health Security Total
Public sector motives
Specific legal changes 79 0 0 0 79
Corporate tax increase regarding the case-base 11 0 0 0 11
Administrative delays 5 0 0 3 8
Contract changes 6 0 0 0 6
Environmental requirements changes 1 0 0 0 1
sub-total 102 0 0 3 105
Construction motives
Archaeological findings 35 0 0 0 35
Additional works 23 3 0 0 26
Delay in expropriations 8 0 0 0 8
Construction overruns 7 0 0 0 7
sub-total 73 3 0 0 76
Operational and mjaor cause motives
Low demand 0 14 0 0 14
Global agreement 11 0 0 0 11
Major cause events 4 0 1 0 5
Additional financial compensation 1 0 0 0 1
Other events 42 0 0 0 42
sub-total 58 14 1 0 73
TOTAL 233 17 1 3 254
Time between contract and renegotiation Mean Median Minimum Maximum Sd. Deviation
Roads 7 7 1 18 4
Railway 9 9 7 11 1
Health 4 4 4 4 0
Security 3 3 2 5 2
TOTAL 7 7 1 18 4
Time between first year operation and renegotiation Mean Median Minimum Maximum Sd. Deviation
Roads 6 5 1 15 3
Railway 6 6 6 8 1
Health 3 3 3 3 0
Security 1 1 1 1 0









Table 5. The probability of PPP renegotiations  
This table shows the results of a random effects probit model (due to the Hausman test results) with as dependent variable the renegotiation/no-renegotiation event. Test 1 
includes all of the variables defined above, with the exception of the legal and economic variables (Risk rating, Contract viability, Political risk, GDP growth, Deficit and 
Public debt) which could induce multicollinearity, which is why we include these variables one at the time (Specifications 2-7). Test 8 includes year effects (and therefore 
drops the political and the economic/legal variables). Panel B presents the marginal fixed effects.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** stands for p<0.01, ** stands for 
p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Source: own table. 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated 
         
Sector Variables         
Road sector 5.85*** 5.61*** 5.53*** 5.15*** 4.76*** 4.93*** 5.29*** 2.95*** 
 (1.49) (1.48) (1.45) (1.52) (1.64) (1.56) (1.49) (0.98) 
Railway sector 3.61*** 3.48*** 3.42*** 3.13** 2.69** 2.95** 3.26*** 4.76*** 
 (1.21) (1.20) (1.18) (1.23) (1.33) (1.28) (1.21) (1.23) 
Security sector 3.81*** 3.76*** 3.69*** 3.32*** 3.01** 3.21*** 3.55*** 3.39*** 
 (1.11) (1.09) (1.08) (1.09) (1.19) (1.13) (1.09) (0.92) 
Concession Variables         
First renegotiation 3.00*** 2.86*** 2.82*** 2.59*** 2.73*** 2.53*** 2.78***  
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.60) (0.56) (0.58)  
Concession age -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Operational stage 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 1.04*** 0.94*** 0.83*** 0.91*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) 
Availability Payment -0.36 -0.44 -0.38 -0.02 0.38 0.18 -0.28 -0.28 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) 
Foreign shareholders -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16 -0.27 -0.23 -0.08 -0.10 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27) 
Ascendi  0.21 0.23 0.19 0.10 -0.02 -0.00 0.15 0.12 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) 
Contract duration -0.12* -0.11* -0.11* -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Investment 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.14 0.02 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20) 
Number of bidders 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12* 0.13* 0.12* 0.12* 0.11** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
EIB 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.15 -0.03 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.38) (0.35) (0.33) (0.31) 
Debt/Capex -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated Renegotiated 
Political Variables         
Electoral year 0.27 0.27 0.78 -0.25 0.30 -0.72 0.23  
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.63) (0.54) (0.62) (0.61) (0.58)  
Electoral year (t-1) 0.69* 0.73* 0.93** 0.48 0.28 0.38 0.88**  
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.42) (0.38) (0.40) (0.39) (0.42)  
Electoral year (t+1) 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.05 0.43 -0.14 0.03  
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.38) (0.34)  
Right wing government 1.49*** 0.01 0.39 0.65** 1.45*** 1.02*** 0.42  
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.29) (0.27) (0.38) (0.30) (0.29)  
Change in government 0.09 -0.56 -0.74 0.04 -0.65 0.03 -0.16  
 (0.51) (0.54) (0.58) (0.47) (0.61) (0.48) (0.52)  
Majority government  1.35*** 0.20  0.54*  0.69** 0.19  0.37  0.40  
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) (0.31) (0.42) (0.34) (0.31)  
Legal Variables         
Rule of Law 1.53*** 2.05*** 2.96*** 2.21*** 2.71*** 2.62*** 2.30***  
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.53) (0.47) (0.53) (0.53) (0.50)  
Corruption -0.74 -1.55** -0.90 -1.41* -4.03*** -2.01*** -1.24*  
 (0.74) (0.63) (0.76) (0.73) (0.89) (0.71) (0.71)  
2006 PPP Law 1.91***        
 (0.39)        
Contract viability  -1.03***       
  (0.24)       
Political risk   -0.17***      
   (0.04)      
Risk rating    -0.13**     
    (0.05)     
Economic Variables         
GDP growth     0.35***    
     (0.12)    
Deficit      -0.16*   
      (0.09)   
Public debt       0.03***  
       (0.01)  
Constant -2.48 5.61 10.10** 11.50*** 15.70*** 3.53 -2.68 2.67 
 (4.74) (3.96) (4.33) (4.26) (5.36) (5.04) (5.09) (158.27) 
         
Year effects No No No No No No No Yes 
Wald test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 




Panel B – Marginal effects 
Sector Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Road sector 0.911*** 0.903*** 0.902*** 0.889*** 0.881*** 0.883*** 0.893***
(0.0410) (0.0429) (0.0432) (0.0468) (0.0495) (0.0484) (0.0456)
Railway sector 0.558*** 0.554*** 0.547*** 0.542*** 0.511*** 0.533*** 0.546***
(0.0731) (0.0717) (0.0718) (0.0737) (0.0791) (0.0755) (0.0723)
Security sector 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.437*** 0.452*** 0.459***
(0.0483) (0.0472) (0.0471) (0.0473) (0.0489) (0.0478) (0.0470)
Concession Variables
First renegotiation 0.508*** 0.505*** 0.499*** 0.494*** 0.482*** 0.488*** 0.501***
(0.0468) (0.0461) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0461) (0.0456)
Concession age -0.0216 -0.0217 -0.0199 -0.00608 0.00767 0.000313 -0.0155
(0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0140)
Operational stage 0.351*** 0.312*** 0.319*** 0.306*** 0.359*** 0.338*** 0.311***
(0.0949) (0.0959) (0.0956) (0.0945) (0.0925) (0.0924) (0.0951)
Availability Payment -0.139 -0.170 -0.147 -0.00155 0.176* 0.0816 -0.103
(0.119) (0.125) (0.124) (0.117) (0.0943) (0.105) (0.123)
Foreign shareholders -0.0370 -0.0233 -0.0312 -0.0589 -0.0875 -0.0832 -0.0315
(0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.109) (0.112)
Ascendi 0.0801 0.0872 0.0740 0.0387 -0.0125 -0.000535 0.0578
(0.0948) (0.0944) (0.0938) (0.0943) (0.0919) (0.0923) (0.0937)
Contract duration -0.0465* -0.0446* -0.0422* -0.0399* -0.0313 -0.0344 -0.0398*
(0.0240) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0233)
Investment 0.0712 0.0792 0.0692 0.0484 0.00738 0.0185 0.0595
(0.0847) (0.0840) (0.0836) (0.0825) (0.0809) (0.0811) (0.0828)
Number of bidders 0.0476** 0.0473** 0.0471** 0.0454** 0.0475** 0.0457** 0.0470**
(0.0240) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0235)
EIB 0.0645 0.0580 0.0576 0.0564 0.0579 0.0700 0.0656
(0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125)
Debt/Capex -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
(0.00266) (0.00262) (0.00261) (0.00257) (0.00258) (0.00256) (0.00259)
Political Variables
Electoral year 0.106 0.107 0.298 -0.0938 0.111 -0.286 0.0928
(0.217) (0.218) (0.224) (0.210) (0.230) (0.226) (0.226)
Electoral year (t-1) 0.260* 0.273** 0.339** 0.183 0.106 0.145 0.323**
(0.139) (0.135) (0.136) (0.140) (0.151) (0.145) (0.137)
Electoral year (t+1) 0.0102 0.0105 0.0867 0.0171 0.163 -0.0644 0.00883
(0.130) (0.131) (0.128) (0.132) (0.126) (0.147) (0.132)
Right wing government 0.533*** 0.00543 0.154 0.250** 0.517*** 0.390*** 0.165
(0.100) (0.127) (0.111) (0.100) (0.110) (0.0983) (0.111)
Change in government 0.0354 -0.219 -0.290 0.0147 -0.224 0.0134 -0.0648
(0.201) (0.207) (0.216) (0.185) (0.227) (0.186) (0.207)
Majority government -0.446*** 0.0766 -0.203* -0.255** 0.0803 -0.135 -0.152
(0.0888) (0.136) (0.108) (0.103) (0.160) (0.122) (0.113)
Legal Variables
Rule of Law 0.603*** 0.809*** 1.164*** 0.870*** 1.057*** 1.044*** 0.905***
(0.196) (0.193) (0.209) (0.183) (0.200) (0.204) (0.196)
Corruption -0.289 -0.603** -0.351 -0.535* -1.578*** -0.771*** -0.476*
(0.288) (0.243) (0.293) (0.281) (0.339) (0.277) (0.276)



















Table 6. Renegotiation motives  
This table shows the results of a multinomial logit model with as dependent variables the renegotiation motives, which are shown in Table 4 (panel A). Motive 1 amalgamates the public sector 
motives (specific legal changes, corporate tax increases, administrative delays, contract changes, and changes in environmental requirements). Motive 2 stands for the construction motives 
(archaeological findings, additional investments, delay in expropriations, and construction overruns). Motive 3 captures operational and major cause motives (low demand, major cause events, 
also called in literature as “Acts of God”, global agreement, additional financial compensation and other events). Motive 1 relates to 105 events (41%); Motive 2 to 76 events (30%), and Motive 
3 had 73 events (29%). Standard errors are in parentheses; *** stands for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Source: own table. 
 Test 1 Test 2 
 (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
VARIABLES Motive 1 versus 2 Motive 1 versus 3 Motive 2 versus 3 Motive 1 versus 2 Motive 1 versus 3 Motive 2 versus 3 
       
Sector Variables       
Railway sector 25.18 -2.34 -27.51 26.76 -2.73 -29.49 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ((0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Road sector 9.22 -20.37 -29.59 9.71 -22.11 -31.82 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Security sector -10.21 -33.69 -23.48 -10.49 -35.93 -25.44 
 (0.00) (0.00) ((0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Concession Variables       
Concession age -0.44*** -0.13 0.31** -0.43*** -0.14* 0.29** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) 
Operational stage -0.84 0.72 1.56* -1.18 0.46 1.65* 
 (0.73) (0.75) (0.84) (0.77) (0.77) (0.86) 
Availability payment -3.39*** -0.62 2.77*** -3.84*** -0.89 2.95*** 
 (0.96) (0.86) (0.97) (0.97) (0.84) (0.97) 
Foreign shareholders 1.33 -0.73 -2.06** 1.48 -0.69 -2.17** 
 (0.91) (0.89) (0.93) (0.92) (0.88) (0.94) 
Ascendi  -1.19 -1.82*** -0.63 -0.85 -1.72*** -0.87 
 (0.74) (0.65) (0.80) (0.77) (0.65) (0.82) 
Contract duration -0.39* 0.10 0.49** -0.44* 0.11 0.55** 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.24) 
Investment 0.27 -0.01 -0.27 0.39 0.05 -0.34 
 (0.62) (0.50) (0.63) (0.63) (0.51) (0.65) 
Number of bidders 0.29 0.02 -0.27 0.39 0.06 -0.33 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) 
EIB 1.48* 2.24*** 0.76 1.35* 2.23*** 0.88 
 (0.76) (0.86) (0.93) (0.76) (0.86) (0.93) 
Debt/Capex 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 




 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES Motive 1 versus 2 Motive 1 versus 3 Motive 2 versus 3 Motive 1 versus 2 Motive 1 versus 3 Motive 2 versus 3 
       
Political Variables       
       
Electoral year 1.55 -1.30 -2.84 -1.11 -2.22 -1.11 
 (1.98) (1.64) (1.84) (1.96) (1.62) (1.92) 
Electoral year (t-1) 0.94 -3.01** -3.95*** -0.55 -3.44** -2.89** 
 (1.51) (1.37) (1.48) (1.39) (1.36) (1.42) 
Electoral year (t+1) 0.92 -0.95 -1.87 0.13 -1.39 -1.52 
 (1.64) (1.56) (1.43) (1.48) (1.48) (1.39) 
Right-Wing government 6.36*** 2.58 -3.78 6.44** 2.06 -4.38 
 (2.32) (2.19) (2.75) (2.79) (2.60) (3.50) 
Change in government 2.75* 1.49 -1.26 3.60* 1.72 -1.88 
 (1.50) (1.17) (1.61) (1.90) (1.17) (1.96) 
Majority government -3.95** -5.36*** -1.40 -2.55 -4.28** -1.73 
 (1.90) (2.06) (2.09) (1.84) (1.86) (2.18) 
Legal Variables       
Rule of law -7.17*** -2.49 4.68* -9.90*** -3.71 6.19** 
 (2.40) (2.21) (2.62) (2.79) (2.40) (3.01) 
Corruption 9.51*** 2.88 -6.63** 4.42** 0.68 -3.75* 
 (2.95) (2.35) (2.88) (2.23) (1.71) (2.24) 
2006 PPP Law 9.47*** 5.58** -3.89 9.97*** 5.02* -4.95 
 (2.75) (2.47) (2.96) (3.28) (3.04) (4.03) 
Contract viability 3.63*** 1.81 -1.82    
 (1.36) (1.20) (1.43)    
Political risk    0.73** 0.28 -0.46 
    (0.30) (0.27) (0.36) 
Constant -60.10 -0.70 59.40 -69.47 0.95 70.42 
 (7,006.51) (4,408.18) (5,446.04) (13,089.86) (8,235.54) (10,174.52) 
       
Observations 254 254 254 254 254 254 






Table 7. Duration models 
This table estimates a duration model by means of a Cox-hazard test. The dependent variable is the time between the start of a negotiation and its conclusion (in case of a successful completion) 
or the end of 2012 (when our data end) (in case of uncompleted renegotiations). Test 1 includes all the variables discussed above with exception of the legal and economic variables (Risk rating, 
Contract viability, Political risk, GDP growth, Deficit and Public debt) which could induce multicollinearity, which is why they are introduced one at the time. Nine observations were dropped 
due to a lack of data. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: own table. 
Panel A – All Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
Concession Variables        
Concession age -0.29*** -0.16* -0.23*** -0.20** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Operational stage 0.85* 0.89* 0.59 1.43** 0.84* 0.76 0.62 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.61) (0.51) (0.52) (0.50) 
Availability payment -2.00*** -0.25 -1.26 -0.90 -1.98*** -1.79** -0.95 
 (0.69) (0.88) (0.80) (0.87) (0.69) (0.75) (0.82) 
Foreign shareholders -0.29 -0.79 -0.52 -0.63 -0.30 -0.40 -0.65 
 (0.65) (0.69) (0.67) (0.68) (0.65) (0.67) (0.68) 
Ascendi  0.42 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.42 0.36 0.22 
 (0.47) (0.51) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) 
Contract duration -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Investment 1.77*** 1.65*** 1.71*** 1.50*** 1.74*** 1.71*** 1.67*** 
 (0.50) (0.55) (0.52) (0.53) (0.51) (0.51) (0.53) 
Number of bidders 0.26** 0.43*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.26** 0.28*** 0.37*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
EIB 1.51 2.06* 1.69 1.63 1.50 1.54 1.83* 
 (1.05) (1.05) (1.04) (1.02) (1.05) (1.04) (1.05) 
Debt/Capex -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
Political Variables        
Electoral year 0.97 1.62* 0.75 1.36 1.06 1.29 1.43 
 (0.87) (0.95) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90) (0.98) (0.93) 
Electoral year (t-1) 0.22 0.68 0.15 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.41 
 (0.69) (0.74) (0.70) (0.70) (0.69) (0.69) (0.72) 
Electoral year (t+1) -1.22* -0.56 -1.15* -0.96 -1.23* -1.09 -0.77 
 (0.64) (0.71) (0.66) (0.66) (0.64) (0.68) (0.70) 
Right wing government -1.35** -0.60 -1.10* -1.32* -1.29* -1.47** -1.26** 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
Change in government -0.59 0.10 -0.19 -0.28 -0.66 -0.51 -0.30 
 (0.82) (0.84) (0.84) (0.86) (0.85) (0.84) (0.82) 
Majority government -0.51* -1.20* -0.43 -0.27 -0.42 -0.71 -0.47 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.68) (0.67) (0.74) (0.74) (0.67) 
Legal Variables        
Rule of law -1.13 -0.86 -1.60* -1.18 -1.06 -1.42 -1.13 
 (0.78) (0.75) (0.82) (0.79) (0.82) (0.88) (0.75) 
Corruption  1.42*  1.58* -0.67 -0.60 -1.28 -1.27 -0.92 
 (1.00) (0.88) (1.08) (1.02) (1.08) (1.00) (0.95) 
Contract viability  1.50***      
  (0.51)      
Political risk   0.12*     
   (0.07)     
Risk rating    0.20*    
    (0.10)    
Economic variables        
GDP growth     0.06   
     (0.18)   
Deficit      0.10  
      (0.14)  
Public debt       -0.04** 
       (0.02) 
        
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 














Panel B – Road Sector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
Concession Variables        
        
Concession age -0.20** -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.21*** -0.17* -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Operational stage 0.60 0.80 0.38 1.60** 0.64 0.47 0.38 
 (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.69) (0.56) (0.58) (0.55) 
Availability payment -2.60*** 1.11 -1.44 -1.07 -2.74*** -2.19** -0.76 
 (0.90) (1.64) (1.09) (1.00) (0.95) (1.03) (1.20) 
Foreign shareholders 0.45 0.24 0.34 0.07 0.52 0.32 0.21 
 (0.98) (0.88) (0.96) (0.89) (0.99) (0.98) (0.93) 
Ascendi  1.57** 1.51** 1.58** 1.63** 1.61** 1.50** 1.49** 
 (0.70) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.69) 
Contract duration -0.55*** -0.44*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.56*** -0.52*** -0.47*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Investment 1.70*** 0.95* 1.43*** 0.68 1.78*** 1.59*** 1.26** 
 (0.52) (0.56) (0.54) (0.59) (0.55) (0.54) (0.55) 
Number of bidders -0.11 -0.20 -0.13 -0.27 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
EIB 1.12 0.87 0.86 0.19 1.22 0.97 0.80 
 (1.45) (1.41) (1.42) (1.59) (1.46) (1.46) (1.42) 
Debt/Capex -0.06** -0.04* -0.05* -0.04 -0.06** -0.05** -0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Variables        
Electoral year 0.20 0.31 -0.42 0.87 0.00 0.44 0.19 
 (0.90) (0.93) (0.98) (0.97) (0.97) (0.96) (0.91) 
Electoral year (t-1) -1.09 -1.05 -1.50* -0.78 -1.18 -1.15 -1.32* 
 (0.72) (0.74) (0.77) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) (0.74) 
Electoral year (t+1) -2.76*** -2.54*** -3.02*** -2.45*** -2.82*** -2.72*** -2.69*** 
 (0.79) (0.80) (0.81) (0.79) (0.80) (0.79) (0.80) 
Right wing government -0.19 0.59 0.04 -0.12 -0.31 -0.30 -0.21 
 (0.66) (0.68) (0.67) (0.70) (0.69) (0.68) (0.67) 
Change in government -0.43 0.27 -0.11 -0.08 -0.28 -0.42 -0.22 
 (0.76) (0.79) (0.77) (0.78) (0.81) (0.76) (0.76) 
Majority government 0.20 -0.86 0.12 0.38 0.06 -0.11 0.09 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
Legal Variables        
Rule of Law -0.95 -0.60 -1.47 -0.97 -1.08 -1.26 -0.98 
 (0.89) (0.88) (0.94) (0.87) (0.93) (0.97) (0.87) 
Corruption 2.06** 2.22** 1.05 1.16 2.25** 1.85* 1.29 
 (1.03) (0.94) (1.18) (1.04) (1.11) (1.05) (1.02) 
Contract viability  2.44***      
  (0.87)      
Political risk   0.14*     
   (0.08)     
Risk rating    0.33***    
    (0.12)    
Economic Variables        
GDP growth     -0.11   
     (0.20)   
Deficit      0.12  
      (0.15)  
Public debt       -0.05** 
       (0.02) 
        
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 







Figure 1 - PPP Investments (1995–2011) as percentage of GDP 
This figure shows the relative weight of PPP investments according to the size of each economy (level of 
accumulated PPP investment, over the period 1995 to 2011, as a percentage of GDP). Source: figure 
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Figure 2 – PPP renegotiations by year 
This figure shows the number of renegotiations in Portugal by year. Source: own data. 





















Figure 3 – Histogram of the duration of renegotiations 
 











Efficiency of Highway Public-Private Partnerships 
 
ABSTRACT 
As there is growing concern regarding the efficiency of public resources spent in public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), we measure the efficiency of seven PPP highway projects in Portugal over the past 
decade by means of a Data Envelopment Analysis model and the Malmquist productivity and efficiency 
index. This study analyses the relative efficiency changes, in the sense that shows whether a specific 
highway has improved its efficiency during a certain period. Therefore, the concept of PPP efficiency 
should not be confound with the argument of Value for Money (VfM) as there is no comparison in this 
study with the public sector efficiency.  
We distinguish between technical and technological efficiency, and find that most highways face a 
reduction over time in both types of efficiency, mainly due to an increase in operating and maintenance 
costs, follow-up investments, and a decline in traffic. A second group only experienced a reduction in 
technological efficiency following a loss of traffic which was compensated by cost control and stable 
investments. While controlling for scale efficiencies (which are anyhow very limited), a lack of pure 
technical efficiency is found for highway PPPs that were not subject to a competitive environment, which 
produces a lack of incentives for better management. Not only is there evidence of poor management due 
to a lack of competitive pressure, but increased use of outsourcing also increases inefficiencies. The 
introduction of tolls and the outburst of the economic crises in Portugal have substantially reduced traffic 
further contributing to inefficiency. Finally, the local context, such as highways in low-income areas and 
rural regions with a lower traffic density affect PPP highway performance. 
  
KEY WORDS: Public-Private Partnerships, procurement, efficiency models, transport, highways.      





Governments around the world have increasingly used Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to 
build and manage large public infrastructure projects. However, this was gradually followed by 
concerns regarding the efficient use of public money in PPPs relative to public procurement, 
and by doubts about whether PPPs really represent value for money (VfM) for the public sector. 




but has a larger impact on the regional economic development in terms of trade and mobility. 
Although most of the PPP projects around the world were created to improve the infrastructure, 
and mainly to construct highways, only few studies have examined their efficiency. The debate 
about what drives highway PPP efficiency has predominantly concentrated on the need for 
economies of scale in terms of the ideal highway dimension, whereby Amdal, Bårdsen, 
Johansen, & Welde (2007) and Odeck (2008) argue that highway size increases efficiency, 
whilst Welde & Odeck (2011) reach the opposite conclusion. The Portuguese experience with a 
large number of PPP-highways provides fertile testing ground to explore the factors that can 
affect efficiency, such as the financial and non-financial inputs and outputs, shareholder 
composition, level of investment, and urban/rural or coastal/interior geography. 
We use a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with a Malmquist index to test the efficiency of 
seven PPP highway projects. The advantage of using a non-parametric method such as DEA is 
that one does not a priori need a functional form on technology or any restrictive assumption 
regarding input remuneration (Barros, Felício, & Fernandes, 2012). DEA and the Malmquist 
index has been applied to measure the efficiency of units in a certain year or the change of 
efficiency over a period of years for a large field of organisations and activities (Vitner, 
Rozenes, & Spraggett, 2006), such as hospitals or schools ( Dharmapala, 2009; Alexander, 
Haug, & Jaforullah, 2010; Barnum, Walton, Shields, & Schumock, 2011;), seaports ( Barros, 
2003; Al-eraqi, 2008; Panayides, Maxoulis, Wang, & Ng, 2009; Barros et al., 2012;), airports ( 
Gillen & Lall, 1997; Fernandes & Pacheco, 2002; Yoshida & Fujimoto, 2004; Barros & Dieke, 
2007), and public transport (Husain, Abdullah, & Kuman, 2000; Pina & Torres, 2001; von 
Hirschhausen & Cullmann, 2010).  
Portugal has been developing its highway sector over the last 20 years, building substantial 
stretches of highways. The first wave of PPPs in the highway sector comprised the so-called 
SCUTs highways where SCUT stands for “Sem Custos para o Utilizador”, which is Portuguese 
for “without cost to the user”. The first wave of highway contracting (between 1999 and 2001) 
consisted of seven separate contracts and is the focus of this paper. The motivations to carry out 
this analysis are: First, there is very little research on the efficiency of PPPs in general (and 
none on Portuguese PPP highway efficiency). Second, we apply an efficiency methodology not 
yet applied to highway research, which also includes financial and non-financial data of both 
inputs (operating and maintenance costs, investment and number of employees) and outputs 
(revenues and daily traffic). Third, this study about the efficiency of highway operations is 
timely because the highway regulator is in the process of renegotiating these PPPs. The need to 
reduce future public payments – in the context of the chain of recent global financial crises 
which has hit Portugal hard - puts pressure to cut operational and maintenance expenses and 




This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on PPPs 
and the efficiency of highways. Section 3 presents the institutional framework for Portuguese 
highway PPPs. Section 4 describes our data and gives a brief account of the methodology used. 
We present the results in section 5, and the conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future 
study in section 6.   
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 PPPs and their efficiency 
 
Traditionally, two main reasons are usually brought forward to make the case that the public 
sector ought to be responsible for large transport infrastructure projects. The first is known in 
literature as “market failure”, the fact that most projects are not profitable or at least require 
high levels of investments that only makes them profitable in the long run (Borzel & Risse, 
2005). Consequently, these projects tend to not attract the interest of the private sector 
investment. However, for social and political reasons, this infrastructure must be provided to 
society. The second main reason regards the positive externalities that a transport infrastructure 
brings to the economy (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). Better infrastructure brings about indirect 
benefits that are usually not considered in the cost-benefit analysis of the project. For instance, 
the construction of a new road could reduce travel time and accidents, bringing benefits to 
people and companies, even though they have not paid for it.    
Over the last few decades, the public sector’s role in infrastructure has changed substantially, 
especially since the introduction of a new concept: PPPs. This is an alternative to the traditional 
public procurement where the public sector is responsible for all stages of the project (planning, 
design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance, plus the residual value). In the case 
of PPPs, some of these functions become the responsibility of the private sector. This does not 
mean that the public sector no longer pays for the assets, but signifies that the private sector 
becomes responsible for the construction, financing, and maintenance of the asset. Grimsey & 
Lewis (2002) define a PPP as “an agreement whereby the public sector enters into long-term 
contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of 
public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or for the provision of services 
(using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity for the community on behalf of a 




The risks that occur in a PPP context can be categorised in several ways: (i) endogenous versus 
exogenous risks (the latter risks cannot be controlled for); (ii) commercial risks (preferably 
allocated to the private sector) versus legal and political risks (usually allocated to the public 
sector) (OECD, 2008); (iii) risks related to the development (planning and construction), 
operation and transfer phases, and the lifetime phase (political, finance, environmental, and 
force majeure risks) (Jin, 2010); and (iv) risks at the macro, meso, and micro level (Bing, 
Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005). Macro-level risks are exogenous and can be narrowed 
down to country/industry risks and acts of God or force majeure. Meso-level risks are 
endogenous risks that occur within the boundaries of the project system and are thus related to 
construction, demand, and technological risks. Micro-level risks are stakeholders’ risks and are 
party-related (rather than project-related). Although different parties typically have different 
perceptions of what is a proper risk allocation, the optimal risk allocation reduces economic 
costs, provides incentives for sound management, and reduces the need for future renegotiations 
(Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006; Asenova & Beck, 2010). In PPPs, most risks can be allocated in 
a simple way: risks can be retained by the public sector, transferred to the private company that 
manages the PPP (which could in turn opt to reallocate risks to third parties), or shared between 
public and private parties (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014b). 
The purpose of a PPP for the public sector should be to create value for money (VfM), and it 
should not be motivated by the fact that it can be (has been) treated as an off-balance sheet 
investment (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). VfM is not about cost effectiveness alone, whereby the 
same quantity and quality of services should be provided at a lower overall cost (the whole-of-
life cost to meet the users’ requirements) (Ball, Heafey & King, 2007), but also about value 
delivered through risk transfer, innovation, greater asset utilisation, and integrated whole-of-life 
management (Fitzgerald, 2004). According to Debande (2002) and Quiggin (2005), the benefits 
of PPPs should compensate the additional costs incurred by the need to resort to private sector 
financing. The private sector tends to be considered as more efficient than the public sector 
because the former is subject to better incentives to make more cost-effective investments, to 
control operational costs, and especially to better manage risks. Daube, Vollrath, & Alfen, 
(2008) add that PPPs are characterised by optimal risk allocation and a holistic life-cycle 
approach, which is very important for long-life investments, such as transport infrastructure. 
Taking the above considerations into account, studies on PPPs’ efficiency are relevant and their 
insights could lead to substantial cost savings for the public sector in case they identify 







2.2 DEA, highways and efficiency 
 
The aim of DEA is to calculate an efficiency frontier measured as the relative performance of 
different Decision Making Units (DMUs) in terms of distance per unit to the ideal frontier 
constructed using observed input and output data (Brebbia, 2014). Bogetoft & Otto (2010), 
asserted that the highway, when considered as a business, contains all the general characteristics 
of the production systems in which DEA models are widely used. Applying the efficiency 
analysis theory by means of a DEA analysis, researchers can build a model to evaluate 
alternative schemes and to analyse and diagnose ineffective schemes. In addition, Cooper, 
Seiford, & Zhu (2011), stresses the fact that it has become imperative for highway sector 
organisations to rationalise their operating costs and to improve the quality of services offered. 
The author obtains measures of purely technical, scale, and overall efficiency for both public 
and private agencies and establishes that DEA can be used for the evaluation of the relative 
efficiency of multiple homogeneous decision-making units. It should also be noted that the 
advantage of using the DEA framework is that it is capable of handling noneconomic factors, 
such as the number of accidents, maintenance cost per day, traffic per day, and the average age 
of the pavement, and it also allows for the measurement of such factors on different scales. 
Bhagavath (2006), argues that the DEA model is particularly suited for determining the 
efficiency of highways, as factors such as traffic intensity and safety parameters are an essential 
part of highway transport. 
The objectives of highway efficiency models are to meet the largest possible traffic demands 
with the lowest traffic delays with minimal inputs: the minimum number of highway lanes that 
requires the lowest level of investment along with the lowest level of operational costs during 
the life-cycle of the project (Ozbek, de la Garza, & Triantis, 2010). DEA model analysis shows 
that the most beneficial improvements to operational highway efficiency can be achieved by 
reducing the resource consumption levels of individual vehicles, the amount of funds available, 
the time and space resources of the highway, and the price of environmental pollution, among 
other resources (Mao, 2010). According to Odeck (2008), the objective of DEA is to compare 
the performance of different urban networks to provide technical support to policy makers for 
the choice of actions that need to be implemented to make a highway system efficient. Brebbia 
(2014) states that DEA analysis enables highway agencies to calculate a value of the relative 
efficiency of each highway network, on the basis of which networks are ranked, thus 







2.3 DEA studies on highway efficiency 
 
The few studies that have been conducted in this field of research are summarised in Table 1. 
Academic research has been focused on two particular issues: measuring inefficiencies and the 
impact of dimensions (economies of scale). Several studies have concluded that highways were 
operating at an inefficient level (Deller & Halstead, 1994; Odeck, 2008; Welde & Odeck, 2011). 
Different causes for this inefficiency are brought forward: maintenance costs that are higher 
than necessary, poor management skills, and a lack of competition.  
The debate has also concentrated on the impact of highway dimensions and on whether 
economies of scale are determinants of highway efficiency. Studies by Amdal et al., (2007) and 
Odeck (2008) conclude that the highway’s dimension is a critical factor of its efficiency and that 
operating costs are reduced with increased traffic: operating costs vary significantly but larger 
companies that serve more traffic have lower levels of operating costs per vehicle. This result 
suggests important and unexploited economies of scale. For Odeck (2008), larger companies 
(measured by the number of lanes or by the number of km) tend to be more efficient because 
highways with a longer dimension are able to reduce the unitary fixed costs. These conclusions 
are supported in the case of the Italian highway concessionaries, as Benfratello, Iozzi, & 
Valbonesi (2008) found economies of density and scale using an L-shaped average cost curve 
over the range of output. In contrast, Welde & Odeck (2011) propound the notion that 
economies of scale are not always significant in terms of highway efficiency because they are 
able to present evidence of companies with low traffic levels having efficiency scores of 1.0 (the 
maximum efficiency in DEA model) or thereabouts.   
[Insert Table 1here] 
To conclude, efficiency measurement and benchmarking in highway transport is an important 
topic, whether one is interested in comparing the efficiency of different highway networks or in 
learning how to improve their efficiency. It is also relevant to define negotiation parameters for 
future PPP projects. The calculation of relative efficiency scores by means of the DEA model 
generates insights into the performance of highways of various dimensions and localizations, 
which thus guides the choice of the required actions. The benefit of using the DEA model in this 
context is that it is free from a priori assumptions on functional forms and is applicable to units, 
such as highways, that have several outputs (e.g. traffic and revenues). Still, the weakness of the 
DEA model is that it is sensitive to outliers and can generate multiple best-performers. DEA can 
be combined with other approaches to separate and measure the technological advances that can 




identified sufficient potential to increase their efficiency. However, there is no consensus about 
the main determinants of that increase and the impact of economies of scale. The debate is 
expected to continue at least until a sufficient number of projects are studied in detail over their 
entire life-cycle.  
 
3. The Portuguese Highway Sector Experience and SCUTS Projects 
 
Since 1993, when the first PPP was created to build the “Vasco da Gama” bridge, Portugal has 
launched a total of 35 PPPs, mainly within the periods 1999 to 2002 and 2008 to 2010 
(Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014b). The majority of these projects were in the highway sector (22 
projects), but some were also in the health (10), railways (2) and security (1) sectors. Seventeen 
billion Euros were invested by the private sector over these last two decades. Highways 
absorbed the largest part of the investment (80%), with railways, health, and security attracting 
18%, 2%, and 1%, respectively. The significant number of projects and the size of the 
investments represent a large liability for the public sector in terms of future payments that will 
become due over the coming decades. Between 2014 and 2020, annual payments will stand for 
1% of the GDP. From 2020 to 2035, annual payments will gradually be reduced to nearly 0.5% 
of GDP. If we use a discount rate of 6% which is used by the Portuguese government for public 
sector investments, we can calculate that the NPV of the future payments (from 2014 beyond) 
reaches 10% of the 2014 GDP. Despite the importance of PPPs in Portugal, only few studies 
have been conducted (de Lemos, Eaton, Betts, & de Almeida, 2004; Monteiro, 2005; Sarmento, 
2010; Basílio, 2011; Cruz & Marques, 2011; Sarmento & Reis, 2012; Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2014b). 
In the highway sector, two waves of PPPs have emerged. The first one comprised seven SCUT 
highways, which are the subject of this study. Since its inception, there have been debate and 
controversy as to whether PPPs were the best option for contracting the construction of 
highways and whether PPPs have delivered value for money for the public sector. The SCUTs 
extend over a total of 930 kilometres and were originally equipped with shadow tolls which 
imply that the payment to the private sector was at the expense of the public budget in lieu of 
the users. 
Currently, after several rounds of renegotiations, the SCUTs no longer operate with shadow 
tolls but with real electronic tolls to users. The individual concessionaries charge the tolls, but 
these revenues are transferred entirely to the government. In exchange, the concessionaries 




Audits, these renegotiations have reduced the level of risk of the private sector, while revenues 








In order to assess the efficiency of the Portuguese PPP highways, we have used a DEA by 
estimating a productivity Malmquist Index. The Malmquist Index measures the productivity 
changes over a period of several years, and is decomposed into changes in efficiency and 
technology. DEA measures the efficiency of each decision making unit within a group relative 
to the (observed) more efficient unit within that group (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978; 
Bhagavath, 2006). The more efficient DMU is the one that lies on the efficient frontier and 
assumes a value of one in the model. All the other DMU´s are compared with the more efficient 
unit, and have a value between zero and one. A DEA model can be subdivided into an input-
oriented model, which minimizes inputs while satisfying at least the given output levels, and an 
output-oriented model, which maximizes outputs without requiring more of any observed input 
values (Cook, Tone, & Zhu, 2014). Hence, efficiency is measured in terms of a proportional 
change in inputs or outputs. 
In line with Cooper et al. (2011), we find two types of efficiency in a DEA model: technical and 
allocative efficiency. The first type of efficiency signifies that for the current technological 
level, there is no waste of inputs for a certain level of output. This is the type of efficiency that 
is directly affected by management or scale; an organization operating at best-practice is said to 
be 100% technically efficient  (Bhagavath, 2006). The allocative efficiency refers to the use of 
resources so as to maximise profit and utility, more specifically, by minimizing of costs for a 
unit already technically efficient. This is, the inputs should be used in such a way to reach 
technical efficiency (i.e. minimum inputs and maximum outputs), but also to minimize costs. 
How does the DEA work? DEA is a non-parametric approach, meaning that the efficiency 
frontier does not assume any particular functional form, which may be considered an advantage. 
However, it does not provide a general relationship, in terms of equation, for relating inputs and 
outputs (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978). It identifies an efficiency frontier on which the 
relative performance of all the DMUs in the sample can be compared against the best DMU. If 
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firms only used one input to produce one output, then the efficiency score would easily be 
calculated by dividing the value of the input by the value of the output. However, in case of 
multiple inputs and outputs, DEA assumes a linear programming methodology that enables 
presenting a single value of efficiency when the production process presents a structure of 
multiple inputs and outputs. DEA makes for each unit a combined weight, with an optimal 
estimation of inputs and outputs. It is necessary to refer to how this optimal estimation is made: 
The weights for the inputs and outputs do not have to be identified because they are determined 
and optimised by the DEA model. The weights used are DMU specific, and during the 
application of DEA, they are optimised by each DMU to maximise its efficiency rating. 
This way, each unit can still be represented in a simple chart, with a single input and output 
value, and an efficiency frontier can be drawn. The units in the frontier will have a value of 1. A 
DMU is said to be efficient if the ratio of its weighted outputs to its weighted inputs is larger 
than the similar ratio for every other DMU in the sample. All the other units, the DEA measures 
the distance of the unit to the frontier, assuming a value between 0 and 1.  
Therefore, we can draw some of the DEA characteristics: There is no assumption regarding the 
Input-Output Function, and it does not require a weight restriction. More often, there is no limit 
to the number of inputs and outputs. Finally, it is an important tool for benchmark and decision 
making. 
In our DEA analysis, we use the Malmquist index to evaluate the productivity change of each 
unit between two periods of time (Cooper, Seiford, & Tone, 2007). This index divides technical 
efficiency change into pure and scale efficiency changes (Malmquist, 1953; Caves, Christensen, 
& Diewert, 1982). Whereas pure technical efficiency represents the technical efficiency devoid 
of scale effects, meaning that the efficiency stands entirely under the control of the management 
(it is also called managerial inefficiency), the latter type of efficiency is a direct consequence of 
dimension. A unit is scale efficient when its size of operations is optimal: if its size is either 
reduced or increased, its efficiency will drop ( Färe, Grosskopf, & Brännlund, 1996; Barros & 
Dieke, 2008). Scale efficiency will have a maximum value of 1, assumed by the DMU with the 
most productive scale size. Also, the technological progress with respect to outputs is Hicks-
neutral if the marginal rate of transformation between two outputs is constant, holding the mix 
of outputs constant (Barros et al., 2012). The Malmquist index measures the efficiency of 
DMUs by means of multiple inputs and outputs over a certain period of time, and represents the 
total factor productivity growth of a DMU, reflecting the progress (or regress) in the efficiency 
and the frontier technology of that unit over a period of time (Cooper et al., 2011). 
The Malmquist index decomposes the change in total factor productivity into a change in 




technical efficiency multiplied by a change in scale efficiency change. Pure technical efficiency 
is the impact of management on the company efficiency (also called managerial efficiency). 
Consequently, this part of a company’s increase or decrease in efficiency can be ascribed to the 
managers and their decisions regarding the level of inputs and outputs and the efficient 
utilisation of resources. This process may be considered input orientated, meaning how much 
the inputs can be reduced while maintaining the same level of outputs, or output-orientated, and 
representing how much the outputs can increase by maintaining the same level of inputs. 
Certain decisions, such as changing the operational process, improve quality or reduce costs can 
lead to better pure technical efficiency.  
Scale efficiency regards the (dis)economies of scale of a certain unit. It could either represent 
economies of scale (i.e., an increasing return to scale (IRS)), due to being at less than optimum 
size, or diseconomies of scale (i.e., decreasing returns to scale (DRS)), due to being at more 
than the optimum size (Isik & Hassan, 2003). A reduction in scale efficiency represents the cost 
of operating at an incorrect scale. It is necessary, however, to consider that an increased or 
reduced scale is always influenced by the market. Moreover, in the specific cases of highways, 
there is a clear limitation on the size and scope of the operation, as dimension is a project 
variable defined and most difficultly changed during the concession period. However, large 
highways, with more kilometres and lanes should be more efficient due to this scale effect. As 
economies of scale refer to a situation in which if production is increased by some amount, costs 
increase by a lesser amount. Thus, companies serving a greater number of lanes and, implicitly, 
a larger amount of traffic, should be more efficient than others are (Odeck, 2008). 
Technological efficiency is the impact on the increase or decrease of the overall firm efficiency 
caused by use of the technology by itself. This means to produce new technology that may 
reduce costs or increase revenues. In the case of highways, several examples can be given: 
electronic payment systems, replacing staff with toll-collecting machines or better maintenance 
materials and systems. 
The total factor productivity frontier is de facto a best-practice frontier and that DEA is also 
referred to as ‘balanced benchmarking’ (Sherman & Zhu, 2012). If a change in the distance to 
the efficiency frontier relative to the previous year is higher (lower) than 1, then a reduction 
(increase) in efficiency has occurred. A detailed explanation on how the inputs and outputs 
relate to the Malmquist index is discussed in Färe, Grosskopf, Norris, & Zhang (1994), Isik & 
Hassan  (2003), and Barros et al. (2012).  
The linear program software (we used DEAP) takes a three step approach: first, for each 
combination of inputs and outputs, an efficiency frontier is generated consisting of the most 




proportionate increase in the output levels). Secondly, the Malmquist index measures the 
difference of each unit to the efficiency frontier over time: for instance, as our sample starts in 
2003, the efficient frontier is calculated for 2003 and 2004 and the first value of the Malmquist 
index for 2004 is the difference in deviations to the efficient frontier of a unit for 2004 and 
2003. The distance function to the efficiency frontier is calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝐼𝑡+1 =  
 𝐸𝑡+1 ( 𝑥𝑡+1; 𝑦𝑡+1)   
𝐸𝑡 ( 𝑥𝑡; 𝑦𝑡)   
 (1), 
where MI stands for the Malmquist index and x and y are inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Finally, once the Malmquist index is calculated for each year, we take the geometric mean of 
the values for each firm. Suppose we have 4 units using one input and one output for period t 
and t+1, and that the units have the following combinations of inputs/outputs: A(0,5;0,5), 
B(2;2); C(1;2), D(2;1) at t and A1(1;1); B1(2;3), C1(1;3), D(3;1,5) at t+1. From Figure 1, we 
observe that C is the most efficient unit and that B had no efficiency gains between t and t+1 
because its distance to the efficiency frontier has remained equal. (It should be noted that in a 
single input and output case, the efficiency frontier reduces to a straight line).  




We use a balanced data panel, comprising all seven Portuguese companies involved in the first 
PPP highway wave (the free highways, with concessionaries’ tolls originally paid for by the 
government) during the period 2003 to 2012. The annual data were obtained from the 
concessionaries’ Annual Reports and from the Portuguese highway regulator (InIR – Portuguese 
for Institute of Road Infrastructure) that also has supervisory responsibilities. The proportional 
rule required by DEA is that the number of observations should be more than three times the 
sum of inputs (in our case, we use operating and maintenance costs (O&M), total assets, and 
number of full time equivalents (ftes)) and outputs (in our case, revenues and daily average 
traffic/km or DAT/km): 63 (7 PPPs * (10-1) years) is larger than 3 x (2+3) (Cooper et al., 2011). 
All of the units (companies) utilise the same type of inputs to produce some types of outputs and 
we have a balanced dataset. 
A summary of variables defining each highway project is presented in Table 2: the distance, 
capital expenditure (Capex) by km, location (inland or coast), type of district (urban or rural), 
and type of shareholder (domestic versus foreign). The Capex by km defines the level of 
investment and is expected to have a strong impact on efficiency. The main cost for highways is 




1% of the total investment (Sarmento, 2010). Location is relevant, as the Portuguese inland is 
mountainous, faces cold weather (which affects the maintenance costs), and is much less 
populated than the coastal regions. Moreover, a highway in an urban area is expected to attract 
more traffic by km, but then again the maintenance costs will be higher (as highway 
maintenance is usually performed without entirely closing the road, more dense traffic makes 
the work more complex). 
Our data vary across PPPs: for instance, the Capex/km varied from 1.69 M € (for the A22, a 
coastal urban operation in the south of the country) to 6.46 M € (for the GP, a similar operation 
– coastal and urban – but it circles around the second largest city in Portugal). The distances 
range from 72 km (the GP) to almost 180 km (the A23, 178 km and the A25, 176 km, both are 
inland rural highways). The average highway stretches for 133 km, and its Capex/km is €3.4m. 
Other performance-related information (revenues, operating and maintenance costs, daily 
average traffic /km) is presented in Table 3. 
[Insert tables 2, 3 and 4 here] 
The descriptive statistics of the two outputs and three inputs are reported in Table 4. In line with 
the efficiency literature, we use as outputs: DAT/km (daily average traffic, which is the total 
traffic of a highway in a year divided by the number of days, and subsequently, divided by the 
number of kilometres) and revenues (i.e. the payment for concessionaries according to PPP 
agreements signed with the Portuguese authorities). The inputs required for handling traffic 
volume and managing all of the operations combine financial and non-financial data: O&M 
(operating and maintenance) costs, which include salaries; total assets (i.e., the investments by 
year); and the number of employees (ftes) (Table 4). It should be noted that a reduction in the 
number of employees does not necessarily lead to an increase in efficiency, but may simply 
represent a transfer of service to outsourcing companies, which affects the O&M costs. 
Outsourcing is standard practice with PPPs which are this way able to reallocate the operational 
risk to a third party. However, we show that this reduction of risk was not followed by an 
increase in efficiency.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The Malmquist index does not identify the causes of efficiency, in the sense that the result only 
shows an increase or decrease in efficiency, but it enables us to identify the inefficient units, 
either in terms of change in technical efficiency or technological change. With that information, 




changes of efficiency. Furthermore, by grouping the different units according to the increase or 
decrease in the different types of (in)efficiencies, we can assess the possible explanations 
regarding the units’ characteristics. We consider the following characteristics: (i) the change in 
the inputs and outputs in each company during this period; (ii) the scale of each highway or its 
length (in kms), as we expect scale efficiency to have a positive impact on overall efficiency; 
(iii) the investment level as expressed by the Capex/km as a high level of investment is expected 
to reduce highway efficiency; (iv) the location (inland or coastal) because the Portuguese inland 
is mountainous which can reduce efficiency; (v) the type of district, as urban areas attract higher 
traffic density which should increase efficiency; and (vi) the main shareholders: a PPP with 
national shareholders may be more efficient (from a private partner’s perspective), because, due 
to political connections, they may have been able to attract more favorable contract conditions. 
The average Malmquist indices for each of the toll-free highways are presented in Table 5.  
[Insert table 5 here] 
Table 5 (column 1) shows that the total factor productivity change score (which equals the 
Malmquist index) amounts to 1.2096 which is above one and hence signifies that there was a 
deterioration (of -0.2096) in highway productivity during this period. The only exception to the 
overall deterioration is highway A27. The average change in technical efficiency (column (2)) 
amounts to 1.008, which indicates that pure and scale efficiency slightly decreased (the A17 and 
A25 are mainly responsible for the reduction). The average change in the technology (column 
(3)) amounts to 1.2 and also demonstrates that there was degradation in the technological 
efficiency, which signifies that investments were scarce over the past decade.  
Finally, we observe that the change in pure technical efficiency and the change in the scale 
efficiency are limited. The former small decline may still be due to the limitations of 
competition in this sector. The latter indicates that there is no apparent effect of dimension in 
highways (only A17 and A25 have values slightly different from one where one signifies no 
change in the efficiency).   
When we break down the Malmquist index into an efficiency change and a technological 
change, we are able to identify three groups of highways. The first category consists of the most 
inefficient PPP toll-free highways in terms of productivity: their productivity decline is due to 
the simultaneous deterioration of technological change and technical efficiency, or put 
differently, the Malmquist index >1, technical efficiency change >1 and technological change 
>1. Highways A17 an A25 belong to this category and both underwent a substantial increase in 
the O&M costs and a decrease in the number of employees because the two companies 
outsourced more of the maintenance and operations. Given that these two highways belong to 




conclusion reinforced by the fact that the two highways are geographically connected. Also, the 
value of the assets of these two highway companies increases significantly for both (in terms of 
additional investments), which were not compensated by higher revenues with a resulting 
decrease in efficiency. Both highways also suffered from a strong reduction in traffic following 
the introduction of tolls in 2010. The second group of highways is characterized by a 
productivity decline caused by deterioration in technological change (Malmquist index >1 with 
technical efficiency change =1 and technological change >1) and includes the A22, A23, A24 
and GP. The decline in productivity is related to a substantial loss in traffic (almost 50%), but 
they were able to keep follow-up investments down and to maintain O&M costs at a stable 
level. The third group of highways with a productivity improvement resulting from 
technological improvement (Malmquist index <1, technical efficiency change =1 and 
technological change <1) only comprises one highway: the A27. Both the O&M costs and the 
number of employees in this company remained stable, investment was low and, in spite of 
tolls, traffic did not decline over the sample period. 
We also find that for some highways O&M costs increase, followed by a significant reduction 
in the number of employees which implies that the highway PPPs resorted to more outsourcing. 
Furthermore, substantial levels of follow-up investment decreased it efficiency, but it is most 
likely that over the coming years, as the investment requirements decline, these highways will 
augment their efficiency. It is worth noting that the introduction of tolls (in 2010) along with the 
economic crises has led to a substantial reduction of traffic in almost all highways, and hence 
efficiency.     
When we rank the seven highways in terms of the efficiency scores (with the most efficient 
coming first) we get: A27, A23, GP, A22, A24, A17, and A25. This shows that there seem to be 
no scale effects. In terms of location, highways in coastal areas perform better than the ones in 
mountainous regions, as the traffic volume is higher in the former increasing the use of these 
assets. Also, highways mainly situated in rural areas perform better than those located in urban 
ones, which is related to the fact that O&M costs are higher in urban areas because the 
maintenance of highways in urban areas is more complex and costly. The major cause of 
productivity degradation in (initially) toll-free Portuguese highways is efficiency deterioration.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We have estimated the Malmquist input-based index of total factor productivity for seven 
Portuguese highways over the period 2003 to 2012. A linear programming analysis has resulted 




highway can be gauged. We have first dissected the productivity change into a change in 
technical efficiency and technological change. This analysis has revealed that the average 
productivity slipped for Portuguese SCUT highways. In general, this change is predominantly 
caused by a drop in technological efficiency and to a lesser extent to a reduction in technical 
efficiency. Although the Malmquist index does not identify the causes of each of type of 
(in)efficiency, the identification of poor and strong performers still enables the parties involved 
in the PPP to delve deeper to the sources of (in)efficiencies. Efficiency change is mainly 
associated with managerial practices and technological efficiency is related to new (follow-up) 
investments and procedures. We have found for most highways that there is some evidence of 
weak management in terms of O&M costs, possibly due to a low competitive pressure. Also, 
some highways were still, particularly during the first years, making large investments, which 
decreased their efficiency. The substantial reduction in traffic as a consequence of the recent 
financial crises and the introduction of levying electronic tolls has had a negative impact on 
traffic density and resulted in the fact that the infrastructure is not used at maximum efficiency. 
It is also important to note that the efficiency performance of each highway is mainly driven by 
its local context, particularly location and district. Some remote highways are inefficient on 
account of being located in low-income districts with scarce traffic. Other companies suffered 
from a lack of investment or qualified human resources caused by cost-control policies induced 
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Table 1 – Literature review on highway efficiency studies 
This table presents the main studies regarding efficiency and performance of highways. Source: own table 






Price of motorised grader 
Price of dump trucks 
 
Miles of highways 
Maintenance costs higher than necessary 
due to managerial inefficiencies 
Erik Amdal (2007) 
Panel data 
analysis 








OBU – cars’ on-board 
units 
 
Average cost per vehicle 
Very important unexploited economies of 
scale 
Higher share of vehicles using on-board 
units significantly reduces average costs 
Competitive tendering reduces average 
costs 
Increase number of lanes, debt and 
passenger charging increases average costs 
Odeck (2008) DEA  
18 companies, 
from 2001 to 2004 
Operational costs 
 
Payments to managers 
Annual traffic 
 
Number of lanes 
Potential for efficiency increases 
Economies of scales: Larger companies are 
more efficient than smaller ones 
Productivity increase due to companies 
using more efficient methods to collect 
revenue 
Ozbek (2010) DEA 
Highway 
maintenance 
19 cost maintenance 
inputs, such as climate, 
cost, traffic, accidents or 
speed limit 
7 outputs, such as 
changes in highway or 
bridge conditions and 
pollution 
Theoretical background and framework 
 
Specific inputs and outputs for bridges 
 





20 companies from 






Number of lanes 
Great potential for efficiency improvement 
No evidence of economies of scale, unlike 






Table 2: Characteristics of Portuguese PPP highways 
This table presents the main data on the PPPs used in this study. Besides the dimension of each highway 
(measured in km), we also observed the investment by km (Capex/km), the geographical location (I for 
highways mainly situated in the interior and C for those mainly located in the coastal area). We also 
present the type of district (U if the highways are in urban areas and R if they are in rural ones). We also 
record if the main shareholders are domestic (the majority of the capital is owned by Portuguese groups) 
or foreign. Source: Own table, based on information from INIR (Institute of Road Infrastructure).  
 
 
Table 3: Operational characteristics of Portuguese PPP highways  
This table presents the main characteristics of the highways used in this study for the year 2012. DAT/Km 
real traffic stands for the daily average traffic by km observed during the year. O&M costs stands for 
means operating and maintenance costs (these costs include salaries). Source: Own table, based on 









A23 121,243 9,400 25,442 
A24 90,253 6,685 8,514 
A22 38,592 8,219 4,734 
A17 43,280 19,988 17,015 
GP 78,506 22,151 11,605 
A25 97,147 9,172 18,912 
A27 48,133 20,305 6,951 
Mean 73,879 13,703 13,310 
Median 78,506 9,400 11,605 






















I R Foreign 
A22 SCUT Algarve 129 
1,69 
 














C U Domestic 
A25 
SCUT Beiras 















Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Input and Output Data 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs used in the Malmquist index for the 
period 2003-2012. DAT stands for daily average traffic and O&M for operating and maintenance costs. 
Source: own calculations. 
Variable Description Min. Max. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Outputs      
Revenues 
 
In 000 Euro at constant 
prices; 2005=100 
 
2,683 149,222 52,646 41,740 43,147 
DAT/KM real 
traffic 
Daily average traffic by 
Km (real traffic) 
 
4,257 38,073 18,492 17.202 10,715 
 Inputs      
O&M Costs 
 
In 000 Euro at constant 
prices 2005=100 
 
3,236 24,943 7,356 5,610 4,525 
Total assets 
000 Euros at constant 
prices; 2005=100 










Table 5. Efficiency decomposition for Portuguese PPP highways 
This table presents the Malmquist index for the seven highways examined in this study over the period 2003-2012. The index is decomposed in technical 
efficiency change and technological change. The change in technical efficiency is also dissected into a change in pure technical efficiency and a change in 














∆ Scale efficiency 
A23 1.161 1.000 1.161 1.000 1.000 
A24 1.248 1.000 1.248 1.000 1.000 
A22 1.247 1.000 1.247 1.000 1.000 
A17 1.339 1.034 1.295 1.007 1.026 
GP 1.233 1.000 1.233 1.000 1.000 
A25 1.359 1.021 1.331 1.000 1.021 
A27 0.934 1.000 0.934 1.000 1.000 
Mean  1.210 1.008 1.200 1.001 1.007 
Median 1.247 1.000 1.247 1.000 1.000 





Figure 1 – The Malmquist index using a Constant Return of Scale DEA model 
This figure presents an example of how the Malmquist index is represented by means of the DEA 
distance function. A, B, C and D represent the input/output efficiency of 4 firms in year t and 
A1,B1,C1,D1 in year t+1. The Malmquist index calculates the change in the distance of each unit to the 
efficiency frontier, regarding period t and t+1. If the unit moves closer to the efficiency frontier, then this 
represents an increase in efficiency. For each company, we calculate the ratio between the two distance 
measures at t and t+1.  
Considering this example, what is the function of the DEAP software? The first step, for each year, is to 
calculate the DEA score for each unit. As mentioned before, the DEA generates a combined weight for 
each unit, with an optimal estimation of inputs and outputs. The second step is that the Malmquist 
measures the distance of each unit to the efficiency frontier in each year and then compares it with the 
previous year. This provides a year value for the efficiency change for t1 compared with t. Therefore, the 
Malmquist will have tn-1 observations for each unit. The third step is that for each unit, the Malmquist 
provides a final value of the efficiency change by calculating the geometric mean of the year values 
calculated in the second step. 
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Cost Overruns in Public Sector Investment Projects 
 
ABSTRACT 
The high level of public resources allocated to infrastructure expenditures, along with concerns regarding 
the efficiency and value of these projects, has created increasing concern regarding cost deviation. Using 
a sample of 243 projects from 1999 to 2012, we analyse cost overruns in public infrastructural investment 
projects in Portugal. The average cost deviation amounts to 24%. Large projects, which are often more 
complex, have a longer duration, are subject to higher risk, have a higher cost deviation and a higher 
probability of cost overruns, which suggests that the public administration may not be well prepared to 
handle these types of projects. Local and regional governments seem to control costs better than the 
central government. There is no evidence that right or left wing governments are better or worse at 
adhering to the budget. Still, cost overruns are more likely in election years, as politicians seem eager to 
conclude infrastructural investments, and thus, they inaugurate a new service to harvest political goodwill 
with the population. Over time, while cost deviations are reduced, this reduction does not appear to be the 
result of the new procurement law but rather is most likely the result of other factors, such as more 
experience or increased fiscal constraints. Less corruption reduces not only the level of deviations but 
also the probability of cost overruns. 
 
KEYWORDS: public sector, public works, cost deviations, Portugal 




It is a well-known fact that most infrastructure is built by the public sector. There are several 
reasons why governments spend taxpayers’ money on building roads, railways, prisons, 
hospitals, schools, and museums, among other types of public assets. The first reason is market 
failure, as the private sector is normally not interested in this type of investment because it may 
take too long to recuperate the heavy initial investments. Second, this type of infrastructure is 
usually regarded as a public good. Third, providing infrastructure to the community generates 
positive economic and political externalities. 
The large amount of public resources that the public sector spends on infrastructure generates 
concerns about the effectiveness of these projects. One of the main sources of concern is cost 




a positive deviation (i.e., the project cost is greater than the initial forecast), no deviation or a 
negative deviation (i.e., the cost is less than the forecast). There are two main reasons why cost 
overruns are a source of concern. That is, either they represent a source of inefficiency in the 
use of public resources and/or they represent a cost underestimation of the initial project. 
Whereas the academic literature focuses on positive cost deviations (see, for instance, 
Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl (2002), or Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, van Wee, & Molin (2008)), also 
called cost overruns or cost escalation, this study will focus on the above three types of cost 
deviations.  
Despite their relevance, quantitative studies based on a large sample of projects covering 
different sectors and countries are rare. For instance, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), being an exception, 
focuses on the amplitude of cost deviations and the main determinants of those deviations. In 
the existing literature, we found evidence of cost deviations between 10% and 30% of the initial 
cost, with most of the projects showing cost overruns. The main causes for cost deviations in 
public projects are optimism as decision makers tend to assume optimist bias in cost forecast 
and opportunistic behaviours as public managers tend to underestimate costs to have their 
projects approved. Additional causes of cost deviations include the size of the project, the 
region/country were the project is developed and the period of implementation. This research 
serves as a strong contribution to extant literature for two reasons. Specifically, most of the data 
herein are not publicly available, and we were able to collect a large sample of infrastructural 
investments.   
In this paper, we use a sample of 243 public investment projects in Portugal over the period 
1999 to 2012. We concentrate on assessing their cost deviations and the probability of cost 
overruns.  
There are several hypotheses in this study (as we will also see in the data section): i) There is a 
cost overrun pattern in public projects ii) Central government is more efficient than regional and 
local governments; iii) Large projects increase cost overruns; iv) election years (or their nearby) 
increase cost overruns; v) the new procurement law introduced in 2008 has reduced the 
incidence of cost overruns; vi) A better legal and regulatory environment reduced the cost 
overruns, as well as a low corruption level. 
We reach eight main conclusions. First, cost overruns appear to be the standard in public 
investment projects. Second, projects initiated by the central government have larger cost 
overruns. Third, there is a clear scale effect as measured by large projects that increases the 
deviations and the probability of cost overruns. Fourth, while no political party in government is 
more efficient in avoiding cost overruns, we find evidence that election years increase the 




pay more to have the infrastructure ready before elections. Fifth, the 2008 change in the 
procurement law has failed to produce a better procurement system. Sixth, while the better rule 
of law reduces cost deviations, it has no impact on the probability of cost overruns. Seventh, 
cost overruns increase with corruption. Eighth, experience, better governance, and control 
reduce cost deviations.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. The methodology and 
data are presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 presents the 
conclusions.  
   
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The role of the public sector in infrastructural investments 
 
The construction and maintenance of infrastructure - public infrastructural investments - is 
mainly a public sector responsibility (Savas, 2000). As such, they are characterised by a long 
duration in construction and operation, as well as by capital intensity, and a complex valuation 
process (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). 
There are several reasons why the government spends taxpayer resources on infrastructure such 
as roads, railways, ports, airports, schools, hospitals, theatres, museums, etc. One reason is that 
a market failure emerges when the allocation of goods and services is not efficiently arranged 
by market forces (Bator, 1958). Such failure is observed in scenarios where individuals’ pursuit 
of self-interests leads to results that are not efficient, i.e., they can be improved upon, from a 
societal perspective, leading to government intervention (Stiglitz, 1989; Arrow, 1996). In the 
particular case of infrastructure, governments intervene because the development of 
infrastructure requires a long-term view and faces a high level of risk. Therefore, the private 
sector is not eager to deliver these types of goods and services as there is uncertainty about their 
long-run profitability. However, for social and/or political reasons, as the infrastructure must be 
made available to society, it becomes the public sector’s responsibility. As such, infrastructure 
becomes a public good as the benefits are shared across the community in such a way that those 
who do not wish to buy the service cannot be excluded from the benefits created by those who 
do (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).  
Furthermore, infrastructural investments produce positive externalities that affect society as a 
whole. This occurs when the actions of firms or consumers impose costs or confer benefits on 




actions (Brealey, Cooper, & Habib, 1997). For instance, the construction of new road may 
reduce travel time and accidents.  
Despite the increase of private sector participation in building and maintaining infrastructure 
(through public private partnerships, concessions, or privatisations), the need - with respect to 
decision making, planning, and the allocating of resources - for the public sector to develop the 
infrastructure remains.  
The various financial crises over the past 15 years have made the constraints to public resources 
more binding and the topic of cost overruns in infrastructural investments more relevant. 
Accordingly, it is surprising that there is little research on this subject as noted by the literature 
reviews of Siemiatycki (2009), and De Jong, Annema, & Van Wee (2013), who found less than 
twenty studies with (some) statistical analyses.     
 
2.2 Public investments and cost deviations 
 
The main reason for the limited academic research is the lack of data. Most studies treat an 
individual case (or a small number of cases), which raises questions about the generalizability of 
the conclusions. Other research papers concentrate on changes in legal or regulatory 
frameworks (e.g., Nijkamp & Ubbels (1999), or van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk 
(2008)). The most relevant literature with some degree of statistical analysis is listed in Table 1, 
and focuses on two issues: the level of cost deviations (or cost overruns) and the main 
determinants of cost deviations (or cost overruns). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The most comprehensive quantitative study is by (B. Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). The study 
presented a panel of 254 projects with data on investments in roads, railways and bridges in the 
US, Europe, and Japan for sample period 1910 to 1998. The study reports an average cost 
overrun of 28% across all sectors and of 45%, 34%, and 20% for rail, bridges, and roads, 
respectively). Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith, & Valila (2006, 2009), find an average cost overrun of 
24% for road projects in Europe from 1990 to 2008. 
Bent Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012), also investigated infrastructural investments related to the 
Olympic Games between 1960 and 2012 and documented an average cost overrun of 179%. For 
other types of large investment projects, such as electrical infrastructure and large dams, 
Sovacool, Nugent, & Gilbert (2014), and Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Lunn (2014) found 




Most studies focus on data from only one country, such as Odeck (2004, 2014), and Magnussen 
& Olsson (2006), focus on Norway, Cantarelli et al. (2008), on the Netherlands, Makovšek, 
Tominc, & Logožar (2011), on Slovenia, and Lundberg, Jenpanitsub, & Pyddoke (2011), on 
Sweden. 
Although there are no studies that revisit analyses of specific sectors by country, Table 1 may 
reveal some patterns. The older studies show higher levels of cost overruns in the range of [50% 
to 100%], e.g., P. Morris & Hough (1991) and S. Morris (1990) in India and MacDonald (2002), 
in the UK. In contrast, more recent studies show cost deviations less than 20%, e.g., Odeck 
(2004, 2014), and Magnussen & Olsson (2006), in Norway, Lundberg et al. (2011), in Sweden, 
Aibinu & Pasco (2008) and Creedy, Skitmore, & Wong (2010) in Australia, Cantarelli et al. 
(2008) in the Netherlands, Makovšek et al. (2011) in Slovenia and Bucciol, Chillemi, & Palazzi 
(2013) in Italy. 
 
2.3  The main determinants of cost deviations 
 
The main determinants of the cost deviations reported in the literature are (i) imprecise project 
concept design planning, risk management and implementation, and poorly organised bidding 
processes; (ii) over optimism in the forecasts; (iii) time effects (as the passage of time yields 
better experience, thus reducing cost overruns); (iv) country/region where projects are located; 
(v) size of the investments; and (vi) public versus private ownership of the project and 
inefficiencies at the level of the central and regional/local governments.  
In many ex post cost analyses, technical difficulties in forecasting the costs of infrastructural 
investments lead to cost escalations (see, e.g., Flyvbjerg (2004)). In addition, subsequent 
changes in project scope, design, delays, financial constraints, and technological innovations 
during the development and construction stages explain some of the overruns ( Nijkamp & 
Ubbels, 1999; Lee, 2008). There is a strong statistical relationship between the length of 
implementation and the increase in cost escalation (Flyvbjerg, 2004). An obvious reason is that 
cost estimates are usually prepared using limited past data as guidance), limited valuation and 
forecasting skills of public servants, and imperfect forecasting models (Aibinu & Pasco, 2008; 
Odeck, 2014). For instance, the introduction of new quality standards with respect to project 
planning, implementation and control has contributed to a reduction in cost deviations in 
Norway (Magnussen & Olsson, 2006).  
Some studies argue that technical failures in the planning and construction phases do not 
provide an accurate explanation for cost deviations because if cost deviations were explained by 




zero, which is not the case. Furthermore, improvement over time should be expected as 
experience from planners and managers increases, which is also not the case. Therefore, 
Siemiatycki (2009), and Altshuler & Luberoff (2003), claim that over-optimism biases and 
political decisions are more plausible as explanations for cost overruns. 
Political decisions influence cost deviations by what Flyvbjerg (2002), called strategic 
misrepresentation. This refers to the deliberate underestimating of the cost to have a lower 
budget for the project. With limited resources, the project may not be selected if the decision 
makers were aware of the real cost of the project. Furthermore, competition between projects 
creates political and organisational pressures to emphasise future benefits and pare down the 
costs and risks. Once a project is started, it is not likely that a project will be cancelled or its 
scale reduced because most projects are committed to by politicians and interest groups, making 
it difficult to reverse decisions at a later stage (Priemus, 2007). Instead, it is more likely that 
projects receive additional funding to compensate for the positive cost deviation. The result is 
that non-viable projects continue to be implemented, leading to an inefficient allocation of 
resources.  
The optimism bias in forecasting costs refers to the public sector accepting a lower probability 
of a negative event occurring, although this systematic bias may also be found among appraisers 
who under-/over-estimate a project’s key parameters. Most of this bias is natural, as Lovallo & 
Kahneman (2003) note that most people are highly optimistic most of the time, and accordingly, 
managers also make decisions based on this optimism. Wachs (1990), further contends that if 
politicians favour one project over another, the forecasters may tacitly select assumptions that 
are more favourable to the project supported by the politicians. Most studies did not find 
evidence to support the notion that experience in public projects leads to more accuracy in new 
investment projects (see, e.g., Aibinu & Pasco (2008)).  
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), found statistical evidence that some regions, such as Europe and the US, 
perform better in terms of matching public investment costs with the budget than do others. It 
could be that less developed countries have poorer procurement systems, financing, control and 
governance, and accountability with respect to the management of public investments (Kaming, 
Olomolaiye, Holt, & Harris, 1997; Lee, 2008; Kaliba, Muya, & Mumba, 2009). 
One aspect on which the literature is less unanimous is the impact of the project dimension. It is 
not clear whether cost deviations as a percentage of the budget costs occur more frequently in 
small or large projects. Some authors argue that larger projects should have a higher percentage 
of cost deviations (e.g., Merewitz (1973); Morris & Hough (1987)) because larger projects are 
more complex and such complexity may be positively related with cost deviations (Flyvbjerg et 




they did not find such evidence in road or railway projects. An explanation could be that roads 
and railways possess a divisibility characteristic that bridges and tunnels do not. That is, roads 
can be divided into several phases, for instance, a 200 km highway can be divided into several 
stages), while this is not the case for bridges and tunnels.  
Although there is some evidence that cost deviations are related to the size of the investment 
projects, cost overruns are mainly due to the project’s complexity (e.g., tunnels, geographical 
terrain) and most evidence finds a higher percentage cost deviation for small projects ( Odeck, 
2004; Aibinu & Pasco, 2008). As large projects have a more substantial fiscal impact, decision 
makers and the public could be more sensitive to budget overruns for large projects. Moreover, 
small projects may have fewer resources in terms of staff for planning and control, which makes 
these projects less reliable with respect to forecasts. 
Finally, the literature has also focused on the nature of ownership of the project. Despite the 
public decision making and funding, the private sector has assumed over the past few decades a 
major role in building and operating infrastructure. This increased importance of the private 
sector has taken many forms, such as public-private partnerships, concessions, or privatisation. 
Governments seek private sector participation with two main goals: finding new sources of 
financing, particularly in periods of strong fiscal constraints, and utilising the private sector’s 
expertise and higher efficiency in construction, operations, and risk management (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). Delivering infrastructure through privatisation or other private sector 
arrangements may create more market discipline, with incentives to be more efficient while 
reducing the probability of errors in forecasting. Therefore, infrastructure built and operated by 
the private sector is expected to have lower cost overruns than that managed entirely by the 
public sector. Although Blanc-Brude et al. (2006); Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith, & Valila (2009b) 
found that PPP highways in Europe were built at lower costs than those under traditional 
procurement, there is little evidence that could be generalised indicating that the private sector 
has been more efficient in avoiding cost overruns than has the public sector (Handler, 1996; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2006).      
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1  Data 
The dimension of the cost deviations and the probability of cost overruns can be affected by (i) 
the project’s characteristics, (ii) political constraints, and (iii) the institutional and legal 
environments. Table 2 summarises the independent variables as well as their expected signs. 




Education, transports, social facilities, and economic facilities identify the sector of the project. 
Education captures whether the project is in the education sector, mainly the construction of a 
new school. Transports relates to roads, bridges, railways, ports and airports. Social facilities 
represent projects in the health, social housing, or cultural sectors, while economic facilities 
include projects related to economic infrastructures, such as rural markets or industrial parks.   
Subsector is an indicator variable taking the value of 0 if the project is developed by the central 
government and 1 if it is developed by regional or local governments. Traditionally, regional 
and local Portuguese governments have been associated with less accountability and more 
overspending than the central government. This does not mean, however, that the central 
government functions efficiently. 
Parque Escolar is a dummy variable capturing whether the project is developed under the 
Parque Escolar programme, a major infrastructure programme developed between 2009 and 
2012. This program was the Portuguese response to the financial and economic crisis that began 
in 2008. Despite the political controversy - mainly regarding the type of projects and the total 
volume of investment and debt - cost deviations are low. Hence, we expect this variable to be 
negatively related with cost deviations. 
Large project is a dummy variable capturing whether the project is a large project. This is 
defined in the Portuguese legislation, according to the size, relevance, and complexity of the 
project. For instance, in our sample, we have as large projects the stadiums for 2004, the new 
bridge under Coimbra and the music house of Porto. These projects are under special control 
and scrutiny, but due to their higher complexity and the pressure to open within the expected 
time, we expect this variable to be positively related with cost deviations.  
Election year lag and election year refer, respectively, to whether the year of the project 
conclusion was the year prior to an election or the election year itself. Politicians often expect to 
harvest political benefits from public sector investments. In addition, underestimating costs may 
be a strategy that helps to get projects approved. Therefore, we expect these variables to be 
positively related to cost overruns.  
Right-wing party is a dummy variable for the party in government, assuming 0 if the party in 
government is the socialist party (left wing) and 1 if it is the social democrat party (liberal, right 
wing).  
2008 procurement law is 0 if the project was concluded before the introduction of the new 
regulatory framework regarding public procurement laws and 1 if it was concluded subsequent 
to the law. We expect that this new legal framework, which is mainly the result of European 
Union directives, has strengthened the procurement process, thereby reducing cost deviations. 




variable, we will introduce, for control variables, three economic variables: GDP growth, 
inflation and public deficit. The source for these three variable is the Portuguese national 
statistics office. 
Rule of law is a proxy for the quality of contract (enforcement). This variable is dynamic, with 
the values ranging from 0 to 100. The best possible score is 100 whereby an increase in the 
score represents an improvement in the country’s situation regarding this indicator. Better 
enforcement should reduce cost deviations. Rule of law represents the quality and strength of 
the legal system and shows the judicial limits of government to realise its policy program 
through the legislative arm of government. Corruption is a dynamic variable representing the 
level of corruption in a country, which ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being the lowest possible 
level of corruption. If a private contractor believes that the government is subject to influence, 
the odds for cost overruns as a way to capture additional rents increases. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are summarised in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We have performed several data diagnostic tests. The correlation matrix (not reported) shows 
no evidence of strong correlations between variable pairs (nor did the VIF tests). Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not likely to lead to estimation problems. We also performed a Breusch–
Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and rejected the null hypothesis. In addition, the Wald test was 
statistically significant, which implies that the regressors have an important collective impact on 
renegotiations. 
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
We collect data for 243 projects that were developed between 1999 and 2012 from two sources: 
the Portuguese Court of Audits and the Ministry of Finance Internal Audit (IGF). The Court of 
Audits is an independent body similar to the national audit office in other countries, such as the 
UK or Australia, and is the supreme body that examines the legality of public expenditures. As 
such, this body audits the accounts that the law has ordered to be submitted to the Court.  
From these reports, we collect the following information for each project: (i) the year of 
conclusion; (ii) the initial budget cost; (iii) the final cost; (iv) the project’s sector; and (v) 
whether the project was developed by the central, regional, or local (municipal) government. To 
assess the cost deviation of each project, we calculate the percentage of the deviation as [(final 
cost – initial budget cost)/initial budget cost]. We also study what determines the (percentage 





𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽3𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽4𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠
+  𝛽5𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽6𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔
+  𝛽8 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽9 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+  𝛽10 2008 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛽12 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽13 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽15 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜇𝑖  
 
We test this model by means of an OLS with and without year effects as a number of crucial 
variables are not time dependent. We also estimate GLM and a Tobit models with left censoring 
whereby we only consider projects with positive cost deviation (cost overruns). Finally, as some 
cost overruns are exceptionally high (above 100%, which is more than three times the average 
deviation), we also run a Tobit model with left and right censoring after eliminating extreme 
cost overruns. 
To measure the probability of a cost overrun, we run a logit model whereby cost overruns take 
the value 1 (and negative or no cost deviations take the value 0). Of the sample projects, 155 




4.1  The descriptives of cost deviations  
 
The average cost deviation is approximately 24% (Table 4), with a weighted average deviation 
of approximately 28%. If we limit our sample to projects with cost overruns, then the mean is 
36% (Table 4). When comparing these numbers to those reported in the literature, the 
Portuguese experience in public project costs does not prima facie appear to be worse. 
Figure 1 shows a histogram with the distribution of the cost deviations in our sample. Most of 
the projects have cost deviations between -20% (the costs are lower than the forecasts) and 40% 
(cost overruns). The cost deviation percentage is strongly skewed to the right, meaning that cost 
overruns are dominant. In fact, for every 10 projects, 7 have a positive deviation in the final 
cost. A quartile analysis indicates that 25% of the projects have a cost deviation equal to or 
below zero (projects with no cost overruns compose 37% of the sample), while 50% and 75% of 
the projects have deviations up to 5% and 24%, respectively. For the 90
th
 percentile, the 
deviation reaches 54%. 




Figure 2 presents a plot of the cost deviations against the year that each project was concluded. 
We observe some heteroscedasticity with lower cost deviation spreads in later years, which 
could indicate that the public sector has been improving in terms of efficiency.  
[Insert Figure 2]  
When dividing the sample between projects with cost overruns and projects without cost 
overruns, we have a total of 152 (63%) and 91 (37%), respectively. For the subsample of 
projects with cost overruns, the average cost deviation is 36% (Table 4). For the subsample with 
projects without cost overruns, the average deviation is only slightly negative (-1.5%), which 
confirms the skewness in cost overruns. A one-sample binomial test rejects the thesis that errors 
of overestimating costs are as common as the errors of underestimating costs, which signifies 
that forecast costs are biased and systematically underestimated.  
Cost deviation statistics for different types of subsamples are presented in Table 4. The cost 
overruns of regional and local governments are substantially below the average and, hence, 
below that of the central government. While this suggests that regional and local governments 
are more efficient than the central government, we will test this explicitly in the next subsection 
wherein we control for project characteristics such as investment size, election years, etc. As the 
projects under the Parque Escolar programme are almost perfectly on target, they are an 
example of good planning and control.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Large projects have a higher cost overrun (33%) and are often projects that are concluded in 
election years (30%). Table 4 also shows the number of projects with cost overruns by 
subsample. It is interesting to note that the education sector has a substantial number of projects 
with modest cost overruns. Almost all (19 of 22) large projects have cost overruns. The same 
occurs for the central government and the years around elections.  
    
4.2 Determinants of cost deviations 
 
We estimate the determinants of cost deviations in public sector investment projects and present 
the results in Table 5. We observe in Models 1 to 5 that the dimension of the project increases 
the percentage of cost deviation. Large projects, while they are better planned, controlled, and 
monitored, are also more complex. The models also show that projects in the transport sector 
are negatively evident. Projects that are part of the Parque Escolar programme have fewer cost 




In Model 1, we observe that election years appear to have significant impact on cost deviations. 
We would have expected that projects concluded in election years would have more cost 
deviation for two reasons: (i) the average cost deviation in this subsample is higher than that in 
the total sample and (ii) there is a political tendency to open infrastructure in election years, 
which could induce pressure to speed up projects at the expense of cost control. When we focus 
on project cost overruns, we observe that the election year continues to be statistically 
significant and larger cost overruns occur. In Models 1, 4 and 5, the year prior to elections is 
negatively related to cost overruns. We also observe that the type of governing party, be it right 
or left wing, is not related to cost deviations on model 1 and 3. However, right wing 
governments appear to have some positive impact on cost overruns.  
In relation to the legal and institutional variables, we find that the new 2008 procurement law 
has not had the expected effect. Rather than reducing cost deviations, the opposite has occurred 
(the coefficient is positive and statistically significant), which suggests that the new law has 
failed to promote a better and more transparent public procurement mechanism, even when 
controlling for economic environment. In contrast, a better general legal environment as 
measured by the rule of law has a significant impact in reducing cost deviations in public 
projects. Finally, we find a strong relation between corruption and cost deviations such that cost 
deviations increase when corruption exists. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
To estimate what variables affect the probability of a project having a cost overrun, we run a 
logit model and present the results in table 5 
Consistent with the results from the previous subsection, large projects increase the likelihood 
of cost overruns. On the contrary, and related with the previous findings, projects in the 
transport sector reduce the probability of cost overruns. While projects concluded in the year 
before an election have lower cost deviations, the likelihood of cost overruns in election years is 
great, implying that governments accept cost escalations to complete the infrastructure, and 
hence, they also collect the political dividends. As before, we confirm that the new procurement 
law does not decrease the cost overruns and that positive cost deviations have actually increased 
since 2008. A higher level of corruption also increases the odds that a project will incur cost 




We have analysed the cost deviations and cost overruns in public infrastructure investment 




we consider only projects with cost overruns, the costs are 36% above budget. We find a clear 
scale effect on cost overruns as large projects, which are often more complex, have a longer 
duration, are subject to higher risk, and have a higher cost deviation and a higher probability of 
cost overruns. The public administration may not be well prepared to handle these types of 
projects. Transport projects have lower levels of cost deviations and a lower probability of cost 
overruns.  
We also show that local and regional governments control costs better than the central 
government (even after controlling for project size, time period, election years, etc.). There is no 
great evidence that right or left wing governments are better or worse at adhering to budgets. 
Still, cost overruns are more likely in election years, as politicians seem eager to conclude 
infrastructural investments and thus inaugurate a new service to harvest political goodwill with 
the population. Over time, though cost deviations are reduced, this does not seem to be the 
result of the new procurement law of 2008 but is most likely the result of other factors, such as 
more experience, better projects, or increased fiscal constraints. Less corruption reduces not 
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Table 1 – Review of the main studies on cost deviations 
















10 urban rail 
projects 
50%  86% of projects have cost overruns 
 Cost estimations are imprecise 
 Cost deviations are similar across different projects and 
locations 
Morris & 




290 projects 82%  Cost deviations between 40% and 200% 
 Reasons: delays, poor project concept, poor planning and 






7 projects on 
bridges and 
tunnels 
14%  Cost overruns between 50% and 100%  













2668 projects on 
road 
construction /  
maintenance 
4.5%  55% of projects have cost overruns 
 Factors that influence cost overruns are contract bid amount, 
difference between the winning bid and second bid, project 
type and location by district 
 
Odeck, 2004 Norway 1992-
1995 
620 projects 9%  Cost deviations between -59% to +183% 
 Cost overruns predominant in smaller projects 
Flyvbjerg et al., 
2002; Flyvbjerg, 












28%  90% of projects with cost deviations 
 Average cost deviations for rail was 45%, 34% for bridges 
and 20% for roads 
 Cost deviations do not reduce over time 
 Larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations 
 The main problem in megaproject development is pervasive 
misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved 






















9%  Cost deviations decreased after introduction of quality 
assurance measures 
 74% of projects have cost deviations 
 Project scale has no impact on cost deviations 
 
Ellis et al., 2007 US 1998-
2006 
3.130 state road 
projects 
8% to 9%  Projects by traditional procurement perform worse than 
those by alternative contract forms 
Blanc-Brude et 





24%  PPP road projects have more cost deviations than traditional 
procurement projects 
 Largest part of ex-ante construction cost difference 










 Project changes and cost underestimations are main sources 
of overruns 
 Complex projects have higher cost overruns 
 Local governments are more efficient 
 






10%  Cost estimates of smaller projects more inaccurate than 
those of larger projects 
 Cost deviations do not improve over time 
 
Lee, 2008 South Korea 1985-
2005 





 86% of projects have cost overruns 




8 projects 70%  Inflation and government interference, weather, schedule 
delays, strikes, technical challenges, and environmental 
protection cause cost escalations 
 






16%  No correlations between project size and cost overruns 
 Cost overruns are induced by changes in project 




















Molin, & van 













87 projects on 
roads and rail 
10%  Cost deviations ranged between -46.8 and +90.3% 
 Average cost deviation for road sector was 20% 
 For rail projects, Dutch projects perform well  
 
Singh, 2010 India 1992-
2009 
157 projects 16%  Contractual and institutional failures lead to cost and time 
overruns 
 Incomplete contracts are source of cost overruns 
 




56 road projects 19%  Time effect in reducing cost overruns 
 No scale effect in cost overruns 
 




102 projects on 
roads and rail 
 
11%  No time or scale effects on cost deviations 
Bent Flyvbjerg 







179%  All OG have cost overruns, larger than other types of 
megaprojects 
 Infrastructure associated with large events is most risky 






8%  Cost overruns are smaller under the Italian average bid 




















245 large dam 
projects 
96%  Costs are systematically underestimated 
 A scale effect in increasing cost overruns 
 No time effect in improving cost estimations 
  
Sovacool et al., 
2014 
57 countries n.a. 401 electrical 
infrastructure 
projects 
66%  Only 9% of projects with no cost overruns 
 Cost overruns are multi-causal 
 Electrical infrastructure seems prone to cost overruns, 





Malaysia n.a. 359 projects on 
education and 
health 
12%  45% of projects completed at or below contract sum 
 Large projects were completed at a cost overrun below 10% 
Odeck, 2014 Norway 1993-
2007 
1.045 projects  10%-20%  Public sector reform: no reduction in cost overruns 
 More competition reduces overruns 
 Separating planning and construction into two government 
departments   eliminates cost overruns; privatisation of 







Table 2 - Variables 
This table describes the independent variables used in this study. N/D means that our model does not specify an expected signal for that variable. Source: Own table. 












0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Project sector N/D 





0 – central government 
1 – regional/ 
local government 
Level of government  + 




0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Project under Parque Escolar 
program 
- 




0 – No 
1 – Yes 
If the project is considered a 
large project 
+ Large projects may to be more prone to cost deviations. 
Political variables 
Election year lag 
Dummy 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Project concluded in year 
before elections 
+ 
 Politicians tend to inaugurate public works and infrastructure projects 
before elections to obtain political benefits. 
Election year 
Dummy 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 






0 – Socialist 
1 – Liberal 
Left of right wing party in 
government at time of project 
contract 
N/D 
 Right wing parties have better business links and could be more 
realistic in forecasting costs and revenues.  




0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Before or after the introduction 
of 2008 procurement law 
- 
The new procurement law should improve public procurement and 
reduce cost deviations. 
Rule of law Discrete Index (1-100; 100 is best) - 
This index indicates the quality and strength of the legal system. A 
better legal system should reduce cost overruns 





Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used. Source: Own table 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sector variables
Education 243 0.26 0.44 0 1
Transports 243 0.26 0.44 0 1
Social facilities 243 0.30 0.46 0 1
Project variables 243
Subsector 243 0.54 0.50 0 1
Parque Escolar 243 0.13 0.34 0 1
Large project 243 0.08 0.28 0 1
Political variables 243
Election year lag 243 0.50 0.50 0 1
Electionyear 243 0.35 0.48 0 1
Right wing government 243 0.13 0.34 0 1
Institutional and legal variables 243
2008 Procurement law 243 0.71 0.45 0 1
Rule of law 243 2.21 0.32 1.5 2.5
Corruption 243 6.19 0.27 5.8 6.7
Economic variables
GDP growth 243 0.72 2.06 -3.2 3.6
Inflation 243 2.13 1.31 -0.8 4.3







Table 4 – Cost deviations by subsample type 
This table presents the size of cost deviations for various subsamples. The average in each sample is the weighted average, which considers the specific weight of each project 
in the total cost and deviations. Positive numbers in cost deviations represent a cost overrun, and negative numbers represent a cost below the forecast. n.a. stands for not 
applicable. Source: Own table. 
Average Median St Dev Min Max
Total sample 243 63% 24.0% 4.6% 41% 18.81% 29.24% -42% 278%
Cost with overruns 152 n.a 36.0% 18.7% 48% 28.39% 43.61% 1% 278%
Large projects 20 86% 32.6% 54.0% 91% -7.16% 72.30% -13% 278%
Parque Escolar 32 59% 0.4% 0.1% 2% -0.18% 0.90% -2% 7%
Central government 112 74% 25.6% 6.4% 57% 15.01% 36.13% -42% 278%
Regional and local government 131 53% 13.5% 3.4% 16% 10.77% 16.30% -7% 84%
Election year lag 122 60% 26.4% 0.7% 46% 18.27% 34.52% -42% 278%
Election year  86 53% 29.5% 0.2% 42% 20.64% 38.41% -31% 219%













Table 5 – Determinants of cost deviations 
This table presents the results of the determinants of infrastructural investments’ cost deviations. Model 1 
is based on an OLS regression, while Model 2 is an OLS with year effects (which necessitates dropping 
variables that are not time dependent). Model 3 is a generalised linear model, with left censoring as only 
projects with positive cost deviations (as cost overruns) are included. Model 4 is a Tobit model with left 
censoring (for cost overruns only). Model 5 is a Tobit model with left censoring and right censoring 
(projects with cost overruns above 100% were dropped). Model 6 is a logit model on cost overruns 
(projects with a cost exceeding the cost forecasts). Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own table. 





















Tobit with left 
censoring 
Cost overruns only 





       
Sector variables       
Education  0.08 0.07 0.11 0.19* 0.14** 0.88 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.68) 
Transports -0.12** -0.11* -0.07 -0.32*** -0.19*** -1.96*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.65) 
Social facilities 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.84 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.58) 
Project variables       
Subsector 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.59 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.57) 
Parque Escolar -0.15*** -0.13 -0.28*** -0.31** -0.28*** -1.27 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.78) 
Large project 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.52*** 0.77*** 0.52*** 3.16*** 
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.81) 
Political variables       
Election year lag -0.33***  -0.23 -0.49*** -0.35*** -4.73*** 
 (0.12)  (0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (1.66) 
Election year 0.30***  0.41*** 0.16 0.10 4.22* 
 (0.11)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (2.16) 
Right wing government 0.16  0.18 0.55*** 0.44*** 4.40* 
 (0.12)  (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (2.30) 
Legal and institutional 
variables 
      
2008 procurement law 0.43***  0.33 0.63*** 0.44*** 4.83*** 
 (0.13)  (0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (1.25) 
Rule of law -1.14***  -1.24*** -0.99*** -0.59** 0.22 
 (0.30)  (0.43) (0.34) (0.23) (2.62) 
Corruption 2.07***  1.93*** 2.81*** 2.17*** 14.81*** 
 (0.40)  (0.49) (0.42) (0.29) (4.56) 
Economic variables       
GDP growth 0.04  0.06 0.06* 0.04* -0.04 
 (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.38) 
Inflation -0.01  0.01 -0.13*** -0.11*** -1.24*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.32) 
Deficit -0.06***  -0.05** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.32 
 (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.30) 
Constant -10.82***  -9.69*** -15.76*** -12.50*** -90.38*** 
 (2.29)  (2.68) (2.69) (1.87) (27.95) 
       
Year effects No Yes No No No No 
Observations 243 243 152 152 140 243 





Figure 1 – Histogram of cost deviation 
This figure presents the histogram of the cost deviation for all 243sample projects. The cost deviation of 
each project is on the x-axis is. The percentage of projects with cost deviations by interval is on the y-
axis. Source: Authors’ data. 
 
 
Figure 2 –Cost deviation by year 
This figure represents the scatter plot between the cost deviations and the year of the project’s conclusion. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
 
